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Abstract

The Contribution of Isocrates to Western Educational Thought.

W. L. Innerd

The main theme of the thesis is that Isocrates, although somewhat neglected, is one of the most important figures in the early history of Western Education. He is, in particular, largely responsible for the fact that it has been predominately literary. His role in the conversion of rhetoric from an oral to a written art is discussed, as is his place in the new rhetorical and philosophical culture and his role in the transmission of that culture to subsequent generations. The influence on Isocrates of such exponents of the new culture as Euripides, Socrates and Gorgias is stressed. An analysis is made of sophistry and philosophy in Fourth Century Athens and attempt is made to place Isocrates within this intellectual milieu. His own philosophy is discussed, especially the ideas expressed by the words logos and doxa. The relationship between them is described and is shown to be relevant to Isocrates' concept of practical education. The place of logos at the centre of his curriculum is emphasised together with the introduction of History as a specific subject. His teaching methods are analysed and special

Abstract 2.

attention is paid to the three stages of instruction, the small size of his classes and the subsequent interaction between his pupils and himself. An attempt is made to estimate the success of his school and his ideas by a survey of his known pupils. Timotheus and Lycurgus, two of his pupils, are suggested as models for the Renaissance Man. Finally an examination is made of the manner in which Isocrates' ideas were accepted and absorbed into Western Educational Thought by way of Cicero, Quintilian and such later figures as Erasmus and Sir Thomas Elyot.

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THE CONTRIBUTION OF ISOCRATES
TO WESTERN EDUCATIONAL THOUGHT

W. L. INNERD

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Education.
Durham University, October, 1969

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Works of Isocrates. Orations.

<u>To Demonicus</u>	<u>To Dem.</u>
<u>To Nicocles</u>	<u>To Nic.</u>
<u>Nicocles</u>	<u>Nic.</u>
<u>Panegyricus</u>	<u>Paneg.</u>
<u>To Philip</u>	<u>To Phil.</u>
<u>Archidamus</u>	<u>Arch.</u>
<u>Areopagiticus</u>	<u>Areop.</u>
<u>On the Peace</u>	<u>Peace.</u>
<u>Evagoras</u>	<u>Evag.</u>
<u>Helen</u>	<u>Helen.</u>
<u>Busiris</u>	<u>Bus.</u>
<u>Panathenaicus</u>	<u>Panath.</u>
<u>Against the Sophists</u>	<u>Soph.</u>
<u>Plataicus</u>	<u>Plat.</u>
<u>Antidosis</u>	<u>Antid.</u>
<u>The Team of Horses</u>	<u>De Big.</u>
<u>Trapezeticus</u>	<u>Trap.</u>
<u>Against Callimachus</u>	<u>Call.</u>
<u>Aegineticus</u>	<u>Aegin.</u>
<u>Against Lochites</u>	<u>Loch.</u>
<u>Against Euthymus</u>	<u>Euth.</u>

Letters.

<u>To Dionysius</u>	<u>To Dion.</u>
<u>To Philip I</u>	<u>To Phil. I.</u>
<u>To Philip II</u>	<u>To Phil. II.</u>
<u>To Antipater</u>	<u>To Ant.</u>
<u>To Alexander</u>	<u>To Alex.</u>
<u>To the Children of Jason</u>	<u>Jason.</u>
<u>To Timotheus</u>	<u>To Tim.</u>
<u>To the Rulers of the Mytilenaeans</u>	<u>Mytilene.</u>
<u>To Archidamus</u>	<u>To Arch.</u>

Works by other Authors.

Aristotle. <u>Rhetoric.</u>	<u>Rhet.</u>
Plato. <u>Republic</u>	<u>Rep.</u>
Cicero. <u>De Oratore</u>	<u>De Or.</u>
Quintilian. <u>Institutio Oratoria</u>	<u>Inst. Or.</u>

Other.

American Journal of Philology	..	AJPh.
American Philological Association		
Transactions	TAPA.
Journal of Hellenic Studies	..	JHS.

I shall try as best I can to explain what is the nature of this education, what is its power, what of the other arts it is akin to, what benefit it is to its devotees, and what claims I can make for it.

Isocrates. Antidosis 178.

I INTRODUCTION

The attitudes of modern scholars towards Isocrates have varied a great deal.¹ He has had his supporters, notably Werner Jaeger,² and his detractors, among others Professor Baynes.³ He has, at one time or another, been attacked as treacherous, dull and even unintelligent and, as often as not, by those wishing to defend him.⁴ One element common to all those who find his life or work, or both, unsatisfactory, is at least a hint of intellectual snobbery. Isocrates, it seems, is just not clever enough to match up to the standards of modern literati.⁵ Without the enthusiastic championship of Jaeger and the reluctant but nevertheless certain support of Marrou,⁶ it is likely that the ex-logographer and long-serving headmaster would no longer remain within the canon of major and acceptable classical authors.

¹S. Perlman, "Isocrates' Philippus - A Reinterpretation", Historia, VI (July 1957), 306-307, fn 3.

²Werner Jaeger, Paideia: the Ideals of Greek Culture, trans. Gilbert Highet (Oxford, 1945), III, 46-155.

³Norman Baynes, Byzantine Studies (London, 1955), pp. 144-167.

⁴e.g. H. I. Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity, trans. G. Lamb (London, 1956), p. 79 and Jacqueline de Romilly, "Euonia in Isocrates or the Political Importance of Creating Good Will," JHS, LXXVIII (1952), 92-101.

⁵e.g. The condescending tone in G. Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton, 1963), and in F. A. G. Beck, Greek Education, 450-350, B.C. (London, 1964).

⁶Marrou, p. 79 and p. 91.

If we take it for granted, however, that Isocrates has not got the intellectual stature of either Plato or Aristotle, and concentrate instead on the content of his work and in particular on what he had to say concerning education, we may find that his contribution to, and by inference, his influence on Western culture is not to be ignored. It is then clear that it is irrelevant (as to) whether or not he was a traitor, a dullard or a genius, and we might be forgiven for suspecting that because Plato and Aristotle are intellectually so much more satisfying, their contributions, especially to educational thought, have been magnified, to the detriment of that of Isocrates.

Consider alone the fact that before Isocrates opened his school, oratory was concerned with the extempore speech and the spoken word, whereas when he died oratory was concerned with the set speech and the written word.¹ Isocrates is largely to be credited with this radical change in emphasis and clearly its impact on Western education is very great indeed. Just as great is its impact on literature. Cicero has long been acknowledged as the 'father' of Western literature, but it is only comparatively recently that it has been recognised that Cicero owes a great deal to Isocrates. As Hubbell² pointed

¹Marrou, p. 80. See also La Rue Van Hook, "Alcidamus versus Isocrates; the Spoken versus the Written Word," The Classical Weekly, XII, No. 12 (1919), 89-94.

²H. M. Hubbell, The Influence of Isocrates on Cicero, Dionysius and Aristides (New Haven, 1914).

out, the debt which Cicero freely acknowledged, is as much one of content as of style, and this is a fact of great and lasting significance in any assessment of Isocrates' contribution to educational thought.

As this thesis is an attempt to make such an assessment, it is as well to recognize that any judgement concerning such a controversial figure as Isocrates must be influenced by one's view of him, for, against or neutral. Therefore, let it be understood that while striving at all times to maintain a scholarly objectivity, my sympathies lie with Isocrates.

Other limitations of this study may be only too obvious, but at this point it is also worth noting two delimitations.

First, this is not meant to be an exhaustive study of Isocrates. For example, although his political views are of great interest, and are an integral part of his educational theories, no attempt will be made to trace the course of his political activity nor to analyze, except coincidentally, the success or failure of his propagandizing. Again, important as his contribution to the technicalities of rhetoric may be, especially in the development of the period, it is not the intention to examine them in any detail.

Second, the emphasis will be on defining and describing the nature of Isocrates' educational thought and on

determining the principal routes by which his thought has come down to us. It will not be the purpose of the study to conduct a detailed examination of Isocrates' influence on later thinkers, except in so far as they can be shown to have played a major role in the direct transmission of his ideas. The main reason for this is that much of his thought is embedded in generally accepted theories of education and cannot be readily attached to him. It will be shown that Isocrates is the instigator of a recurrent aspect of Western education, and because it is recurrent, his contribution is often either ignored or credited to someone else. A secondary reason for this delimitation of the study, is the series of problems involved in precisely attributing influence. For example, unless an author specifically cites or acknowledges another thinker, it is, I believe, better to speak of parallel developments rather than of influences.

Occasionally these delimitations may be ignored, if, for instance, it becomes necessary to discuss certain of his political associates, or if passing reference should be made to someone, such as Milton, whose connection to Isocrates is tenuous. This will occur, however, only in attempts to delineate more precisely some aspect or aspects of his educational thought.

The plan of this thesis is as follows. The rest of this chapter will be concerned with his life, his character and his works. It will also include brief discussions of influences and controversial matters of fact.

Chapter 2 will be concerned with the terms Sophist and Philosopher and how they relate to Isocrates and in particular how he used the terms. Chapter 3 will be a continuation of this discussion and will be concerned especially with the terms Logos and Doxa, within the context of his philosophy. Certain aspects of Plato's epistemology will be considered in order to clarify the meanings that Isocrates gives to certain words, in particular Doxa.

Chapters 4 and 5 will deal with, respectively, the curriculum and the teaching methods advocated and used by Isocrates in his school. Chapter 6 will concern his pupils and special attention will be given to Timotheus as the personification of the ideal Isocratean pupil and man and as, perhaps, the forerunner of the Renaissance Man.

Chapter 7 will consider the influence that Isocrates had on Cicero's and Quintilian's views on education and will also be concerned with the rediscovery of Isocrates at the time of the Renaissance. It will conclude with an over-all assessment of the contribution that Isocrates made to Western educational thought.

Isocrates was born in 436 B.C. and died in 338. These are salient facts for two reasons, one historical and the other more personal to Isocrates.

First, his life spanned a critical and highly interesting period in Western political and intellectual history. Isocrates was young enough to have lived in the last years of the Age of Pericles and old enough to have written a letter to the youthful Alexander the Great. When he was five years old, the Peloponnesian War began. Just before he died, the Macedonians under Philip won the great and decisive battle at Chaeronea which marked the end of intra-Greek hostilities, and of the city-states as viable political entities. His life was thus spent in a climate of almost continual war.

His contemporaries included an unsurpassed list of great and talented men, politicians, orators, historians, dramatists, sophists and philosophers. In particular, there was Plato, who was born ^{nine} ~~seven~~ years after Isocrates and who died nine years before him.

Thus Isocrates, on the one hand, bridged the gap between the city-state and the Hellenistic Empire and, on the other, saw the flowering and the high point of Greek and specifically Athenian culture. It is significant for this

thesis that, in the midst of this incredible display of talent, Isocrates was able to hold his own and was accorded a high place by the Ancients. He must at any rate be acknowledged as one of the most important sources we have concerning the nature of education in Fourth Century Athens.

Second, a ninety-eight year life span enabled Isocrates, who took infinite pains over his writings, to add a good deal to his literary output. For example, if he had died at a mere eighty years of age, we would have been denied most of his major works, On the Peace, the Areopagiticus, the Antidosis, To Philip, and the Panathenaicus. While it is true that Isocrates started writing comparatively late in life, it is equally true that he finished writing very late indeed. The Panathenaicus was completed when he was ninety-seven and the second Letter to Philip when he was a year older and almost on his death bed. Whatever else may be said about Isocrates, his accomplishments as a very old man are a cause for wonder and amazement and, perhaps, for a tribute to the climate and way of life of ancient Attica.

The details of his life are open to some disagreement. As Norlin¹ pointed out, the biographical tradition must be treated with some caution. Nevertheless certain events are

¹George Norlin, "General Introduction," Isocrates, Loeb Classical Library (London, 1966), I, xi ff.

clear. Diogenes Laertius tells us that "Isocrates was born in the archonship of Lysimachus."¹ Lysimachus was archon from 436 to 435 B.C. Isocrates confirms this approximate date by remarks he makes in both the Antidosis² and the Panathenaicus³ concerning his great age when engaged in their composition. Norlin gives the date as 436⁴ and Mathieu places it in the middle of that year.⁵ He was born in the deme of Erchia.⁶ His father was Theodorus, a slave-owning flute manufacturer, a fact which the comedians did not let Isocrates easily forget. His mother was named Heduto and he is supposed to have had three brothers and a sister.⁷ Theodorus was rich enough to have been choregus⁸ and also to have provided Isocrates with the best education money could buy.⁹

¹Diogenes Laertius, "Life of Plato," Lives of Eminent Philosophers, trans. R. D. Hicks, Loeb Classical Library (London, 1925), I, 3.

²Antid., 9.

³Panath., 3, 268-270.

⁴"General Introduction", p. xi.

⁵Georges Mathieu, "Introduction," Isocrate: Discours, trans. into French, Mathieu and Emile Bremond (Paris, 1963), I, i.

⁶Ibid.

⁷R. C. Jebb, The Attic Orators (New York, 1962), II, 2-3.

⁸Ibid. 3.

⁹Antid., 161-162.

Expensive, and therefore extensive, as Isocrates claims his education to have been, it seems reasonable to suppose that most, if not all, of the teachers that the biographical tradition associates with him, were indeed his mentors, to greater or lesser degrees. They include Prodicos of Chios, Gorgias of Leontini, Tisias of Syracuse, the Athenian orator Theramenes, Protagoras and Socrates,¹ in other words almost all the notable Sophists of the day. This is as one would expect. In close on thirty years of schooling, Isocrates had both the time and the money to hear them all.

This is of great importance in any consideration of Isocrates as an educator. He knew a very great deal about the conduct of education in his time. Thus, when he took ideas or practices from other men and changed them into something peculiarly Isocratean, he must have done so with a great deal of knowledge and understanding. Further, when he criticized either the Sophists or the Socratics, he did so from an informed and very experienced standpoint.

As regards influences, stylistically all the Rhetoricians among those mentioned above can be shown to have had an effect on him. Intellectually, Isocrates was very

¹(Plutarque), "Vies des Dix Orateurs," and Anonymous, "Vie d'Isocrate," "Isocrate: Discours, pp. xxvi and xxxiii. Norlin, "General Introduction," p. xii.

much a part of the new Sophistic culture, which will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. It has been shown that Euripides, the great dramatist, was one of the foremost exponents of the new culture and that there are many parallels to be drawn between his thought and that of Isocrates.¹ It is difficult, of course, to determine precisely what influence Euripides' plays had on Isocrates. Presumably, at least some of the common elements in their work came from common sources within the new culture itself.

Besides Euripides and the new culture in general,² the two greatest influences on his thought were undoubtedly Gorgias and Socrates. Gorgias was also the tutor of Theramenes and it was probably through the latter that Isocrates was introduced to his work.³ However, Gorgias was a visitor to Athens on diplomatic business in 427 B.C., and later he spent some time giving very popular lectures there.⁴ That was after a short return visit to Leontini and before he retired to Thessaly where he remained until he died at, it is

¹A. Douglas-Thomson, Euripides and the Attic Orators (London 1898).

²See below Chapter II.

³Jebb, p. 5.

⁴Norlin, "General Introduction," p. xli.

said, the ripe old age of 105.¹ Therefore, it seems quite possible that Isocrates, while still a youth, heard Gorgias speak in the Palaestra, which might have induced him later to study his thought, by means of his writings.

Cicero² remarked that Isocrates had studied with Gorgias in Thessaly. This has led various commentators to speculate as to the date of this visit and their guesses have ranged widely from 414 B.C. to 386. Mathieu³ and after him Marrou⁴ suggested an extended period of from ten to twelve years, between 415 and 403, spent in Thessaly to escape the tyranny of Athens. This seems to be without any real foundation. Furthermore, in Letter VI, To the Children of Jason, Isocrates declared,

All who heard of my proposed residence would justly despise me if, having chosen to pass my former life in tranquillity, I should undertake in my old age to spend my life abroad when it would be reasonable for me, even if I had been accustomed to live somewhere else, now to hasten home, since⁵ the end of my life is now so near at hand.

This seems to preclude any extended stay abroad, although not perhaps a short visit. Certainly however, Isocrates was

¹Jebb, p. 94.

²Orator, trans. H. M. Hubbell, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass., 1949), LII, 176.

³Isocrate: Discours, p. ii, fn. 1.

⁴Marrou, p. 82.

⁵To the Children of Jason, 2.

familiar, one way or another, with Gorgias' thought.¹ He took two ideas from Gorgias and made them central to his own thought. The first was that oratory should be as artistic and pleasurable as poetry. It was this belief, developed and expanded by Isocrates, that Cicero in turn made his own and from which the tradition of Western literature has descended. The second was that oratory should deal principally with broad Pan-Hellenic themes. This notion, as we shall see, is basic to the entire Isocratean theory and practice of education. Clearly his debt to Gorgias was considerable.²

Even greater in all probability, was his debt to Socrates. It is possible to argue, indeed, that he saw himself as the true heir to Socrates' thought. Certainly a close examination of the text of the Antidosis reveals a great number of parallels between it and the Apologia of Plato, which indicates that Isocrates wished comparisons to be made between himself and Socrates.³ Further, as Norlin points out,⁴ there are many points of similarity in the thought of the two men, which indicate the great influence of Socrates.

¹H. Ll. Hudson-Williams, "A Greek Humanist, "Greece and Rome, IX, No. 27 (1940), 168.

²Norlin, "General Introduction," p. xlii.

³Ibid. p. xvii, fn. c. See also Appendix C.

⁴Ibid. pp. xvii-xviii.

There is also the much quoted passage toward the end of the Phaedrus,¹ where Plato makes Socrates speak very warmly indeed of the young Isocrates and his abilities. It seems unlikely that Plato would have invented such a relationship while one of the principal characters was both alive and a professional rival, even if the intention was to flatter Isocrates, as a way perhaps of extending an olive branch. Nor does it seem feasible to explain it away as an example of Socratic irony. Such a reading does an injustice to the text. It appears that some authorities have been so anxious to deny a relationship of master and pupil, because it would intermingle the first rate and, in their view, the second rate, that they have been willing to deny the evidence plainly before them.

It is not my intention to prove that Isocrates was a disciple of Socrates. However, it seems hardly possible that Isocrates would not have encountered Socrates in a city the size of Fourth Century Athens. Indeed, he would have had to make a conscious effort to avoid him if he had wished to do so. But, as Socrates had no formal school, it is almost impossible to say precisely who did or did not listen to him. Nor incidentally should we take the Platonic Dialogues as the last word in this matter.

¹Plato, Phaedrus, 278-279, in The Dialogues, trans. B. Jowett (London, 1871), III.

It seems curious therefore that Gomperz and after him both Marrou and Jaeger,¹ should argue that Isocrates knew Socrates only through books, that is to say the Platonic Dialogues. This seems to ignore the realities of Fourth Century Athens and the intensity with which Isocrates felt his proximity in spirit to Socrates. Certainly Isocrates knew Plato's work very well indeed, as we know from the Antidosis. But this does not explain why Isocrates should want to identify himself so closely with Socrates, or why Plato should also portray them as very close to each other.²

Norlin has compiled a comprehensive list of characteristics which indicate the extent of the influence of Socrates upon Isocrates.³ For our purposes the most significant are his contempt for the sham pretensions of certain of the Sophists, his logical clearness and his insistence on the proper definition of objectives and terms, his prejudice against the speculations of philosophy on the origins of things, his emphasis upon ethics and his insistence on morality, his feeling that ideas are of value only as they can be translated

¹Marrou, p. 82. and Jaeger, p. 301, fn. 8.

²We can only speculate as to why Isocrates is consigned, on precious little evidence, to Thessaly for several years, and yet an almost self-evident personal relationship between Socrates and himself is denied. It may be that 12 years in Thessaly is essential, if we are to deny that they ever met.

³Norlin, "General Introduction," pp. xvii-xviii.

into action and, most importantly, his belief that education should be practical and aim at right conduct in private and public life.

Clearly there are echoes of Socrates in all his writings, perhaps not the Socrates of Plato but if not, perhaps then, the Socrates of Xenophon. It is important, therefore, to keep in mind this influence, not least because of the light it throws on Isocrates' thought processes.

Until his early thirties then, Isocrates enjoyed the life of a well-to-do and earnest student, studying first with one Sophist and then with another, completing the education begun, we may assume, in the usual fashion with the study of Homer. However, during the Peloponnesian War he lost his patrimony, already shrunken by the cost of state functions levied on his father and the educational expenses he had incurred himself.¹ It became necessary for him to repair his fortunes and so it was that he went to work for the first time, as a logographer.

There is a certain amount of doubt about this fact, largely because of his own denial of it. He implies that when it became necessary for him to work, he began straight away to attach pupils to himself,² further implying that that was

¹Antid., 161-162.

²Ibid.

all he did. However, the fact that we have six of his forensic orations indicates that he certainly was a logographer at one time or another. Further, Aristotle declared that volumes and volumes of his legal speeches lay gathering dust in the bookshops.¹ Isocrates consistently disavowed his work as a logographer probably because the trade, akin to the modern barrister, had none too good a reputation. In the Antidosis he declared; "I shall never be found to have had anything to do with speeches for the courts."² And later; "I have nothing to do with litigation."³

Yet it is clear that Isocrates did write forensic speeches, on the incontestable grounds that they still exist. Further it is clear that they were meant for the courts and were not merely exercises written for his pupils, although they may very well have served that function also, well-written as they undoubtedly are. The actions, for which they were written, are known to have existed because of evidence from other sources. For instance the affair of the Team of Horses, (De Bigis) is mentioned in Plutarch's Life of Alcibiades⁴ and

¹Jaeger, p. 55.

²Antid., 36.

³Ibid. 40.

⁴La Rue Van Hook, "Introduction to the Team of Horses," Isocrates, Loeb Classical Library (London, 1961) III, 174.

Diogenes Laertius cites a reply by Antisthenes to the speech by Isocrates called Against Euthymus.¹ There are also various internal points of evidence which indicate the same conclusion but these need not detain us here.

It is generally agreed that Isocrates wished to divorce himself completely from this period of activity, as it was harmful to his dignity. Also, it has been suggested that the anti-intellectualism of the ten years up to 390 forced him against his will into logography.² This does not ring very true, because there was at least as much opposition to logography as there was to intellectual activity.

Two points may be made. First, Isocrates, like Socrates and like Plato, was very aware of the dangers of forensic oratory. Further the use of oratory or rhetoric in this fashion went against his major principle that oratory should be used in the main to express lofty and preferably Pan-Hellenic themes. Clearly, therefore, Isocrates must have deeply regretted his own participation in logography, even under the duress of poverty. He denied it, I would suggest, not only because it harmed his personal dignity, but because it also harmed the dignity of his concept of culture and education.

¹La Rue van Hook, "Introduction to Against Euthymus," Isocrates, III, 351.

²Kennedy, pp. 182-184.

Second, although the statement, "I shall never be found to have had anything to do with speeches for the courts,"¹ is a blatant lie, it was necessary in order to support a half-truth which acted in his favour. He wished to give the impression that, from the time he found it necessary to earn a living, he began to "attach pupils to himself".² He neglected to say that these pupils, if they existed, were pupils in the art of logography. This was in fact the normal practice among logographers.³ However, these pupils would be neither numerous enough, nor profitable enough, for Isocrates to have abandoned the sale of his speeches. Thus, he could quite truthfully declare that he had taken pupils from the start, which fact could then be used to help cover up the embarrassing fact that he was both a teacher of logography and a logographer.

In any event, the fact that he wrote forensic speeches is of great help to us in determining the date of the opening of his school. For the last of the speeches, the Aegineticus, can be dated to the period between 393 and 390 B.C.⁴ This indicates that Isocrates had abandoned the profession in favour of something more congenial to him. It also is an indication

¹Antid., 36.

²Antid., 161-162.

³Jaeger, pp. 65-66.

⁴La Rue Van Hook, "Introduction to the Aegineticus," Isocrates, III, 299.

that he no longer needed the income from forensic speeches, which means either that he made a great deal of money from them and was, therefore, very able in that profession, or that he was confident of the success of his new venture, namely his school.

Further corroboration of the approximate date of the opening of the school comes from his tract Against the Sophists, which Isocrates tells us in the Antidosis¹ he wrote at the outset of his career. The tract can be dated to 391 or 390 B.C.² We can quite confidently, therefore, assign the opening of the school to this period and probably to either 392 or 391.

The Pseudo-Plutarch, in the Lives of the Ten Orators, speaks of a previous school set up by Isocrates on Chios.³ Freeman⁴ and Jebb⁵ accept this, but both Mathieu⁶ and Jaeger⁷ have cast grave doubts upon its existence. The same arguments that can be expressed concerning Isocrates' stay in Thessaly can also be used in this instance. Further, the statement is

¹Antid., 193.

²Jebb, 127, fn. 2.

³Isocrate: Discours, p. xxviii.

⁴K. J. Freeman, Schools of Hellas (London, 1912), p. 181.

⁵Jebb, p. 6.

⁶Isocrate: Discours, p. ii.

⁷Jaeger, pp. 35 and 302, fn. 32.

expressed very loosely. "Having failed in his project to sway Greece by broadsheets⁷ he abandoned it and became a headmaster first of all, some say, on Chios, with nine students."¹ First the order of events, as we understand it, is incorrect. Second, the hearsay nature of the evidence is indicated by the use of the phrase "some say". Third, the nine pupils are clearly derived from a passage in the Antidosis, where Isocrates speaks of eight students, who were "among the first to begin studying with me",² to whom may have been added Timotheus, son of Conon, his most famous pupil.

Another point is that the Greek is somewhat strange, epi Chiou instead of en Chioi. epi with the genitive means 'on', in the sense of 'in the time of'. It is often used to locate events in time by using it in reference to a particular archonship. Hence, epi Chiou could be expected to mean in the archonate of Chion, or some such name. However, there is no archon of the period whose name could be plausibly corrupted into such a form, so the puzzle remains.³

¹My translation. Isocrate: Discours, p. xxviii.

²Antid., 93-94.

³Marrou, p. 377, fn. 8.

Of course there are plenty of reasons why Isocrates might have gone to Chios, just as there are plenty of reasons why he might have gone to Thessaly, most of them to do with the uncertain political climate of the times. It may well be that there is an underlying element of truth in the story of a previous school, reflecting perhaps the teaching he probably did during his career as a logographer. In any event, there is logic in the notion that Isocrates did some teaching before he started out as a full fledged headmaster. The chronology of the careers of certain of his pupils, Eunomos, Philomelos and Androtion, for example, also hint that Isocrates did teach before he opened his school. However, in the absence of conclusive evidence the school on Chios must be rejected, which leaves us with the fact that by 390, at the latest, Isocrates had established a school close by the Lyceum in Athens.

From this point on, the events of Isocrates' life offer few problems which need concern us. Both the Antidosis and the Panathenaicus have much autobiographical material in them,¹ which allow us to chart his life with some confidence.

He continued to teach and write right up to the time of his death as we noted previously, although his illness in his mid-nineties forced him to cut down on his very heavy work

¹e.g. Antid., 4, 7, 86-87, 145. Panath., 7-8.

load.¹ Although his weak voice and his diffidence, to which he often alludes,² prevented him from appearing in active public and political life, the latter half of his life is taken up with the painstaking composition of political and polemical orations and with letters and advice to many of the leading politicians and statesmen of the day, including Philip of Macedon. These writings were eminently political and practical and cannot be construed as exercises written only for the benefit of his pupils.³ However, it would be a mistake to think that his school was merely a political training camp for one particular party. It may well have been that, but it was much more, for culture, not politics, remained the focus of Isocrates' educational thought, even if it is difficult sometimes to disentangle the one from the other.

He was politically conservative, yet capable of suggesting, and indeed urging, radical departures from accepted policies and procedures. He was a supporter of Eubulus and indeed may have written for and on behalf of his party,⁴ a fact not liable to endear him to Nineteenth Century Liberals. Nor was the fact that he was on the opposite side of the political fence to Demosthenes. Yet it has been

¹Norlin, "General Introduction," p. ix.

²e.g. Philip, 81-82, Panath., 10.

³Perlman, p. 317.

⁴Jaeger, p. 127.

argued that Isocrates was a realist and right, whereas Demosthenes was noble but wrong.¹ It is also wrong to see him as a traitor to Athens, a notion we will return to below.

He was closely associated with the policies of Timotheus and stood by him after his downfall.² He may even have acted in the capacity of secretary to his former pupil and was certainly an advisor. It cannot be stressed too often that he was deeply involved in politics and this is important in considering his educational thought.

He married late in life, according to the Pseudo-Plutarch. His bride was Plathene, the widow of the orator Hippias, and Isocrates adopted her son Aphareus,³ who was later to loyally deny that Isocrates had ever written logography.⁴ Both the Pseudo-Plutarch⁵ and the author of the anonymous Life⁶ refer to Isocrates' relationship to the courtesan Lagiska and also to the comedians, who twitted him about her.⁷ It is clear that this affair, which did in all

¹Jaeger, p. 127.

²Antid., 101-139.

³Isocrate: Discours, p. xxxi.

⁴Jebb, p. 8.

⁵Isocrate: Discours, p. xxxi.

⁶Ibid. xxxiv.

⁷Ibid. xxxv.

probability occur, was no handicap to the continued existence of his school nor to the high moral tone of his writing.

He died in 338 B.C. soon after the battle of Chaeronea. The old myth¹ that he committed suicide on hearing the news, by starving himself to death, is most likely just that, Milton's Tenth Sonnet notwithstanding. His illness, which may have been chronic dysentery, and his advanced age are quite sufficient to account for his demise. In any event, the second letter to Philip, Epistle III, appears to have been written after the battle and its tone does not reflect deep despair.² The myth in all probability arose because he died on the day of the Funeral for the Chaeronean Dead.

iii

The character of Isocrates has long been a target for criticism, especially in view of his position as regards the Macedonians. He has often been compared unfavourably to Demosthenes; Isocrates usually playing the part of coward, traitor and even quisling, to Demosthenes' hero, patriot and partisan. However, there were many factors, economic and demographic, as well as political, which indicated that by the middle of the Fourth Century, the end of the city-state was at

¹Norlin, "General Introduction," p. xliii.

²To Philip, 2.

hand. Isocrates should be given credit for reading the situation correctly and acting upon his assessment.

Nor is it fair to question Isocrates' motives for the advice he offered to Philip, advice which, it may be noted, was accepted, at least in part, not only by the King of the Macedons, but also by the majority of the Greek states at the Congress of Corinth in 337.¹ The advice was inspired by his deeply held belief in Pan-Hellenism. This, it must be noted, in no way negated his love for Athens. He believed that it was Paideia and not blood alone which distinguished the Greeks from the Barbarians² and Paideia, in his view, was essentially Athenian and was their contribution to the world. Indeed Isocrates can be acquitted of the charge of racism, even though he said some fearsome things about the Barbarians, because he was willing in the last analysis to count any cultured man a Hellene.³ Part of his Hellenism and part therefore of his theory of culture and education, was his belief that the benefits of culture should be available to all, even the despised Barbarian. This is at once a surprisingly modern attitude and also an aid to understanding his attitude to non-Athenians and non-Hellenes.

¹ Norlin, "General Introduction," pp. xlv-xlvi.

² Paneg., 50.

³ Ibid. 47-50.

Isocrates was often motivated by compassion. This is easily understood when we recall that his life was passed in a period of war, with all that that meant in terms of famine, blood, dispossession, mercenaries and the like. Thus, any settlement that could possibly bring about the end of the strife was liable to appeal to him; in turn this always made him vulnerable to the jibes of the super-patriots.¹

There are several stories concerning his personal courage. He is alleged to have stood by his teacher Theramenes when the latter was tried and condemned by the Thirty and only to have left the condemned man on his express command.² He is also said to have gone into mourning on the death of Socrates, a brave and loyal act if it in fact occurred.³ There has always been a tendency to play these stories down, because they do not fit in with the usual image of Isocrates, and in truth they are part of the biographical tradition which must be taken with a pinch, if not a pillar, of salt. The story concerning Socrates has a ring of truth about it, however. It has been denied on the grounds that his reference to Socrates in the Busiris⁴ is colourless and this is taken to show that they were not close. This seems to be a bit of dubious

¹ e.g. Demosthenes.

² Isocrate: Discours, p. xxvii.

³ Ibid. p. xxxi.

⁴ Busiris, 4.

reasoning and, as Norlin has shown,¹ his reference to Gorgias in the Antidosis is equally bland. At any event it seems certain that he was in Athens when Socrates died and the same could not be said for all the old man's former pupils.

There is no doubt, however, that Isocrates is bombastic and boastful and these characteristics tend to grate on the modern reader, especially as he is often long-winded and too 'flowery' for the modern taste. But we must remember that amongst other things, Isocrates virtually invented autobiography² and a certain latitude must be allowed him on the grounds that he was first in the field. Again, the Greeks were not as prone as we are to condemn self-praise. Aristotle indeed commended and recommended the use Isocrates made of it.

Assertions, if made about yourself
may excite dislike, appear tedious
or expose you to the risk of contra-
diction. . . . Put such remarks,
therefore into the mouth of some
third person. This is what Isocrates
does. . . .³

Further as regards these charges it is worth remembering the age at which his major works were written, an age

¹Norlin, "General Introduction," p. xvii.

²George Misch, A History of Autobiography in Antiquity, trans. E. W. Dickes (Cambridge, Mass., 1951), 154-175.

³Rhetorica, 1418b 24-26. The reference is to Antid. 141-149.

at which most men are maundering, never mind producing works of great clarity and moment, if somewhat filled with self-importance. Certainly the Panathenaicus, his last and in many ways his weakest work, which contains much that must be classed as immodest, can be justified on the grounds that a part, and a necessary part, of the praise of Athens, had to be praise of self. He was after all one of her most renowned sons and to diminish his contribution to Paideia was to reduce hers.

One thing that must be said in his favour is the high esteem in which he held his pupils and which we may safely say they reciprocated. It is as much a relationship of mutual affection as of respect if we are to believe what he tells us himself,

Although I have had so many pupils, and they have studied with me in some cases three and in some cases four years, yet not one will be found to have uttered a word of complaint about his sojourn with me; on the contrary, when at the last the time would come for them to sail away to their parents or their friends at home, so happy did they feel in their life with me that they would always take their leave with regret and tears.¹

With so many ex-pupils still living when he wrote that, it hardly seems a statement he could have made if it were not largely true.

¹Antid., 87-88

He took a great pride in the performance of his pupils in after life, thus setting a fashion for headmasters ever since. He took great pleasure in those who succeeded in leading "untroubled lives"¹ or who were "distinguished for the character of their lives and deeds," more so, he claimed, than in those who were able speakers.² A story in the Lives of the Ten Orators, if true, bears witness to the feelings of one of his pupils. Timotheus is said to have erected a statue to him at Eleusis, in testimony to his affection for him and his respect for his wisdom.³

He was boring, fascinating, diligent, pompous, altruistic, egocentric, successful, disappointed, realistic and disillusioned. The verdict of the Hellenic and Roman worlds was that by and large he was a great man and great men deserve to have their faults overlooked, whilst greater attention is paid to their achievements. His achievements cannot be ignored. As Marrou said; "On the whole it was Isocrates, not Plato, who educated Fourth Century Greece and subsequently the Hellenistic and Roman worlds."⁴

¹Antid., 39.

²Panath., 87.

³N.B. However, Timotheus predeceased Isocrates.

⁴Marrou, p. 79.

As regards his works, Against the Sophists and the Antidosis contain the bulk of his educational thought. However, his philosophy may be encountered in any of the orations and most of the letters, therefore we will not confine ourselves to those two works.

Details regarding the works and their dates may be found in Jebb¹ or in the introductions to the Loeb Classical Library editions of his works.²

The modern corpus consists of twenty-one orations and nine letters, which quite remarkably coincides with the Ninth Century corpus described by Photius in the Library,³ at least numerically. As Norlin said, the fact that his works were preserved with such care indicates the high reputation he must have had among the ancients.⁴ The Pseudo-Plutarch⁵ ascribed sixty works to him, but this is very unlikely. The author of the anonymous Life is more cautious for he only mentions 'many works' and also provides a long list of

¹Jebb's classification in general is followed.

²By either Norlin or Van Hook.

³Photius, The Library, trans. J. H. Freese, (New York, 1920)
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⁴Norlin "General Introduction," p. xxx.

⁵Isocrate: Discours, p. xxx.

apocryphal works.¹ He also suggests that there was a Treatise on Rhetoric, an unlikely addition, but one which we will consider later.

Six of the discourses are forensic, Against Lochites, Against Euthynus, the Aegineticus, the Trapeziticus, the Callimachus and the Team of Horses or De Bigis, and three are 'encomia,' the Busiris, the Evagoras and the Helen. They will not claim much of our attention. Of the remaining twelve, three are 'hortatory,' To Demonicus, To Nicocles, and Nicocles or The Cyprians, and they offer us interesting insights into Isocrates' views on morality and the practical conduct of affairs. Another six are political, the Panegyricus, the Philip, the Plataicus, the Peace, the Archidamus and the Areopagiticus, but nevertheless cannot be ignored because of the intimate relationship between his political and his educational thought. The Antidosis and Against the Sophists are not entirely educational but provide us with most of his educational theory, as already indicated. So far I have followed Jebb's classification of the works, but as regards the last one in the canon, the Panathenaicus, I beg to differ, because it simply defies classification. It is epideictic

¹Isocrate: Discours, p. xxxvi-xxxvii.

and is classified by Norlin, with some misgivings, as 'hortatory.'

However its content is political, educational and auto-

biographical and it can really be said to stand on its own.

These twelve works, therefore, with some glances into the letters, will engage our attention as we attempt to distinguish the contribution made by Isocrates to Western educational thought.

II ISOCRATES; SOPHIST AND PHILOSOPHER

During the second half of the Fifth Century B.C., a new kind of culture began to arrive in Athens. This new culture was an amalgam of ideas that had originated in Ionia in the East and Sicily in the West. It was an amalgam of rare intellectual power.

The Ionian ideas were much the oldest. As early as the first decade of the Sixth Century B.C., Ionia had been the scene of scientific and philosophical speculation on the nature of things.¹ The Milesians, Thales and Anaximander, were among those associated with such speculation, as was Pythagoras of Samos. Pythagoras is of special interest, because about the middle of the century he left Samos and went to Southern Italy, where he established his school.² Thus Ionic ideas began to be spread about the Greek world. The word used to denote those who engaged in speculative activity was Ionic in origin, sophistes,³ or as we would say sophists. It meant 'an eminent specialist' and could be applied to someone in almost any field of intellectual activity. For instance, both Aeschylus and Sophocles used it to denote

¹ See Robert S. Brumbaugh, The Philosophers of Greece (London, 1966), pp. 5-92.

² Ibid., p. 31.

³ A. Douglas-Thomson, Euripides and the Attic Orators (London, 1898), p. 3, n. 1.

a clever musician and Pindar, to denote both a musician and a poet. It also meant, of course, a scientist.¹

There is little doubt that before 450 B.C. sophist was a title of high repute. Isocrates tells us that Solon (c. 640-558) "was the first of the Athenians to receive the title of Sophist."² He also remarked that "Pericles studied under two of the Sophists, Anaxagoras of Clazomenae and Damon, the latter in his day reputed to be the wisest among the Athenians."³ But after 450, in Athens at least, the term increasingly fell into disrepute.⁴ This change in the status of the word coincided with a change in the meaning, for after 450 it began to take on the meaning of "one who teaches logon techne," the art of words.⁵ The change occurred because of the development of Rhetoric in Sicily during the first half of the Fifth Century. Rhetoric, which we shall examine in a little more detail in the next section, was originally nothing more than forensic oratory.⁶ But it was soon adopted by the

¹T. Gomperz, Greek Thinkers (London, 1920), p. 579. Also H. Sidgwick, Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant and other Philosophical Lectures and Essays (London, 1905), pp. 352-353.

²Antid., 313.

³Antid., 235.

⁴Gomperz, loc. cit. and Sidgwick, loc. cit.

⁵Sidgwick, p. 579.

⁶The Oxford Companion to Classical Literature, ed. Sir Paul Harvey (Oxford, 1962), p. 296.

Sophists as a tool of speculation. Thus Rhetoric became the second component of the new culture, all of which came under the banner of the Sophists.¹ But if Rhetoric gave a new power to the Sophists, it did so at the expense of making them widely unpopular.

This unpopularity was a phase which passed relatively quickly. It was able to seriously retard the advance of the new culture only with the help of the Thirty Tyrants, during the period of reaction that they inaugurated. However the Sophists were never able to recover completely from this unpopularity. Furthermore, during the period of its existence the character of sophistry was quite changed. It lost its unity and was divided into two camps. On the one hand were the teachers of Rhetoric, the Declaimers, as they were commonly known,² whom we recognize as the Sophists. On the other hand were those who speculated on the nature of things, the Disputers,³ or as we think of them, the Philosophers. These are of course, very broad categories and there must have been a great deal of crossover from one to another. It is important

¹G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy (London, 1892-96), I, 352.

²Sidgwick, p. 331.

³Ibid.

to note that Sophistry was in no sense monolithic, nor a specific method and even less a sect.¹

At bottom the split between the two camps was between the Ionic and the Sicilian traditions. A large measure of responsibility for the split can no doubt be attributed to Socrates, whose penetrating analyses showed up the differences between the two traditions very clearly. The split, it may also be noted, "runs like a leitmotiv throughout the history of ancient civilization,"² and has persisted in a slightly different form to this day.³

A more immediate result of the split was the creation of a borderland between the Sophists and the Philosophers, and the first to inhabit this borderland was Isocrates.⁴ It was something of an unhappy position. For instance, devoted as he was to practical education,⁵ he

¹John Stuart Mill, Dissertations and Discussions (Boston, Mass., 1868-75), IV, 246.

²Werner Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, trans. Gilbert Highet (Oxford, 1945), III, 46.

³e.g. C. P. Snow in The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution (Cambridge, 1959).

⁴Jacqueline de Romilly, "Euonia in Isocrates; or the Political Importance of Creating Good Will," JHS, LXXVIII (1958), 100. Also H. I. Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity, trans. G. Lamb (London, 1956), p. 85.

⁵Marrou, p. 89.

could not accept that the winning of legal actions, the most practical aim of rhetorical sophistry, was a worthy one. Similarly, although he recognized the necessity for moral education, he considered that the speculations of Plato, for example, on the nature of the Good and on similar ethical matters were worthless.¹

Nevertheless, simply because he was the first to occupy the borderland and then became the first to advocate a middle way in education, Isocrates is an important and arch-typical figure in Western Education.² For Western Education has characteristically trodden a path mid-way between sophistry, in the sense of vocationally oriented education, and philosophy, in the sense of abstruse speculation. Indeed, Western Education for much of its existence has stayed surprisingly close to the model first displayed by Isocrates and his Paideia.³ It has been predominantly literary, as Isocrates believed education should be, and by being so it has repeated all the faults of which he was guilty, such as long windedness, artificiality, over concentration on style, smugness and lack of wit. It has also, until comparatively recently, ignored the claims of science for a place in the school curriculum,

¹H. Ll. Hudson-Williams, "A Greek Humanist," Greece and Rome, IX, 27 (1940), 172.

²Jaeger, pp. 56 and 60.

³Ibid.

just as Isocrates did.¹ However if the faults of Western education can be traced back to Isocrates, so also must some of its triumphs, even if we speak only of parallel developments and not of influences. In any event there is reason to validate the claim made by such men as Burnet and Ernest Barker, that Isocrates is the Father of Humanism.²

An illustration of the fact that he was mid-way between Sophist and Philosopher, is that Isocrates gave himself both titles.³ It is almost as if he denied that there was a distinction to be made between the two and indeed, as we shall see, he used them almost interchangeably. But there was such a distinction and he was very much aware of it. Indeed he was at pains⁴ to make two distinctions, one between himself and the regular run of sophists and another between himself and the eristics. In order to understand these distinctions and to understand why he came to occupy the middle ground, we need to inquire briefly into the nature of Rhetoric and its place in Fourth Century Athens. This will require us to account for the unpopularity of the Sophists and why the unpopularity ebbed. We will also consider the new culture and the part

¹Antid., 268.

²Jaeger, p. 300, n. 2.

³e.g. Soph., 1. To Dem., 3.

⁴Especially in Against the Sophists.

played in its acceptance in Athens by Isocrates. Against this general background we will be able to describe Isocrates' philosophy and why he was able to use this term quite legitimately in order to describe his thought. The notions of Logos and Doxa which are the key elements of his philosophy will receive a close examination in the next chapter.

ii

The word rhetor derives from a word whose usual meaning is 'speaker in the assembly'.¹ Rhetoric as "the art of speaking in the assembly" was devised in Sicily in the first half of the Fifth Century when the rule of tyrants gave way briefly to democracy.² Corax it is said,³ composed a text book on the subject which was probably a result of rather than a cause of the popularity of Rhetoric. The Sophists, as the professional teachers of the day, were quick to seize upon the new technique and adapt and improve upon it.

Athens, with its long tradition of speaking in the assembly and its noted orators such as Solon and Cleisthenes,⁴

¹S. Wilcox, "The Scope of Early Rhetorical Instruction," Harvard Studies, LIII (1942), 132 & 154.

²The Oxford Companion, p. 296.

³D. A. G. Hinks, "Tria Genera Causarum," Classical Quarterly, XXV (1936), 170. George A. Kennedy, "The Earliest Rhetorical Handbooks," AJPh, LXXX (1959), 169-178. See also Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1402a 17.

⁴Jaeger, p. 146. Antid., 232.

attracted the Sophists and it soon became a centre for the new teaching. The importance of the assembly in Athens was very great indeed. It was the legislative, administrative and judicial centre of the city-state. Clearly, for the aspiring politician tuition in the art of speaking, once it was available could be a great asset, if indeed it did not become essential. But Rhetoric could be just as important for those with little or no political ambition, for it was almost impossible for an Athenian, certainly a well-to-do Athenian, to avoid being involved in some litigation during his life-time. For "the Athenians were always inordinately fond of litigation."¹ Once involved in legal proceedings, it was incumbent on the citizen to conduct his own case before the assembly, unless there were good reason for him to use a substitute. Although there were codes of conduct and time-honoured precedents, there was no Law in either the Roman or the modern sense of the term. Far more, therefore, depended on the speaker's ability to sway his audience by his words alone. This was true even when later the words were provided by a logographer, another sophistic innovation incidentally, for the presentation and the delivery of a speech remained of great importance.

¹Douglas-Thomson, p. 4. See also Aristophanes, The Clouds, 207-8.

There is little doubt that Rhetoric could be very useful and, among certain people, very popular. But these people by and large would be the young, who could accept new ideas, and the rich, who could afford the teachers who taught them. The older and the poorer citizens who had neither the time, the money, nor the inclination to go to the Sophists looked upon Rhetoric with jaundiced eyes. There is ample proof of this in Aristophanes' The Clouds with its sweeping attack on all Sophists, Declaimers and Disputers alike. The Clouds won the prize at the Great Dionysia in 423.¹ This is a clear indication of a well developed hostility toward the new culture in general by that date.

Of course it was not only in legal matters that the majority were worsted. The calibre of the new teachers speaks for itself. For instance, Protagoras was the friend of and probably a speech-writer for Pericles; Hippias was at one time an ambassador to Athens for Elis; and Gorgias was a member of the Leontini delegation to Athens in 427.² They were all well qualified not only to train the young men of Athens in the art of Rhetoric, but also to educate them in general.

¹The Oxford Companion, p. 111.

²Wilcox, "The Scope," p. 132.

Rhetoric, it must be remembered, is the father of dialectic and ultimately of logic. It must have been a sore trial for the old men, the men of Marathon, to come up against the young men armed to the teeth with the new weapons of argument.¹ No wonder therefore that they turned against the Sophists who "were foreigners, made fortunes, taught novelties [and] excited the minds of youth,"² any of which was quite sufficient to account for the opprobrium which attached to them. The new learning was viewed as a threat to everything that the Marathonomachai held dear, not least to the old religion.³ It is very interesting indeed to note that the representatives of the new culture who enjoyed popular esteem, for instance Euripides, Isocrates and Plato, were all themselves conservative and, it may be noted, absent from active political life.⁴

The Clouds displays very clearly the common man's hatred for the new, the intellectual and above all the foreign. Aristophanes, who had himself had his Athenian descent challenged, knew his intensely conservative audience well, well enough indeed to make Socrates the butt of his merciless wit and not some more culpable but less well known foreigner, and

¹Douglas-Thomson, p. 5.

²Benjamin Jowett, Plato: The Dialogues (Oxford, 1953), III, 328.

³Douglas-Thomson, p. 5.

⁴Jaeger, p. 153.

he wrote accordingly. To many Athenians, Socrates must have seemed the arch-cultural traitor. We should not, therefore, be surprised at the fact that whereas Protagoras, for instance, a foreigner, was merely expelled from Athens, Socrates was done to death. But the death of Socrates marked the high water mark of the opposition to the new culture. It was as if his death was a catharsis, although a more likely explanation for the fading of the opposition is that by the turn of the century the old opponents had simply died off. Later opposition to the Sophists was on quite different grounds to that of the Fifth Century, except perhaps for the comic poets, who continued to allege that the Sophists taught nothing but sycophancy and the arts of blackmail.¹ The Fourth Century saw the opposition of Philosophers to Rhetoricians, an opposition that was largely associated with the name of Plato.²

The fact remains that within ten years of the death of Socrates, it again became possible to teach the new ideas without serious danger of reprisal. It may well have been that there was general recognition that the Sophists could and did perform a useful and socially desirable function. One of the

¹Wilcox, "The Scope," p. 131.

²S. Wilcox, "Criticisms of Isocrates and his Philosophy," *TAPA*, LXXIV (1943), 114.

first to take advantage of the new climate of opinion was Isocrates.¹ As Jaeger suggested, he deserves a great deal of credit for the part he played in making the new culture truly Athenian.² As already noted in Chapter I, one of the outstanding exponents of the new culture was Euripides. He was "one of the foremost standard bearers of the New Culture,"³ Thomson tells us, and "may be said to have been born with it."⁴ It is significant, therefore that Isocrates "offers far more material for comparison with Euripides than do the other orators."⁵

On such matters as the importance of sophrosyne, self-control,⁶ the relative standing of athletes and sages,⁷ the supremacy of virtue among all the goods available to man and the impossibility of teaching it,⁸ and on such political matters as patriotism, the relationship between Athens and

¹Afer Antisthenes. See Gilbert Murray, A History of Ancient Greek Literature (London, 1902), p. 304.

²Jaeger, p. 50.

³Douglas-Thomson, p. 9.

⁴Ibid., p. 7.

⁵Ibid., pp. 10-11.

⁶Ibid., pp. 73-75.

⁷Ibid., pp. 182-83.

⁸Ibid., p. 46.

Sparta, the barbarians and the superiority of the old ways,¹ the views of the two men are very similar. These views are for the most part common to the new culture. But the parallels between Euripides and Isocrates are so close as to strongly suggest that Isocrates was indeed influenced by the dramatist. Of course, Euripides was so immensely popular and so well-known, that it is not necessary to postulate a close personal relationship between the two. It is worth noting that Euripides was forced to leave Athens in his seventy-third year to be an honoured guest of the king of Macedon, at whose court he died in 406 B.C.² That a man of such high repute was vulnerable is evidence both of the intensity of the feeling and of the power wielded by the opponents of the new culture.

The role that Isocrates played, therefore, in the dissemination of the ideas that had been developed in the Fifth Century, whether derived directly from Euripides or at least in part from a source common to both men, is of some importance. The charge that Isocrates was over conservative and very much afraid of the demos,³ loses most of its force when we recognize that both care and caution were required, even after the first

¹Douglas-Thomson, in general pp. 97-148.

²A. S. Way, Euripides, Loeb Classical Library (London, 1916), Introduction, pp. ix-x.

³Jaeger, p. 138.

decade of the Fourth Century, if the new ideas were to have a chance. The new ideas were of considerable importance not only to Athenian but also to Western culture. As T. A. Sinclair declared, "but for the Sophists we should have had no Plato."¹ And as Hegel said, "The claim made by the Sophists in Greece was that they had given a culture to their people; for this great credit was ascribed to them in Greece."²

More particularly as far as we are concerned, the new culture, and specifically its rhetorical aspect, had a decisive effect on the creation of the Western literary tradition. The influence of this tradition on Western education was very great indeed and the very least that can be said about Isocrates' role in all this is that he "helped solidify the tradition that made rhetoric the accepted basis of education."³ But more than that, he, like Euripides, was a standard bearer of the new culture, the culture of the Sophists. It is because he accepted only part of this culture, and added to it innovations of his own, that we place him on the borderland between sophistry and philosophy. In order to understand

¹T. A. Sinclair, A History of Classical Greek Literature (London, 1934), p. 361.

²Hegel, p. 365.

³George A. Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece (London, 1963), p. 174.

why he accepted only part of the new learning, we must look into his criticisms of his fellow Sophists. To do so also requires a general examination of other criticisms of the Sophists and particularly those of Plato, which will in turn help us to understand why Isocrates was also cut off from what we consider to be philosophy.

iii

It is perhaps curious that despite their immense contribution to Western civilization the Sophists even today are under a cloud. The terms Sophists and Sophistry are common, if somewhat academic, terms of abuse. Although E. L. Hunt, writing in 1925, could say, truthfully enough: "It is to Hegel [in lectures delivered in the period 1810-1825] that the Sophists owe their rehabilitation in modern times,"¹ it is clear that this rehabilitation is still not complete. This is despite the support of many eminent scholars.²

Our view of the Sophists is largely conditioned by the comic poets, particularly Aristophanes, and by the

¹E. L. Hunt, in Studies in Rhetoric and Public Speaking, ed. A. M. Drummond (New York, 1925), p. 4.

²e.g. Mill, Sidgwick, Grote, Jebb, Jowett, Marrou, Mathieu and Jaeger.

Academicians, particularly Plato. We have already noted that Aristophanes, at least in part, was motivated by the desire to please his audience, as well as his innate conservatism. His view of the Sophists as witless tricksters is, therefore, less than unimpeachable evidence.

The opinion of Plato is less easily challenged. He did not write against the Sophists in order to win popular claim. Indeed, as suggested earlier, his criticisms as part of the general criticism of rhetoricians by philosophers, are of quite a different nature and order. But because of his position as head of a school teaching a particular kind of learning and because of his position within a body of like-minded philosophers, it is difficult to acquit him entirely of charges of conflict of interest and thus to grant him complete objectivity in the matter. Even if we grant the validity of much of his criticism it is as well to keep in mind the fact that, "Fourth Century Athens was the scene of heated professional jealousy between the exponents of different systems of education."¹

There is no reason to assume that either Plato or Isocrates, the two great exponents of the two divergent

¹Hudson-Williams, p. 166.

aspects of the new culture, were immune to such feelings. This is not to say that the two men were deadly rivals and enemies, and not the friends that Diogenes Laertius suggested they might be.¹ Nevertheless, it is interesting to compare the tone of the earlier dialogues with those that we assume were written later, where Sophists are concerned. In the Gorgias, for example, the great orator is treated with a great deal of friendly respect,² whereas in The Sophist, for instance, Plato reveals a dislike of the Sophists at least as great as his dislike of their teaching. Of course the earlier works may be a more accurate reflection of the actual views of the historical Socrates. Again, the later dialogues no doubt reflect increasing and honest intellectual doubts about sophistry in general. Even so it is clear that Plato was writing about his immediate rivals. He was not of course motivated by commercial considerations,³ but the Academy, for all that, was in direct competition with the Sophists. It is wise, therefore, to maintain some reservations about his objectivity.

Plato's charges are twofold and are of special interest to us because of their special relevance to Isocrates.

¹Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, trans. R. D. Hicks (London, 1925), No. 3, Plato, 8.

²Plato, Gorgias, 447b, 457c, 458d etc.

³Marrou, p. 67.

His criticisms were, first, that the Sophists charged fees and, second, that they dealt in opinion only and not in knowledge.¹

As regards the first charge, there is, of course, much to be said for the idea that selling Truth is very dangerous, not least because Truth may then be determined by its price and by those who can afford to pay it. However it must be acknowledged that Plato was in a singular position. He was a rich aristocrat whose fortune had survived the war and who could afford to operate the Academy without charging fees. In this he was unlike all of his contemporaries, who taught in order to earn a living. Plato was in a position to be hyper-ethical.

Isocrates, as he tells us himself, made more money from teaching than anyone else before,² Jaeger contrasts "the practical bourgeois character of Isocrates. . . . everyone of [whose] writings shows with perfect frankness how much he valued money for its own sake," with "the high minded attitude of Plato."³ Isocrates justified the payment of fees to himself

¹Mill, p. 265. For Plato on opinion see Republic, e.g. end of Book V, especially 476a to end.

²Antid., 39-41 & 154-158.

³Jaeger, p. 142.

by remarking, "that these students cross the sea and pay out money and go to all manner of trouble because they think that they themselves will be better for it."¹ However he did show himself to be sensible to criticism by his claims that he did not charge Athenians.²

The point is that the normal practice in Athens was for students to be charged fees, a practice to which Isocrates conformed and Plato did not. Fee-paying it may be noted has remained a common practice in the West.

The second charge that Plato levelled against the Sophists has perhaps more substance to it. There were, no doubt, many Sophists or so-called Sophists, who merely had an opinion, whether it was on the way in which to convince the jury or on the way in which the earth was created, and made it the basis of their teaching. Certainly this must have become more and more common as the Fourth Century wore on and the danger of repression grew less. This kind of intellectual chicanery must have been anathema to Plato.

In his epistemology, opinion was placed on only the second level of knowledge, pistis, above mere guess-work, eikasia, but well below the level of hypothesis, dianoia, and real knowledge, noesis, of the nature of the Good, to agathon.³

¹Antid., 226.

²Antid., 39

³Plato, Republic, 509d-513e.

He was unwilling, therefore, to acknowledge the validity even of sound opinion and indeed, in his view, all opinion was bad. All epistemologies had to conform to his, and only his claim to the highest knowledge was valid. But the implications of his position were unlikely to be acceptable to his rivals. Furthermore, his claim that only he had the answer, must have been only one more among many such claims being made at the time. Isocrates was in complete disagreement with Plato, for he placed opinion, doxa, at the very pinnacle of human intellectual endeavour. His views on opinion will be considered in detail in Chapter III.

So far in our investigation of the Sophists it appears that Isocrates is at one with them. This is less than the whole truth. In any consideration of the relationship between Isocrates and the other Sophists, two facts stand out. The first is that again and again in his orations he defends the profession of sophistry.¹ The second is that he not only wrote a tract entitled Against the Sophists, but also frequently criticized Sophists in his other works.² These contradictions are, however, more apparent than real. They can be partly explained, of course, by the fact of his occupation of the

¹e.g. Antid., 168, 197ff, 204, 220. To Nic., 13, To Dem., 51.

²e.g. Antid., 147-148, 215-216. Peace, 5.

middle ground between sophistry and philosophy. His view of both fields was therefore unique, and it afforded him unique opportunities for criticism of both.

As regards his criticisms of Sophists, it is important to recognize first of all, that Against the Sophists was a promotional tract, intended as a prospectus for his new school.¹ The opening section, which deals with the faults and deficiencies of existing educational practices and practitioners, is all that remains to us. It might be argued, therefore, that the faults were overdrawn and overstressed in order to provide a more telling contrast with the wonders which were to follow.² Thus, without in any way doubting Isocrates' sincerity, it is better not to take the tract entirely at face-value. As noted earlier, Isocrates as well as Plato was capable of professional jealousy.

Secondly, both Against the Sophists and his other criticisms of Sophists must be seen as attacks against those who damaged the good name of sophistry and not against Sophists in general. Even if his attacks can be generalized, in fact, to cover not only most Sophists but also most Philosophers, it is important to recognize that Isocrates did not object on

¹George Norlin, Isocrates, (London, 1962), II, 160.

²Ibid.

principle to sophists any more than to Rhetoric. Indeed, the fact is that he elevated Rhetoric to the peak of educational achievement, which explains why he castigated 'other' Sophists, who used it for what Isocrates considered to be petty concerns, such as litigation. The crux of his criticism of his fellow teachers is that they misused the glorious powers that Rhetoric had given them.

Isocrates wished Rhetoric to be concerned only with matters of great moment and importance. He had two aims. He hoped to recreate the past when oratory had been the source of Athenian greatness,¹ and he hoped to influence the future by asserting the claims and importance of Pan-Hellenism.² These hopes were to be realised by the power of Rhetoric. It was this view of the function of Rhetoric, that gave him a moral basis both for the teaching of practical politics and for a general educational system, for the two aims were in his view inherently moral. In these twin aims he was quite unlike the other Sophists and he rightly believed himself to be different. Amongst other things they made him an important link between the old and the new.

Most significantly for education, these aims required a unique combination of morality and utility.³ This combination

¹Paneg., 48.

²Paneg., 50.

³Hudson-Williams, p. 72.

marked him off sharply from the Academicians on the one hand, whose over-riding concern with the nature of truth often led them to neglect the practical application of their ideas, and on the other hand, from the 'other' Sophists whose concentration on success as a practical aim caused them, too often, to ignore the claims of morality. This combination, together with the fact that Rhetorical training was the precursor of the literary tradition in education, went a long way towards ensuring the survival of his ideas on education.

Before leaving the Sophists, one further point needs to be made. It is the Sophists who, during the greater part of the Fourth Century, were the orthodox teachers of Greece.¹ It was Plato who was the exception and Isocrates who stayed within the ranks of the orthodox and who, by doing so, changed the nature of orthodoxy. It was Isocrates who, by ennobling the concept of oratory, paved the way for Roman education and the Ciceronian ideal of the Doctus Orator. Despite the fact that it was Plato who scored the literary triumph of his age, it was Isocrates and not Plato who, for good or ill, did most to establish the literary tradition of Western education.²

¹George Grote, A History of Greece (London, 1888), VII, 81.

²Marrou, pp. 79-80.

In political terms, it was again the Sophists who stayed within the orthodox, that is the democratic tradition. The greatest tribute to them indeed, was their prohibition by the Thirty Tyrants. The Tyrants "recognized that oratory is the life-blood of democracy, they shut off the flow at the source, the schools (sic) of rhetoric."¹ It is impossible to separate persuasion and democracy, for each needs the other now, as it did then.² It is ironic that Isocrates, who distrusted and probably feared the demos, can thus be credited with helping to ensure the survival of democracy as an ideal.³

Clearly, Isocrates was a genuine Sophist; indeed it was he who brought the sophistic movement in education to its culminating point.⁴ But it is not quite so obvious that he was a philosopher. It is his claim to such a title that we must now investigate.

¹Wilcox, "The Scope," p. 155. Xenophon, Memorabilia, I, 2, 31.

²Ibid., see also C. Fries, "L'Origine de la Rhetorique Antique," Revue de Philologie, XIV (1940), 43-50.

³Jaeger, p. 136.

⁴Jaeger, p. 48.

iv

There is no doubt that Isocrates applied the name Philosopher to himself. Near the beginning of To Demonicus he declares, "you are eager for education and I profess to educate, you are ripe for philosophy and I direct students of philosophy."¹ In Against the Sophists he refers to philosophy as his profession,² and in the Antidosis promises "to tell you about wisdom and philosophy,"³ and also to present "frank discussions about philosophy."⁴ He continually describes his teaching as philosophy,⁵ and it is clear, therefore, that to understand what he means by philosophy is to understand what he means by education, just as it also throws light on his views on culture in general.

His concept of philosophy is very broad, as are his claims for its successes and its powers.

Philosophy, which has helped to discover and establish all these Athenian institutions, which has educated us for public affairs and made us gentle towards each other, which has distinguished between the misfortunes that are due to ignorance and those which spring from necessity, and taught us to guard against the former and to bear the latter nobly. . . .

¹To Dem., 3.

²Soph., 11.

³Antid., 270.

⁴Antid., 10.

⁵e.g. Paneg., 47

⁶Ibid., see also Antid., 251.

This passage from the Panegyricus contrasts sharply with a remark from Against the Sophists, "For myself I should have preferred above great riches that philosophy had as much power as these men claim . . . ¹ but it is in fact closer to his notion of the scope of philosophy. The breadth of scope he allots to philosophy is not all that different to that of Plato, but there the resemblance between the two philosophies ends.

It was Isocrates and not Plato who used the word in the accepted Fourth Century sense.² The love of wisdom was different for each because their view of wisdom was different. For Isocrates it was synonymous with good judgement and sound opinion, whereas Plato equated it with Truth or the process of seeking Truth. It is not merely that the word meant something different to each of the two men, but that this difference in meaning affected fundamentally their view of, among other things, education. Plato devised an elaborate system of education in the art of dialectic in order to arrive with certainty at knowledge of the Truth. Thus, education became a closed and inward looking process and the esoteric nature of dialectic as Plato taught it, led to the formation of a sect, which required adherence to a creed.³

¹Soph., 11.

²Marrou, p. 80, Jaeger, p. 49. For Plato on 'alleged' philosophy and philosophers see Republic, e.g. 475d-480a and 484a-487a.

³Jaeger, p. 49.

Isocrates, in his search for a means of arriving at sound opinion, of necessity had to keep his attention on the practical effects of his teaching and this in turn made it necessary for him to keep his school open to the world of men as well as ideas. He was, and his philosophy was, concerned with the day-to-day operation of society, especially in its cultural aspect. Thus, his philosophy became almost synonymous with a love of culture and culture for him, and later for us, was in the main literary.

It can be seen that the notion of a school open to the world and concerned with the world, was of much greater practical importance and of general concern to education than the ramifications of speculative philosophy in a closed sect. Not that Plato deliberately cut himself off from the world, as did many of his later supporters. His trip to Sicily was a very serious attempt to put his educational as well as his political ideas into practice. He was as concerned with the practical applications of his philosophy as Isocrates was with his, but the very nature of Plato's philosophy militated against him. In the end, Marrou suggests, Plato had to admit that "philosophical knowledge is useless because the philosopher has no actual reasonable city to apply his ideas to and falls back on a dream city."¹ No such fate awaited Isocrates, who,

¹Marrou, pp. 89-90.

even if kept from active political life by his personal defects, was all his life immersed in the practical and political affairs of his time.

What Isocrates was aiming at was universal education, contrasted with one definite creed or one particular method of achieving knowledge, as preached by the Platonists.¹ That Isocrates was aware of the difference between himself and the Platonists and the 'eristics' in general, is very clear.

I maintain that if you compare me with those who profess to turn men to a life of temperance and justice, you will find that my teaching is more true and more profitable than theirs. For they exhort their followers to a kind of virtue and wisdom which is ignored by the rest of the world and is disputed among themselves; I to a kind which is recognized by all.²

Thus, Isocrates laid his claim to orthodoxy. Not for him were the intricacies of metaphysical argument, but the realities of the concrete world; not for him was there an abstract and almost unattainable virtue, but the accepted and recognized virtue of the good citizen. The reference to "temperance and justice" seems to be a direct allusion to Plato, but even before Plato had made his mark Isocrates was prepared to attack the Socratics in general.

¹Jaeger, p. 49. Platonic, like Socratic - see below - is used in the broadest sense of anyone who studied with Plato - or Socrates.

²Antid., 84.

But these professors have gone so far in their lack of scruple that they attempt to persuade our young men that if they will only study under them they will know what to do in life and through this knowledge will become happy and prosperous.¹

Isocrates had few illusions about the power of education alone to make people happy,² an idea, incidentally, that he shared with Euripides.³ Only by the study of subjects which could be of practical value, which could be applied to certain of life's problems, was there any hope of alleviating hardship. Certainly, he believed practical subjects were more likely to have some measure of success than speculation. Isocrates, it seems was unaware of the dangers that lay ahead of his so-called practical subjects. He certainly was highly critical of those who made claims for kinds of education which were not practical, especially if they confused them with philosophy.

They characterize men who ignore our practical needs and delight in the mental juggling of the ancient sophists, as 'students of philosophy,' but refuse this to those who pursue and practice those studies which will enable us to govern wisely both our own households and the commonwealth, which should be the objects of our toil, of our study and of our every act.⁴

But there is more revealed in this passage than criticisms of other teachers. It shows, for one thing, how far removed

¹Soph., 3.

²e.g. Soph., 15.

³Douglas-Thomson, p. 46.

⁴Antid., 285.

Isocrates was from the scientific speculations of the Ionian philosophers, the ancient sophists, and from such men among their Western counterparts as Parmenides, Zeno, Melissus or Empedocles.¹ It also shows clearly how his philosophy combines morality and utility, personal morality and political utility. The aim of philosophy is "to govern wisely both our own households and the common-wealth," to be both moral and practical. In another passage he again attacked the philosophers and again reveals his belief in the practical benefits of philosophy.

They ought to give up this claptrap which pretends to prove things by verbal quibbles, which in fact have long since been refuted, and to pursue the truth, to instruct their pupils in the practical affairs of our government and train to expertness therein, bearing in mind that likely conjecture about useful things is far preferable to exact knowledge of the useless and that to be a little inferior in important things is of greater worth than to be pre-eminent in petty things that are without value for living.²

The key phrase in the second passage is "value for living". Only "the practical affairs of our government" are "important things . . . of great worth" with "value for living." This concept led him to reject philosophical speculation, but

¹Antid., 268. Helen, 2-3.

²Helen, 4-5.

this did little to delay the growth of philosophy. It also led him to reject science and this may have delayed its growth. He rejected all speculation on the nature of things, from cosmology to mathematics. He was quite incapable, it would appear, of appreciating the nature or benefits of pure, as opposed to applied research or knowledge. This incapacity led him to reject science as useless, rather than as dangerous to his own ideas:

although they [scientific speculators in general and perhaps Aristotle in particular] do no actual harm to their pupils, [they] are less able to benefit them than are other teachers [i.e. himself].¹

Because of his enormous influence on Hellenistic and Roman education and through them on Western education in general,² his failure to include science in his curriculum, except as we shall see later in a very minor way, was of very great importance. It was, as it were, a negative contribution to Western education. Of course, there were other reasons for the eclipse of science, but it is interesting to speculate on the fate of science in education, if it had had the support of both the philosophical and rhetorical branches of learning.

¹Antid., 259.

²Jaeger, pp. 80-81.

Isocrates' philosophy, however, was grounded in the immediately useful:

I hold that men who want to do some good in the world, must banish utterly from their interests all vain speculation and all activities which have no bearing on our lives.¹

Thus speculation and science were irrelevant. This narrow and it appears to us, short-sighted view, was one that he was largely able to impose on his successors, particularly Cicero. Isocrates' idea of education was literary, based, as we shall see in the next chapter, on the mastery of language. This idea was very much influenced by his suspicion of speculative philosophy. "Philosophers," Jaeger said, in a paraphrase of Isocrates' attitude, "are always chasing the phantom of pure Knowledge, but no one can use their results."² By restricting the range of inquiry Isocrates made a negative contribution to Western educational thought, the historical effect of which cannot be ignored.

v

It is perhaps easier for us to recognize the gap between Isocrates and the Philosophers, than to recognize the gap between him and the Sophists. This latter gap can only

¹Antid., 269.

²Jaeger, p. 68.

be understood if we recognize the moral nature of his philosophy and the moral foundation it gave to his teaching of rhetoric.¹ This moral basis was also closely linked with an aesthetic sense, an important element in his teaching method.² The other teachers of rhetoric, generally speaking, passed on collections of formal devices which were not, in any broad sense, educative. Isocrates well understood that form and content, style and purpose were all inextricably linked together. Gorgias had taught him that lofty ideals, such as Pan-Hellenism, should only be expressed by the finest language.³

From Socrates, he had learnt the value of moral ideas per se and even if, as Jaeger claims, "Isocrates could not appreciate the cold ethical claims of the Socratic system,"⁴ he saw that the great advantage of philosophy, Socratic philosophy, as an educational force was that it possessed lofty moral ideas. The very kind of ideas that should be expressed by the finest language. This is not to say that it was Socratic ideals that he wished to embellish although there are many traces of Socrates in his works,⁵ "He believed neither that

¹Marrou, p. 88.

²Soph., 9. Jaeger, p. 60.

³George Norlin, "General Introduction," Isocrates, Loeb Classical Library (London, 1966), I, xiii.

⁴Jaeger, p. 69.

⁵See above, Chapt. 1. Also Norlin, "General Introduction" pp. xvii-xviii.

the Socratic ideal was the only one with any claim to respect nor that the means chosen by the philosophers were likely to attain it."¹ As regards ideals, Isocrates thought they could be found in a return to the old beliefs of Athens and in an acceptance of the idea of Pan-Hellenism. As regards the means, they were to be provided by rhetoric.

It was rhetoric and not philosophy in the Platonic sense, that seemed to Isocrates to be the intellectual form which could best express the political and ethical ideas of his age and make them part of the intellectual equipment of all contemporary Athenians.²

It was in fact this combination of the political and the ethical which made Isocrates' school so successful and which was so powerful in establishing Isocratean education as a main component of Western culture.

For Isocrates the purpose of philosophy, all philosophy, whether it was based on speculation or on rhetoric was the same:

The teachers of philosophy, however much they debate about the principle of the soul - some contending that it is through disputation,^a others that it is through political discussion,^b others that it is through other means,^c that their disciples are to attain greater wisdom - yet they are all agreed on this, that the well-educated man must, as the result of his training in whatever discipline, show ability to deliberate and decide.³

¹Jaeger, p. 70.

²Jaeger, p. 50.

³To Nic., 51 (a) Socratics and early members of the Academy.
(b) Isocrates himself? (c) Sophists in general.

The main difference between his view of philosophy and our view, is that he considered that a philosopher should be competent to "deliberate and decide" on matters which we would consider to be outside the province of philosophy. Philosophy to all the Greeks and not excluding Plato, meant the love of all wisdom and that wisdom might be discovered in the study of many kinds of knowledge. The Greeks merely differed about the methods of study, as Isocrates made clear in the quotation above. It is we who err when we consider that only the method advocated by Plato and his followers is philosophy, thus denying the title of philosopher to Isocrates and to other thinkers.

His reply to his own rhetorical question, "What is philosophy?" he gives in the Antidosis:

My view of this question is, as it happens, very simple. For since it is not in the nature of man to attain a science by the possession of which we can know positively what we should do or what we should say, in the next resort, I hold that man to be wise who is able by his powers of conjecture to arrive generally at the best course and I hold that man to be a philosopher who occupies himself with the studies from which he will most quickly gain that kind of insight.¹

¹Antid., 271.

By his own definition Isocrates is a philosopher, and we should be wary of denying him the title, not least because of the echoes of modern philosophy which we find in his works. For with his emphasis on the centrality of language in philosophy, he is close to the Linguistic Analysts and with his denial of certainty of knowledge, he is close to the Fallibilists and with his insistence on dealing with the problems of living as they are, he is close to the Existentialists.

Most important is his insistence on a command of language, of logos, by which he means powers of conjecture as much as powers of speech. The implications for education of this insistence are very great indeed. It is therefore to a study of logos, the central idea of his philosophy that we now turn.

III LOGOS AND DOXA

The ideas expressed by the word logos in its various connotations lie at the very heart of Isocrates' philosophy. The most general meaning of logos in Isocrates is 'the command of language', although as will be seen in the next section, there are several problems attached to the translation of the word.

Marrou suggested that the aim of Isocratean education was 'the mastery of speech'¹, which is true as far as it goes. But it is also misleading because it ignores the great emphasis that Isocrates places on what might be called 'the mastery of writing'. Isocrates is not the person to emphasise mere speaking out. In the Antidosis he declared, "I had elected to speak and write. . . ."² But we know that he rarely if ever spoke in public, a fact that he revealed, perhaps unwittingly, when, without any reference to speaking, he asserted that, "no citizen has ever been harmed either by 'my cleverness' or by my writings."³

The probability that there were good psychological reasons why he should emphasise writing as opposed to speaking, should not obscure the fact that there were also good

¹H. I. Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity, trans. G. Lamb (London, 1956), p. 85.

²Antid., 3

³Antid., 33

aesthetic reasons. These reasons were derived from Gorgias' notion that only the finest language was appropriate to the finest sentiments. It followed that if these sentiments were to be expressed in suitable language, then extemporisation was an inadequate method of composing speeches. Therefore, it had to be recognized that not only had speeches to be written, but re-written, perhaps several times, if the right degree of polish was to be achieved.¹ The result was, according to Isocrates, that, "All men take as much pleasure in listening to this kind of prose as in listening to poetry. . . ."²

The reference to poetry is of great interest and importance, because rhetoric took over the role of the poets of old. Isocrates was an important figure in this take over. For instance the eulogy to Evagoras was the first eulogy to be written in prose instead of poetry³ and marks a step in the evolution of the Western prose tradition. Rhetoric, in its post-Isocratean form, was viewed as imaginative literary creation "continuing the poets' work and taking over [their] function . . . in the life of the nation."⁴ This function, it must be emphasised, was educational. It is through the rhetoricians and especially through Isocrates that the thread

¹ See below Chapter on Teaching Methods.

² Antid., 47.

³ Evag., 8-11.

⁴ Werner Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, trans. Gilbert Highet (Oxford, 1945), III, 62.

of continuity in our literary tradition passes down to the present, from Homer, Hesiod and Aesop. Aesop's Fables, it is interesting to note, were termed logoi and an underlying element of this chapter is a concern with the transformation in the meaning of logos from 'fable' to 'language mastery.'

It has been suggested that, "All late Greek poetry is simply the offspring of rhetoric,"¹ and it is important to recognize that the scope of rhetoric is very wide indeed. "The art of rhetoric does not mean simply the art of making speeches; it embraces the whole field of prose and much of verse too. It was the art, as the Romans said, of eloquentia."² When we come to discuss the curriculum of Isocrates' school, we shall have to bear this in mind, for the essentially literary nature of Isocratean education, as part of this rhetorical tradition, required a command of all facets of literature and language, or in other words of logos. The acquisition of the higher skills of reading and writing necessary for such a command, has been and still is the most important component of Western formal education.

The study of logos in all its forms had much more than an aesthetic justification. Despite Jaeger's comment that, "It is deeply interesting to see how Isocrates again and

¹Jaeger, p. 62.

²T. A. Sinclair, A History of Classical Greek Literature (London, 1934), p. 361.

again conceives the essence of culture as a purposeless intellectual activity -- an ideal parallel to that of the gymnastic exercises,"¹ logos was studied for eminently practical reasons. Logos was a means of arriving at doxa, sound opinion, and doxa, therefore was the possession only of men of culture, whether they be private citizens, politicians or princes. Doxa, furthermore, could be held about matters of practical and realistic importance, just as well as it could/aesthetic and artistic concerns.

Doxa was a function of logos and it is clear that logos thus takes on the sense of 'thought' or 'reason' as well as/speech. Doxa had to be well thought out and well expressed. Only by the possession of doxa was it possible for a person to grasp the complexity of human affairs, for doxa required the perception of a host of imponderable factors which all had to be weighed and judged.² Thus doxa became the key element in making a decision. As Isocrates' philosophy of education was dedicated to producing men who could deal with the day-to-day management of affairs,³ that is make decisions, ways of forming doxa were of central concern. However dependant as it was on logos, it is to logos that we turn first, to be followed by an examination of doxa and the relationship of the one to the other.

¹Jaeger, p. 78.

²Marrou, p. 90.

³Marrou, p. 89. Jaeger, p. 104.

ii

A glance into a lexicon reveals that logos has about a dozen basic meanings and about twice as many sub-meanings. A casual sampling might include 'a word,' 'a talk,' 'a rumour,' 'prose,' 'a book,' 'a speech,' 'reason,' 'esteem,' 'language,' and, in the plural, 'histories' and 'a chronicle.' It also meant 'the right to speak' and 'the thing spoken of.'

Some of the meanings of logos, of course, were developed in the Hellenistic age or in the early Christian era and do not apply to Isocrates. Nevertheless in Fourth Century Athens the word had many subtle variations of meaning. Isocrates, who may be taken as a representative Athenian, gives ample evidence of this. A cursory examination of the Antidosis gives some idea of how great a variation was possible.

In ^{para}line 1, logos means 'the discourse,' one of the most frequent explicit meanings Isocrates attaches to it. In ^{para}line 5, it has the meaning of 'manner of speaking,' whilst in ^{para}line 11, it means 'the subject-matter,' and in ^{para}line 12, 'a court-room speech.' In ^{para}line 15, logos is used to convey the sense of 'cause,' just as it is used, incidentally in a similar context in Plato's Apology (19b). In the next ^{para}line, it refers to 'the power of speech,' in line 17, to 'assertions' and in ^{para}line 20, to 'a debate.'

There is little point in continuing this list, which could be extended indefinitely, because it is clear both that Isocrates made very frequent use of the word and that he gave it many different meanings and shades of meaning. It may be argued that they merely reflect the nature of the translator's art. In the crudest sense it is true that one could translate logos and logoi simply as 'word' and 'words.' However the translation, although strictly literal, would be largely incomprehensible. For it is just as true that a literally accurate translation would transmit none of the nuances of the Greek; nuances, which, determined by their context, do exist.

Our interest in Isocrates' use of logos is not, however, confined to his mastery and knowledge of contemporary idiomatic usage. More important is his concept of logos as an educational and philosophical force. Of major importance is the high power he ascribes to it: "the power to speak well and think right will reward the man who approaches the art of discourse [logos] with love of wisdom and love of honour."¹

The combination of good speaking and right thinking lies at the centre of his concept of logos. The one is impossible without the other. To teach the student as far as

¹Antid., 277

possible, how to put the right word to the right thought at the right time, is the essence of education for Isocrates.¹ Indeed, it is worth considering how far we would disagree with this view, which has always been of great potency in Western education.

Good speaking was, of course, of great importance in Fourth Century Athens. In the days before the printing press and universal literacy, the actual delivery of a speech was not something that could be ignored even by Isocrates, with his inherent distaste for public speaking. Speeches had to be made or discourses read, whether before 500 fellow citizens in the assembly or with a select handful of friendly dinner guests.² Isocrates' main concern, however was with the preparation necessary before good speaking was possible. His attention was focused on written as opposed to extempore speeches, not on written as opposed to spoken. Indeed he had no doubt of the superiority of the spoken as opposed to the written word, a superiority brought home to him doubtless by his own disabilities. "And yet I do not fail to realize what a great difference there is in persuasiveness between discourses which are spoken and those which are to be read [to oneself]."³

¹The selection of the right time to say something is included in the notion of kairos. The word and its function will be described in the chapter on Teaching Methods. See also below in this chapter and George A. Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece (London, 1963), pp. 67-68.

²See Gilbert Ryle, Plato's Progress (Cambridge, 1966) Chapter II, pp. 21-54.

³To Phil., 25.

His very insistence on ornateness and decoration in writing is a further indication of his belief in the superiority of reading aloud. For such things may be pleasing to hear, but are well nigh insufferable to read. He remarks in the oration To Philip:

I have not adorned it [the oration] with the rhythmic flow and manifold graces of style which I myself employed when I was younger and taught by example to others as a means by which they might make their oratory more pleasing and at the same time more convincing.¹

To be more pleasing and more convincing are the twin aims of logos and by inference, of Isocratean education. To be educated is to master logos, that is to master the powers of speech and thought, and harness it in the service of persuasion. Persuasion has a very important place in Isocrates' thought.² It could be used politically to influence a whole state³ or it could be the source of more personal benefits: "the stronger a man's desire to persuade his hearers, the more zealously will he strive to be honourable and to have the esteem of his fellow-citizens."⁴ Echoes of this belief are to be heard in both Cicero and Quintilian. The reason why logos could offer personal as well as political satisfactions is quite clear: "for

¹To Phil., 27.

²cf. Plato, Gorgias, 453a ff.

³Jaeger, pp. 111-112.

⁴Antid., 278. Also Antid., 280.

the same arguments which we use in persuading others when we speak in public, we employ also when we deliberate in our own thoughts.¹

Isocrates did not believe, however that logos had miraculous powers or infallible solutions.

cf. /
(Confuse)
I consider that the kind of art [techne] which can implant honesty and justice in depraved natures has never existed and does not now exist [and never will -- c/f. Norlin's note]. . . . But I do hold that people can become better and worthier if they conceive an ambition to speak well, if they become possessed of the desire to persuade their hearers, and finally if they set their hearts on seizing the 'advantage.'²

Fleonexia, the advantage, is worth a slight digression at this point, because it illustrates the nature of Isocrates' morality. Fleonexia was associated with "men who indulge their depraved and criminal instincts and who for small gains acquire a base reputation as 'getting the advantage'."³ Isocrates held that "some of our people no longer use words in their proper meaning but wrest them from the most honourable associations and apply them to the basest pursuits."⁴ Therefore, people should only "apply this term to the most righteous and the most upright, that is to the men who take advantage of the

¹Nic., 8.

²Antid., 274-275.

³Antid., 284.

⁴Antid., 283.

good and not the evil things of life."¹ One should be able to "gain advantage without sacrifice of virtue."²

Logos should be used only to gain true advantage. Isocrates was aware of course that logos could be perverted to serve the ends of the wicked, "to make the weaker cause appear the stronger."³ Indeed, as Norlin points out, this had been a stock charge against rhetoric from the time of Corax and Tisias.⁴ Isocrates wished, however, that logos should be used only in the pursuit of "virtue [arete]", that possession which is the grandest and most enduring in the world."⁵ As we have already noted, Isocrates denied the existence of any foolproof method of inculcating virtue.⁶ Nevertheless it was almost inconceivable to him that any one should master logos in the fullest sense and not be virtuous. In his view pleonexia and arete were not mutually antagonistic, but indispensable to each other.

In order to maintain a high moral standard in the pursuit of arete, Isocrates held that it was better to limit the scope of logos, that is the higher powers of logos, to matters of high moment.

¹Antid., 284.

²Nic., 2.

³Antid., 15. cf. Plato, Gorgias, 457b-461b.

⁴George Norlin, Isocrates (London, 1962), II, 192, fn. b.

⁵To Dem., 5.

⁶Antid., 274-275.

When I was younger I elected not to write the kind of discourse which deals with myths, nor that which abounds in marvels and fictions, although the majority of people are more delighted with this literature than that which is devoted to their welfare and safety, nor did I choose the kind which recounts the ancient deeds and wars of the Hellenes although I am aware that this is deservedly praised.¹

Indeed, he must in his teaching have joined in this praise, in view of the number of historians who came from his school.² He also, of course, rejected logography. The crux, as he tells us, is that, "I left all these to others and devoted my own efforts to giving advice on the true interests of Athens and of the rest of the Hellenes."³ This is a subject worthy of logos and to do justice to it he wrote "in a style rich in many telling points, in contrasted and balanced phrases not a few and in the other figures of speech which give brilliance to oratory and compel the approbation and applause of the audience."⁴

His devotion to Pan-Hellenism, to giving advice "on the true interests of Athens and the rest of the Hellenes" is a theme that he returns to again and again in his writings.

¹Panath., 1. cf. Plato, Republic, 376e-403b and 595a-608b on the types of literature he felt were not acceptable in the schools, or even in the state as a whole.

²See below the chapter on Isocrates' pupils.

³Panath., 2

⁴Ibid.

And yet, when anyone devotes his life to urging all his fellow-countrymen to be the nobler and juster leaders of the Hellenes, how is it possible that such a man /i.e. Isocrates himself should corrupt his followers.¹

I urge and exhort those who are younger and more vigorous than I to speak and write the kind of discourse by which they will turn the greatest states -- those which have been wont to oppress the rest -- into the paths of virtue and justice, since, when the affairs of Hellas are in a happy and prosperous condition, it follows that the state of learning and letters also is greatly improved.²

For there are men /e.g. himself who . . . have chosen to write discourses, not for private disputes, but which deal with the world of Hellas, with affairs of state, and are appropriate to be delivered at the Pan-Hellenic assemblies.³

The commitment he required of his students was to Pan-Hellenism, but also and perhaps more importantly, it was to 'affairs of state.' Thus he gave his kind of education political motivation and simultaneously, great immediacy and relevance. Furthermore, because the discourses he wishes them to write should be like his own, "akin to works composed in rhythm and set to music," and because "they /should" set forth facts in a style

¹ Antid., 86.

² Panath., 145.

³ Antid., 43.

more imaginative and more ornate . . . employ thoughts which are more lofty and more original and . . . use throughout figures of speech in greater number and of more striking character,"¹ to be trained by Isocrates in the arts of politics was to be trained in the arts of language, in a word, in logos. Thus Isocrates created a bridge of great importance to education between the political and the cultural, the practical and the aesthetic worlds, and the main pillar of this bridge was logos.

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of this bridge, because the justification for the literary tradition in Western education has always been its practical application. The well-educated man, from the time of Isocrates and even more so since the time of Cicero, has always been the man with literary education; and it is he, it was always believed, who could lead an army, found a colony, or run a government department. This belief, for right or wrong, good or bad, began with Isocrates. Its implications for Western education are enormous. Creating this bridge alone, must be counted as a huge contribution by Isocrates.

Another considerable contribution, of course, was the conversion of the art of logos into the art of written as

¹Antid., 47.

well as spoken composition. This immeasurably increased the power of logos, certainly in Isocrates' eyes, so much so that logos became worthy almost of deification.¹ In view of the power Isocrates attributed to logos, the power to change people and indeed the world, it is small wonder that he wrote what amounted to a Hymn to Logos,² a celebration, above all, of its civilizing and cultivating influence.

iii

The Hymn to Logos occurs in three places in Isocrates' orations. First, chronologically speaking, in the Panegyricus, 48-50, then in the Nicocles, 5-9, and finally, in its most developed form, in the Antidosis, 253-257.

However, praise of logos, harmonics, as it were, of the major paean, are to be found in many places in his works. For instance, in this passage in which Isocrates names the great Athenians.

In fact, however, you will find that among our public men, who are living today, or who have but lately passed away, those who give most study to the art of words are the best of statesmen who come before you on the rostrum, and, furthermore, that among the ancients it was the greatest and most

¹Jaeger, p. 91.

²Marrou, p. 81. cf. Plato's Hymn to Dialectic in Republic, VII.

illustrious orators who brought to the city most of her blessings. First of all was Solon . . . next, Cleisthenes. . . . After him Themistocles. . . . Finally Pericles. . . .¹

The study of logos, Isocrates asserts, is very closely related to the successful practice of the political arts. It is interesting to note that, although this is a political statement, Isocrates avoids actual involvement in contemporary politics. The passage is written for his pupils, as much as anyone else, and its aim is to enhance the stature of logos and not score points in political in-fighting.

In other passages Isocrates relates the art of words to such things as education, morality, religion, ancestors, patriotism, honour and, of course, Pan-Hellenism. For example, these two excerpts from the Antidosis:

Therefore, it behoves all men to want to have many of their youth engaged in training to become speakers, and you Athenians most of all.²

First of all, tell me what eloquence could be more righteous or more just than one which praises our ancestors in a manner worthy of their eloquence and their achievements? Again what could be more patriotic or more serviceable to Athens than one which shows that by virtue both of our own benefactions and of our exploits in war, we have greater claim to the hegemony than

¹ Antid., 231-234.

² Antid., 293.

the Lacedaemonians? And finally, what discourse could have a nobler or a greater theme than one which summons the Hellenes to make an expedition against the barbarians and counsels them to be of one mind among themselves."¹

The common characteristic of all the 'harmonics' is that they are concerned with, as it were, 'applied' logos. The Hymn itself is concerned much more with 'pure' logos.

The notion of the supremacy of logos appears for the first time fairly early in Isocrates' writings, but when he was in fact well into his sixth decade. We may assume therefore, that he had thought about it a great deal since the days when he was a student of Gorgias, before committing it to paper in the Panegyricus. Certainly it was a notion that he held to with increasing tenacity for the rest of his life.

The Panegyricus was written in about 380 B.C., when Isocrates' school had been open about ten years.² The Panegyricus version of the Hymn has all the elements as they appear later, but they are less extensively developed. The Nicocles version, written approximately ten years later,³ is copied precisely in the Antidosis, as part of a more general

¹Antid., 76-77

²R. C. Jebb, The Attic Orators (New York, 1962), II, 150.

³Ibid., 90.

defense of philosophy and education. The Antidosis was (Ammonius)
written some fifteen to twenty years after the Nicocles.¹

His aim in the Hymn is to praise the essential and inescapable power of logos, "eloquence, which all men crave and envy in its possessors."² No doubt most men valued it for very practical reasons, but Isocrates would have us believe that we should value it most because "it is the one endowment of our nature which singles us out from all living creatures," and has thus raised us "above them in all other respects as well."³

This is the central theme of the Hymn to Logos. It is logos that differentiates men from animals. It is logos that makes man truly human. He explains why in the Nicocles.

For in the other powers which we possess we are in no respect superior to other living creatures; nay, we are inferior to many in swiftness and in strength and in other resources.⁴

The very survival of the species depends on our powers of speech. This, at first glance, somewhat extreme statement, has in fact much merit to it. Certainly, man's capabilities as a maker and user of tools, capabilities in themselves dependant on the possession of an apposite thumb, have enabled

¹Jebb, 134.

²Paneg., 48.

³Ibid.

⁴Nic., 5. Antid., 253.

him to master, to a considerable extent, his environment. But information regarding tools and the techniques of using them, must in the main be transferred through the medium of language, written or spoken. Therefore the role played by the arts of communication in man's struggle to survive, is all important. Further, on a higher level, the ability to create and communicate abstract ideas as well as concrete information is entirely dependent on language. Logos, let us not forget, is the power of thought as well as speech.

Logos, therefore, marks us off from the animals and ensures the survival of the species. But it does much more than merely allow us to survive,

because there has been implanted in us the power to persuade each other and to make clear to each other whatever we desire, not only have we escaped the life of wild beasts, but we have come together and founded cities and made laws and invented arts; and generally speaking there is no institution devised by man which the power of speech has not helped us to establish."¹

The key phrase is "the power to persuade each other and to make clear to each other." This is a variation on the idea that good speaking implies good thinking. A further

¹Nic., 6. Antid., 254.

implication is that clear explanation is a prerequisite for persuasion. Persuasion in itself, as Isocrates well understood, is the hall mark of civilized as opposed to barbaric behaviour among men. When men use force instead of argument they forsake that which truly marks them off from the animal world.

The general import of the passage is that logos is responsible for civilization and the logical¹ extension of this thought is that the greater the mastery of logos shown by a people the greater the level of their civilization. It is logos, therefore, or perhaps more correctly the degree of logos, which discriminates between the civilized Hellenes and the barbarians, just as it also discriminates between men and animals. If the barbarians should master logos, then they would become as Hellenes, which title should then be "applied rather to those who share our common culture than to those who share a common blood."² Education, therefore can create a brotherhood of man. This concept prefigures Christianity and is based on the notion of a common culture rather than a common ethic.

¹N.B. A derivative of logos, of course. It is of perhaps more than passing interest that Aristotle who introduced the teaching of Rhetoric into the Academy, should also have devised the science of logic, i.e. the science of logos.

²Paneg., 50.

Logos can civilize even the barbarians because it

has laid down laws concerning things just and unjust, and things honourable and base; and if it were not for these ordinances we should not be able to live with one another. It is by this also that we confute the bad and extol the good.¹

The argument of the Hymn proceeds quite successfully on two levels. Isocrates implies that it is logos alone which lays down the laws of morality. Thus Isocrates deifies logos, for logos, like a god, can create the ethical and moral standards by which men live. But these standards are not remote and lofty ideals, which men can only try in vain to emulate. They are on the contrary essential to the conduct of every-day life. On the practical level the laws created on the ethical level enable men to live with one another. They provide, as it were, the lubricating oil of daily life. It is this intensely felt amalgam of the moral and the useful, one of which is useless without the other, just as speech and thought are useful only when they are conjoined, that is so quintessentially Isocratean.

Education is, of course, entirely a function of, and dependent on, logos. "Through this we educate the ignorant and appraise the wise."² Thus logos, and by implication

¹Nic., 7. Antid., 255.

²Nic., 7. Antid., 255.

education, has in the Isocratean view, a continuing role to play in life. Even the wise are in continual need of logos, because it is by logos that they both devise and express their wisdom. Logos, furthermore, is the mirror and reflection of the soul as well as the mind:

For the power to speak well is taken as the surest index of a sound understanding, and discourse which is true and lawful and just, is the image of a good and faithful soul.¹

Isocrates is beginning to tread on dangerous ground here, for he seems to be but a step from suggesting that good speaking is the same as being good. This is as wrong as the notion that knowledge and virtue are equivalent. The fact of the matter is that "true and lawful and just" discourse can be spoken by someone who has neither a "good" nor a "faithful soul". For all that he had lived within earshot of demagogues all his life, indeed, probably because he had done so, Isocrates was unwilling to believe that good, that is persuasive speeches could be made by someone who was not morally good. It was, I would suggest, a self-justifying and self-sustaining process which supported his disbelief. For if he believed a man to be bad he was unlikely to be persuaded by his argument, and if the man's discourse was unpersuasive that supported the belief that he was bad. In defence of Isocrates, it may be

¹Nic., 7. Antid., 255.

suggested that in a democracy where words have to be supported by deeds, he who speaks well may indeed be a good man. However, as we have learnt to our cost, the most dangerous demagogue is not the man who is plainly wicked, but he who is apparently good.

Logos, however, is a guide not only to the ethical nature of man but also to his cultural attainments, for it "has proved itself to be the surest sign of culture in every-one of us."¹ It would be difficult to deny the truth of this and it has many obvious implications for education. Logos, it is clear, must be at the heart of any educational system that has pretensions to culture and indeed this has been so, as far as Western education is concerned. Culture is, of course, a very broad category of human endeavour with artistic as well as intellectual connotations. Isocrates, it is interesting to see, covers the whole category in the last 'stanza' of the Hymn.

And, if there is need to speak in brief summary of this power, we shall find that none of the things which are done with intelligence take place without the help of speech, but that in all our actions as well as in all our thoughts speech is our guide, and is most employed by those who have the most wisdom.²

¹Paneg., 49.

²Nic., 9. Antid., 257.

This is a sweeping claim for logos and it is not altogether acceptable. After all, it is not true that those who talk the most are the wisest. But it is true that all higher levels of thinking are dependent on language.¹ This is a truism which has been re-stated in recent times by such linguists as B. L. Whorf. If nothing else this testifies to the longevity of Isocrates' ideas.

Logos in Isocrates offers the same kind of problems of interpretation as occur in Plato concerning dialectic. For instance, are logos and dialectic ends or means? Or are they both together? The problem in the case of logos is complicated by the fact that it also has the aim of forming doxa. Doxa, however, is not entirely separate from logos, even though it does exist as a separate entity. It is helpful to consider the sequence of the acquisition of logos and doxa. First, it is only by means of an intensive study of logos that it becomes possible to master it and to appreciate its power. Second, logos is used to arrive at doxa. But third, doxa can be held about logos, or at least aspects of logos, as much as anything else, and also about culture, which is created by the workings of logos. In other words doxai can be held about anything pertaining to human endeavour. It is necessary, therefore to turn our attention to doxa in order to understand its nature and function in relation to logos.

¹See in general Benjamin Lee Whorf, Language, Thought and Reality (Cambridge, Mass., 1956).

iv

The Greek word doxa presents few problems of a semantic nature. If we begin, as we did with logos, with a glance at a lexicon, we find that it means among other things, 'fancy,' 'mere opinion,' 'opinion,' 'judgement,' and 'philosophical opinion.' These meanings are clearly not compatible, 'fancy' and 'mere opinion' being directly opposite to 'judgement' and 'philosophical opinion.' Opinion itself, in English, is a colourless word, which requires adjectives such as good, bad, poor or sound to make its meaning clear.

The contrasted meanings in Greek are in fact reflections of the critical differences between the Isocratean and Platonic schools of thought.¹ We have already noted that as far as Plato was concerned doxa falls into the second category, pistis, of the epistemology represented by the Divided Line. In the Allegory of the Cave,² the man who puts all his faith in doxa is equivalent to the unbound man, who can move about the cave and see the light which makes the shadows on the rear wall of the cave. But his eyes are hurt by the light, which is according to Plato, the light of true

¹cf. Plato, Republic, 476a-480a.

²Plato, Republic, 514a-518d.

knowledge, and he therefore prefers to "flee to those things which he is able to discern and regard them as in very deed more clear and exact than the objects pointed out."¹

From a Platonic point of view, Isocrates fits this description very well. He is unbound in the sense that he is intelligent, receptive to new ideas and not hide-bound by the old.² But his rejection of true knowledge, that is to say of Platonic philosophy, condemns him to stay for ever in the cave, never able to really 'see the light' but instead constantly re-examining and re-evaluating what he mistakenly believes to be reality.

From an Isocratean point of view, the whole allegory is meaningless. Even if Isocrates could accept the picture of the world as a cave he would deny the existence of a so called 'real' world lying outside the cave. The idea of a transcendent reality and of a world of ideas outside the world in which we live is just so much stuff and nonsense. The cave, in that event, is not the cave of ignorance and superstition, but the cave of life and it is neither realistic nor practical to look for the solutions to life's problems

¹Plato, Republic, trans. Paul Shorey, Loeb Classical Library (London, 1953-56), 515e.

²Plato, Phaedrus, 278-279.

outside of it. His own useful solutions, he protests in the Antidosis, are decried by his rivals.

But why should we be surprised at him [Lysimachus his 'accuser'] when even among the professors of disputation there are some who talk no less abusively of the art of speaking on general and useful themes than do the most benighted of men.¹

Jaeger suggests that Isocrates' "purely practical mind never rose high enough to reach the clear vision of absolute standards which was for Plato the proof that education actually was possible."² It may well be that Isocrates' mind could not reach the levels attained by Plato, but this should not be allowed to obscure the possibility that absolute standards are as much of a myth as the cave. It might well be argued that moral standards are culturally relative and that ethics are best determined by situations rather than by rigid codes of conduct. If we consider the possibility of the confrontation of two absolutes, one of which must submit to the other, then it is apparent that an absolute can become a relative.³

¹Antid., 258.

²Jaeger, p. 150.

³e.g. Imagine the collision of Thou shalt not lie, and Thou shalt not kill. If to tell the truth would result in the death of someone, then it would be ethical to lie and unethical to tell the truth. From this point of view there are no categorical imperatives. See Joseph Fletcher, Situation Ethics, (Philadelphia, Pa., 1966).

Isocrates, of course, did not reject moral standards. Indeed the Areopagiticus, for example, is devoted to a plea for a return to the old standards of Athenian morality. But this morality was created by means of doxa, because men know, and can know, nothing of absolute norms of Truth or Beauty or Justice. His claim for his kind of education was that it helped men "to choose the right means and the right ends,"¹ and this was done by means of logos which enabled men to form doxa about means and ends. It was doxa and not episteme, knowledge, which fathered wisdom.² He did not believe, as Plato did, that knowledge and wisdom could be equated,³ nor did he believe in the teachability of virtue any more than in the teachability of the aesthetic sense.⁴ His view was rather that education could help inborn virtue and sensitivity develop and once they had developed, they would have great value in helping to form doxa and in the making of decisions. Not the least interesting aspect of Isocrates' thought is the role he thus gives to the aesthetic sense.⁵

¹Soph., 8.

²Jaeger, pp. 64 & 149.

³Plato, Theaetetus, 145 e.

⁴Antid., 274. Soph., 21. Jaeger, p. 66.

⁵Soph., 16-17.

Isocratean education was intended to make men capable of judging and deciding.¹ But,

from a fundamental scepticism [he] confined his teaching to the realm of opinion and belief. He held that right opinion was not part of an exact knowledge, but of genius -- so that it was inexplicable and could not be produced by teaching.²

There are, therefore, no superhuman philosopher-kings in Isocrates, but only men who, by their powers of conjecture doxais, "arrive generally at the best course."³ That is the true and only accessible sophia, wisdom. Whereas Plato hoped for men who, by means of education, would always know the answer to any problem, Isocrates, being aware of the imperfectibility of man, hoped to produce in his pupils only the ability to take the right decision in as many situations and as often as possible.

As Marrou said,

Isocrates himself chose as his particular province something that was a good deal more practical, and also a matter of urgent necessity: he educated his pupils for life, particularly political life, preferring to teach them to be able to form sensible opinions about things that were useful rather than spend their time in hair-splitting about points that were utterly useless.⁴

¹Jaeger, p. 104.

²Ibid., p. 149.

³Antid., 271.

⁴Marrou, p. 90.

Thus, Isocrates was very critical of other teachers, not so much because their teachings were intrinsically wrong, but because they failed to teach their students how to arrive, as far as possible, at doxa. In the most literal sense, he considered that their teaching was useless:

For I observe that some of those who have become so thoroughly versed in their studies as to instruct others in them, fail to use opportunely the knowledge which they possess. . . . I have the same fault to find with those who are skilled in oratory and . . . writings and in general all those who have superior attainments in the arts, sciences and in specialized skills . . .
[they do not] partake of the state of culture of which I am speaking.¹

The culture was that of logos and its application, doxa. He believed that the superiority of doxa over all other kinds of knowledge, was so overwhelming, that it was something that all could see and understand.

When, therefore, the layman puts all these things together and observes that the teachers of wisdom and dispensers of happiness are themselves in great want, but exact only a small fee from their students, that they are on the watch for contradictions in words but are blind to inconsistencies in deeds, and that, furthermore, they pretend to have knowledge of the future but are incapable either of saying anything pertinent or of giving any counsel regarding the present, and when he observes that those who follow their judgements [doxais] are more successful than

¹Panath., 28-29.

those who profess to have exact knowledge [episteme]¹, then he has, I think, good reason to condemn such studies and regard them as stuff and nonsense and not as a true discipline of the soul.

As exact knowledge is beyond the reach of man, he must fall back on doxa. The aim of education is, therefore, to help students arrive at doxa. Isocrates' epistemology, one might almost say doxology, is, therefore much less complex than that of Plato and it is in no way hierarchical. Words such as dianoia and noesis, thought and intelligence, have no technical meaning in Isocrates. It is interesting to note that pistis, the word used by Plato to denote the second level of his epistemology, the level which includes doxa, can mean 'a means of persuasion,' or a 'proof.' For doxa is above all an instrument of persuasion. It is not something that exists of itself or for itself. It exists only when it is used, when it is transformed by logos into an active force. It is, therefore, quite unlike agathon which exists, if we follow Plato, independently, and is 'out there somewhere,' waiting to be discovered by means of dialectic. Doxa exists in, by, and because of logos. It is something that is created by, and used by, logos, for a purpose.

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¹Antid., 7-8.

v

The complexities of Isocrates' philosophy, such as they are, are inherent in its texture. It is difficult to extract one element, even such a dominant element as logos, and view it entirely on its own.

For instance, the aesthetic sense, as we have already noted has a curious function to perform. It is not used simply, or even at all, to determine the beauty of a particular discourse or passage. It is used to determine its practical value. It is used to "appropriately adorn the whole speech with striking thoughts and to clothe it in flowing and melodious phrase."¹ The point is quite simply that a beautiful speech is more effective and more persuasive than an unadorned speech. There is, therefore, no such thing as a pure aesthetic sense in Isocrates, because the aesthetic value is always determined by the practical value.

Morality also has its uses. A passage in To Demonicus, already quoted in part, which begins, "virtue, that possession which is the grandest and most enduring in the world" also includes the phrase "better than riches and more serviceable than high birth. . . ." ² This may be dismissed as mere cynicism,

¹Soph., 16.

²To Dem., 6-7

but it is nevertheless interesting to see him place virtue above birth, thereby giving credit to development as well as heredity. It would also be unwise to attribute merely base motives to Isocrates, for the notion of virtue, of arete, is a very complex one. Arete may even be used in what we might consider a base fashion. It is in general judged by how it is used and does not contain abstract virtuous properties. It is the application of arete which makes it what it is. This is also true of the minor virtues that go toward making up a person's arete.

For instance, sophrosyne, the virtue of self-control, figures prominently in the list of Isocratean virtues. He advises Nicocles:

Govern yourself no less than your subjects
and consider that you are in the highest
sense a king when you are a slave of no
pleasure but rule over your desires more
firmly than over your people.¹

He ascribes the success of the Athenians "to sobriety and self-control."² He declares "that the most sovereign of the virtues are temperance and virtue,"³ and that "justice and temperance are the possessions of the good and noble alone."⁴

¹To Nic., 29.

²Peace, 119.

³Nic., 29-30.

⁴Nic., 43.

But sophrosyne is not welcomed for itself alone, but because it is "greatly beneficial to the life of man,"¹ and because, "those who practice it enjoy the most secure existence."²

Nothing restrains him [the king] except the virtues of justice and self-control, . . . their only source, therefore is the Prince's Paideia. Paideia brought to perfection is arete -- the highest of all goods.³

But Paideia is at least partially the product of education, of the forces of logos, so that in the last analysis Isocrates acknowledges the possibility of teaching something that is very close, if not identical to, virtue.

Two other elements of Isocrates' philosophy deserve mention at this point. They are kairos, opportune~~ss~~^s, and to prepon, fittingness. They have great practical importance both for logos and for Isocrates' educational theory in general. In many ways Isocrates' 'techne' is characterized by the ability to say the right thing at the right time. However, the teaching of kairos and to prepon is such an integral part of Isocrates' teaching method that the discussion of them in detail is left to that chapter.

Finally we must emphasise that logos, which is all powerful in Isocrates' philosophy, remains a powerful influence

¹Nic., 30.

²Peace, 119.

³Jaeger, p. 87.

on Western education to this day and has been so throughout its long history. It is still powerful because it is still true that "the right word is a sure sign of good thinking."¹ And as Marrou has suggested this is truly profound, perhaps even more profound than Isocrates realised.²

The importance, therefore, of Isocrates' concept of the nature and function of logos to Western education is incalculable. "Isocrates appears as the original fountain-head of the whole great current of Humanist scholarship."³ This alone makes his contribution something to be measured against and matched only by that of Plato.

¹Marrou, p. 90. See Nic., 7. Antid., 255.

²Marrou, p. 90.

³Marrou, p. 89.

IV CURRICULUM

Aristotle stands alone. Yet the school of Aristotle -- in which Rhetoric was both scientific and assiduously taught -- produced not a single orator of note except Demetrius Phalereus; the school of Isokrates produced a host. Why was this so? Clearly because Isokrates, though inferior in his grasp of principles, was greatly superior in the practical department of teaching. It was not mainly by his theory, techne, it was rather by exercises, meletai, for which his own writings furnished models, that he formed his pupils. At the same time, his theory, so far as it went, was definite.¹

This view of Jebb's is not wholly fair to Aristotle. After the Battle of Chaeronea and the establishment of the Macedonian Empire, there were far fewer opportunities for orators to display their talents in the democratic assemblies and therefore less opportunity for them to make names for themselves. Nevertheless the superiority of Isocrates' school in the production of both orators and statesmen is not to be denied. Jebb is quite correct in suggesting that it was in the practical department of teaching that Isocrates showed his superiority, and that his students learned the art of oratory by means of exercises based on his works. Jebb is also correct in suggesting that Isocrates' command of theory was less than that of Aristotle. However, it is unwise to

¹R. C. Jebb, The Attic Orators (New York, 1962), II, 431.

underestimate the philosophical basis of his teaching, for it was quite adequate to provide a solid theoretical foundation.¹

It is true that there was no techne, as such, in Isocratean educational theory. Although it is possible to extract a teaching method from Isocrates' works, it is not a rigid instructional formula. Techne, if it were applied to Isocrates' thought, would have to take on the meaning of an art, rather than the meaning of a technique and still less the meaning of a science. Isocrates was thus able to adapt his teaching to the circumstances of the classroom situation and of his pupils.

Isocrates had, as he tells us himself, little time either for techne, or those who professed to teach a techne,

I marvel when I observe these men setting themselves up as instructors of youth who cannot see that they are applying the analogy of an art, with hard and fast rules, to a creative process.²

The art, techne, to which Isocrates here refers, is probably poetry and the hard and fast rules, are therefore, the rules of metre and rhythm and so forth. It may seem strange to have poetry compared unfavourably as a creative art to speech-writing, but oratory, compared to poetry, was a relatively new art form. Indeed, the preparation of written speeches, as

¹See R. Johnson, "Isocrates' Method of Teaching," *AJPh*, LXXX (1959), 25-36. Also W. Steidle, "Redekunst und Bildung bei Isokrates," *Hermes*, LXXX (1952), 257-96.

²Soph., 12.

we have already noted, was in its very infancy. There were in fact, no rules for oratory, because there had been no time to develop them. It was Aristotle, of course, who carried out such a development. It is worth noting, incidentally, the number of references that Aristotle makes to Isocrates in the course of Rhetorica, as an accepted and acceptable authority.¹

Isocrates, therefore, involved as he was in the creation of a new branch of literature, had every reason to believe that it required a degree of skill and a kind of creativity quite foreign to the other literary arts. He declared that oratory is

good only if it has the qualities of fitness for the occasion, propriety of style, and originality of treatment, while in the case of letters [used in exactly the modern sense, as in arts and letters] there is no such need whatsoever.²

It was especially the qualities of fitness for the occasion and originality of treatment which made Isocrates quite adamant in his disapproval of any techne, for it seemed to him that no system of rules could accommodate such qualities. They were, as we shall see when we deal with them in his teaching method, qualities to be sensed rather than understood.

¹See Appendix B.

²Soph., 13.

Isocrates was opposed equally to textbooks of oratory and to those who "did not scruple to write the so-called arts of oratory."¹ He believed, of course, that there were no such arts. It seems safe, therefore, to reject the assertion, doubted even in antiquity, that Isocrates wrote a Techne, a treatise on rhetoric. Quintilian, referring to such a work, remarked, "if indeed the treatise on rhetoric which circulates under his name is really his"² and the pseudo-Plutarch uses his ubiquitous phrase "some say" to preface his remarks concerning the work.³ A work on the subject of Isocrates' Techne, certainly existed, but it is legitimate to speculate that it was either a work of one of his pupils or a work compiled and 'pirated' from his published work. Cicero apparently believed that Isocrates had written a work "ad artes componendas" basing his belief on evidence in the lost Aristotelian work Synagoge Technon.⁴ However, the wording of the passage in question, "he devoted his time to writing models of oratory and on the theory of their composition"⁵ is vague enough to apply also to the works of Isocrates with which Cicero was quite familiar.

¹Soph., 19.

²Institutio Oratoria, trans. H. E. Butler, Loeb Classical Library (London, 1921-22), II, xv, 4.

³(Plutarque), "Vies des Dix Orateurs," in Georges Mathieu and Emile Bremond, Isocrate Discours (Paris, 1963), p. xxxi.

⁴Cicero, Brutus, trans. G. L. Hendrickson and H. M. Hubbell, Loeb Classical Library (London, 1942), 46-48.

⁵Ibid.

It is important to stress that there was no Isocratean techne, because his curriculum and indeed, all his teaching methods, were based on the needs of his students, and not on the demands of a techne. It was necessary, therefore, for the teacher, for Isocrates himself, to have a very close personal relationship with his students. His description of the role and function of the teacher is very interesting, not least because it begins with an apparent contradiction of all that has just been said. A teacher "must so expound the principles of the art with the utmost possible exactness, as to leave out nothing that can be taught. . . ."¹ The key phrase is "to leave out nothing that can be taught." Isocrates' point is that there is a great deal that can not be taught. His fundamental scepticism did not permit him any belief in his own omniscience. But his deep-rooted conceit did not let him admit that anyone knew any more about rhetoric than he did. Thus, if he could find no place for an all-embracing techne, then it was clear that no one else could. Therefore all technai were useless. The curious result of this rather convoluted reasoning is that it allowed him to develop a very flexible and highly efficient teaching method, which was, as Jebb said, far superior to that of Aristotle.

¹Soph., 17.

The principles of the art, which he mentions, seem, in the light of this analysis, to be nothing more than broad generalities or, at the most, general theories about rhetoric. In any event, he gives a great deal of emphasis to the example to be set by the teacher, at least as great an emphasis as he gives to the principles:

he must in himself set such an example of oratory that the students who have taken form under his instruction and are able to pattern after him, will, from the outset, show in their speaking a degree of grace and charm which is not found in others.¹

This degree of grace and charm is to be acquired by means of the mastery of the elements of discourse. These elements are not to be confused with the principles of the art. They are rather the building blocks of the discourses, the actual material with which an orator must work.

I hold that to obtain a knowledge of the elements out of which we make and compose all discourses is not so very difficult. . . . But to choose from those elements those which should be employed for each subject, to join them together, to arrange them properly and also not to miss what the occasion demands, but appropriately to adorn the whole speech with striking thoughts and clothe it in flowing and melodious phrase -- these things, I hold, require much study and are the task of a vigorous and imaginative mind.²

¹Soph., 18.

²Soph., 16-17.

2/ The acquisition of knowledge, therefore, is of much less importance in Isocratean education than is the understanding of function. Education is a process and a development. It has to do with the structure more than the content of information.

However, although Isocrates does place this stress on process, his students had to have knowledge if not mastery of the elements before they could begin to combine them. It follows, therefore, that there was a curriculum in Isocrates' school, even if it was not expressly stated or considered to be of very great importance. The rest of this chapter will be an attempt to determine the nature of this curriculum. It will show, perhaps surprisingly, in view of what has been said, that Isocrates did in fact make some important contributions to curriculum theory in Western education.

Two points of great significance for the curriculum of Isocrates' school may be made before starting on the main analysis. The first is that although Isocratean education can be characterized as secondary and higher education for young men, the school itself was more than a secondary school and a university. It was also a political research institute predicated on the principles of Pan-Hellenism.¹ Further, during

¹H. I. Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity, trans. G. Lamb (London, 1956), p. 82.

the life-time of the school, it is likely that this became an increasingly important part of its function. Certain of the subjects in the curriculum must, therefore, be viewed in the light of this function.

The second point, which is closely related to the first, is that "rhetoric was no longer a matter of specialized education in forensic oratory, but now aimed at training men to occupy the highest posts in public life as statesmen and monarchs."¹ If that was true of Greek education in general, it was doubly true of the school of Isocrates. It is essential, therefore, to bear in mind that there was no such thing as an academic subject, in our sense of the term, in the Isocratean curriculum. All the elements of education were directed at achieving the necessary master of logos, which was itself necessary for the assumption of high office.

ii

Burk, in Die Padagogik des Isokrates, listed eleven subjects taught by Isocrates. They are Rhetoric, Grammar, Style, Speech Writing and Delivery, Local Studies, History, Archaeology, Law in its broadest sense, Religion, Practical

¹Werner Jaeger, Paideia: the Ideals of Greek Culture, trans. Gilbert Highet (Oxford, 1945), III, 102.

Wisdom and Philosophy.¹ R. Johnson added to this list Geography, Political Science and Strategy.²

These fourteen subjects could doubtless all be justified, one way or another, by reference to the orations, and in all probability it would be possible to add as many subjects again by further resort to the text. A case could be made out, for example, for Poetry,³ which would be at least as strong as the case for Archaeology, a subject which, in any case, seems to be singularly out of place in Fourth Century Athens. Again, it is difficult to justify the inclusion of Strategy and the exclusion of Diplomacy, for both topics are treated together in Isocrates' defence of Timotheus.⁴

Although it is true that Isocrates used his own discourses as models for his students, it is quite a different matter to assert that all matters touched upon in the discourses were full-fledged subjects, still less that they were all permanent fixtures in the Isocratean curriculum. Indeed, the opposite seems to be nearer the truth, for on careful examination it seems to be easier to discard items from the Burk and Johnson list than to justify their inclusion. To give but one example of this, Grammar, which appears on Burk's list, together with

¹August Burk, Die Padagogik des Isokrates (Wurzburg, 1923), pp. 118-119.

²R. Johnson, "Method," pp. 25-26.

³To Nic., 13.

⁴Antid., 117-126.

Music, which does not appear, both seem to be expressly excluded by Isocrates from his course of study.¹

This is not to say that the composition of lists of subjects taught by Isocrates is not of value. After all a curriculum is nothing more than a list of subjects and it is the aim of this chapter to produce a curriculum. However, the emphasis will be on producing, to use a modern term, a core curriculum, rather than a comprehensive and exhaustive list of subjects taught by Isocrates. There are two reasons for this. The first is that it is possible to show that such a core curriculum does exist. The second is that as the main, indeed in the strictest sense the only, subject taught was logos, and as, as we have already seen, logos was concerned with every phase of human activity, a complete and accurate list of all the subjects, topics and fields of interest presented in Isocrates' school would simply be an encyclopaedic index to the state of knowledge of the day. All subjects were liable to be grist to the Isocratean educational mill. If in fact certain subjects, such as speculative science, were not taught at the school, it then becomes necessary to determine, if possible, what subjects were taught and why. These subjects, therefore, make up the core curriculum, a curriculum centred on logos and highly interconnected. As Mikkola pointed out,

¹Antid., 266-67.

it is better "not to break him into fragments but to realize his wholeness and the interdependence of his thought."¹

An illustration of this point can be found in a remark attributed to Isocrates by the pseudo-Plutarch. Demosthenes, it is alleged, asked if he could pay two hundred drachmas, instead of the supposed one thousand drachma fee that Isocrates charged for instruction. In return he expected to receive only twenty per cent of the training. Isocrates replied,

Demosthenes we don't divide up our studies;
just as one sells beautiful fish in one
piece, so if you want to become my student
I will furnish you with my complete set.²

Although the story is almost certainly apocryphal, it serves to illustrate the point and also to emphasise that Isocratean education was a process, which it was impossible to segment.

The process was one of development and because different students took various periods of time in order to complete their development it came about that "they have studied with me in some cases three and in some cases four years."³

2) The criterion for success, therefore, was completed development

¹E. Mikkola, Isokrates (Helsinki, 1954), p. 5. Quoted in R. Johnson "Method," p. 35.

²(Plutarque), Isocrate Discours, p. xxix.

³Antid., 87.

and not the mastery of a set curriculum. The curriculum was as open to outside influence and was as fluid as was necessary in order to master the art of logos.

If logos was so central to Isocratean education, it follows that logos is also the centre of the curriculum. It is necessary therefore, to determine what logos as a subject might be and the simple answer is that logos was the study of the language and literature of Greece. There was, it must be stressed, no clear distinction between language and literature. In the schools of Hellas, education began with the study of literature. Once literature, mainly Homer, became familiar and the mechanics of writing Greek script were mastered, it was time for grammar.¹ This was the work for school boys² and in Isocrates' view this was essential preparation for the real work involved in the mastery of logos, the study of composition. His school was a cross between a sixth form, a political finishing school and an undergraduate university. Students came to it after a traditional grounding in reading, writing, and counting, and in sundry arts, such as were essential to a well-born Greek, perhaps the tuning of a lyre and the appreciation of a verse.³

¹See K. J. Freeman, Schools of Hellas, ed. M. J. Rendall, (London, 1912), Chapters II & III for Greek Primary Education.

²Antid., 267

³Marrou, pp. 82-83.

The study of literature, however, was unlikely to stop when the students reached Isocrates' school. As we shall see in the next chapter, it seems most likely that Isocrates recommended appropriate reading to supplement the study of his own works.¹ This would serve two purposes. First, by increasing the understanding and appreciation the students had for literature, it greatly lessened the danger that they would compose speeches which were no more than carbon copies of those of their master. This may not have been Isocrates' intention, but it would certainly have had such a broadening effect. Second, the students were able to use literature as a source of information and of inspiration. Literature included all manner of writings and not just literature in the modern sense. Thus Isocrates advised Demonicus to, "acquaint yourself with the best things in the poets as well and learn from the other wise men also any useful lessons they have taught,"² And he warned Nicocles; "Do not imagine that you can afford to be ignorant of any one either of the famous poets or of the sages."³ Poetry, as already mentioned, was a subject that was studied by the students of Isocrates. Certainly, his unfulfilled promise in the Panathenaicus to

¹R. Johnson, "Method," p. 30.

²To Dem., 51.

³To Nic., 13.

"speak on the poets at another time,"¹ bespeaks a confidence in his own ability to do so, a confidence based, no doubt, on his experience in teaching poetry. However, as poetry is an integral part of the study of language and literature, of logos, it cannot be presented as a separate subject in the curriculum.

Besides these benefits to be gained from the study of literature, Isocrates discerned another educative function which would also be of value. This function was to relate the present to the past and it had for Isocrates ethical, moral and political implications.

Moreover I think that the poetry of Homer has won a greater renown because he has nobly glorified men who fought against the barbarians, and that on this account our ancestors determined to give his art a place of honour in our musical contests and in the education of our youth, in order that we . . . may conceive a passion for like deeds.²

But Isocrates realised that it was not only Homer who could be used to inspire the youth of the day, nor only mythical characters such as Heracles and Theseus,³ but also real historical personages.⁴ He saw that the study of one particular branch of logos, the study of History, could be of great

¹Panath., 34.

²Paneg., 159.

³To Dem., 8. Panath., 130.

⁴e.g. Panath 196. Areop., 16.

practical value to his students. In this manner History was introduced to the curriculum and has remained so within Western education. We will return to a further consideration of logos after this section, but Isocrates' view of the educational role of History is of such great interest that it requires a section to itself within the general discussion of logos.

iii

Of course, Isocrates did not invent History. Nor is History, as Isocrates taught it, much like the scientific and objective study that it tries to be to-day. For one thing it was very closely related to political ends and aims. Nevertheless the past was, for the Isocrateans, both a useful source of information, a useful study in and of itself and an inspirational, moral and educative device.

Herodotus and Thucydides, who were incomparably greater writers than any of the historians who came out of Isocrates' school, were, in the strictest sense, chroniclers rather than historians. They wrote in order to record and they had no deliberate educational aim in mind. Herodotus begins his great work:

To rescue from oblivion the memory of former incidents and to render a just tribute of renown to the many great and wonderful actions, both of Greeks and the barbarians, Herodotus of Halicarnassus produces this historical essay.¹

Thucydides is just as explicitly a self-styled chronicler.

Thucydides, an Athenian, wrote the history of the war waged by the Peloponnesians and the Athenians against one another. He began the task at the very outset of the war, in the belief that it would be great and noteworthy above all wars that had gone before.²

It is interesting to compare these two statements with that made by Isocrates in his advice to Nicocles.

Reflect on the fortunes and accidents which befall both common men and kings, for if you are mindful of the past you will plan better for the future.³

"Reflect" and "be mindful," for History can be used. Chronicles are not only to "rescue from oblivion" and "render tribute," nor are incidents to be recorded just because they promise to be, or are, "great and noteworthy." They are also to point the way ahead for future actions.

The relationship of History to logos and the educational function of the relationship, Isocrates made plain in the Panegyricus.

¹Herodotus, History, trans. William Beloe, Classical Library (London, 1830), Bk., I, 1.

²Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. C. Foster Smith, Loeb Classical Library (London, 1919), Bk., I, 1.

³To Nic., 35.

For the deeds of the past are, indeed, an inheritance common to us all; but the ability to make proper use of them at the appropriate time, to conceive the proper sentiments about them in each instance, and to set them forth in finished phrase, is the peculiar gift of the wise.¹

History is the hand-maiden of logos, as indeed, is any field of knowledge. It is interesting to note that in this passage, which is one of the 'harmonics' of the Hymn to logos, there is the same concern with kairos, opportuneness, and with aesthetic values that we have encountered elsewhere. Another recurring theme in Isocrates, morality, is very closely connected to the study of History, because of the moral lessons that can be drawn and the comparisons that can be made with the past. Usually these comparisons do not favour the present. In the Antidosis, Isocrates complains bitterly about the conduct of the young men of his day.

The most promising of our young men are wasting their youth in drinking bouts, in parties, in soft living and childish follies . . . while those of a grosser nature are engaged from morning until night in extremes of dissipation which in former days an honest slave would have despised. You see some of them chilling their wine at the 'Nine Fountains;' others drinking in taverns, others tossing dice in gambling dens, and many hanging about the training schools of the flute girls.²

¹Paneg., 9-10.

²Antid., 286-87.

He finishes this curiously modern diatribe with the words, "I discourage such habits in my pupils." The most interesting point for our discussion is the reference he makes to "former days." In the Areopagiticus he not only refers to the past but specifically cites the old rulers of Athens who,

restrained the people from wrong-doing in both ways -- by punishment and watchfulness -- they saw in advance who were likely to commit some offence. Therefore the young men did not waste their time in gambling dens, or with flute girls.¹

He continues with another and longer attack on the habits of the young men, but concluding, interestingly enough with the disclaimer,

But let no one suppose that I am out of temper with the younger generation . . . it is more just to rest the blame upon those who directed the city a little before our time.²

There are lessons to be learnt, it is apparent, from the recent as well as the remote past. As has already been noted, besides the splendours of Pan-Hellenism, the other great Isocratean hope was to re-create the past. It is this aim that gave the greatest impetus to the teaching of History in his school and to its appearance in his discourses.

The historical lessons to be gleaned by his pupils from his works, were many and varied. He commented frequently on various laws and showed how History could be used to analyze

¹Areop., 47-50.

²Ibid.

them and place them in perspective. He advised those who make laws to rest in their labours and "only to put forth the effort to collect those which are approved in other states."¹ He had none of the belief that Plato had in the creation and validity of laws as a means of regulating human conduct.² He believed neither that laws were sufficient in themselves nor foolproof. "Virtue is not advanced by written laws but by the habits of everyday life," he commented in the Areopagiticus.³ A little later he declared, "Men who are badly reared will venture to transgress even laws which are drawn up with minute exactness."⁴ These were lessons to be learnt from History.

His most determined call for a return to past standards of behaviour and to the ways of the past was, of course, the Areopagiticus. It is not without historical interest that Plato's Laws and the Areopagiticus were written at about roughly the same time.⁵ For both call for a return to the old Council of the Areopagus, which in Plato became the Nocturnal Council. If Plato wanted to add certain inquisitorial

¹Antid., 83.

²Jaeger, p. 136.

³Areop., 40.

⁴Areop., 41

⁵When both Plato and Isocrates were very old men. Plato is supposed to have been working on the Laws when he died in 347, and Isocrates began the Areopagiticus in 355. See Marrou, p. 64., and George Norlin, Isocrates, II, 100.

functions to the Council, Isocrates was content to restore to it its old power and authority over the laws, customs, taste and education of the citizens.¹

The Areopagiticus however was more than a plea simply to return to the past. It was also in the nature of a historical textbook for his students. It could teach them about democracy, for example, the democracy of Solon.

I find that the one way -- the only possible way -- which can avert future perils from us and deliver us from our present ills is that we should be willing to restore that earlier democracy which was instituted by Solon.²

But it was not only the political system that Isocrates wished to be restored, it was the whole way of life of the time. This was another lesson to be learnt from History. As regards religion, for example, "they [the citizen's of Solon's democracy] were not erratic or irregular in their worship of the Gods or in the celebration of their rites."³ Again, history showed that, as regards ⁶social conduct and personal behaviour,

in the same manner also they governed their relations with each other. For not only were they of the same mind regarding public affairs, but in their private life as well they showed that degree of consideration for each other which is due from men who are right-minded and partners in a common fatherland.⁴

¹ Norlin, Isocrates, II, 102.

² Areop., 16.

³ Areop., 28-29.

⁴ Areop., 31.

One of the secrets which History revealed was that the success of the Council of the Areopagus was due largely to the way in which the members were selected. It was,

a body which was composed exclusively of men who were of noble birth and had exemplified in their lives exceptional virtue and sobriety and which, therefore naturally excelled all other councils of Hellas.¹

This body "exercised care over all the citizens but most of all over the young."² Thus, it was responsible for producing "men who have been educated liberally and trained in high-minded ways."³ This of course was Isocrates' own ideal, but it is interesting for us to note that in order to express it he went back in time to when "the citizens were so schooled in virtue so as not to injure each other, but to fight and conquer all who attempted to invade their territory."⁴

After reading the Areopagiticus, Isocrates' students could be in little doubt as to the educational value of History, certainly as regards the depiction of an ideal state. But History also had lessons of a more immediate political nature. On the Peace is openly a political document. In it

¹Areop., 37.

²Areop., 43.

³Areop., 43.

⁴Areop., 82.

Isocrates constantly cites historical instances to illustrate his points. He declares,

that the orators who exhort us to cling fast to peace have never caused us to suffer any misfortune whatever, whereas those who lightly espouse war have already plunged us into many great disasters.¹

In another passage he remarks on the dangers of the arrogance of power, taking as an example the Spartans,² whilst in the Panegyricus he praises them and takes pains to mention their contribution to the defeat of the "Asiatic hordes."³

Civic and personal virtue, politics and religion were some of the matters that could be studied through History. It was important not least because it introduced students to the idea that "in bygone days the entire life of Athenian young men was imbued with aidos, the honourable feeling of holy shame."⁴ It was Isocrates' intention to try and revive this feeling of aidos which he believed had a lot to offer the democracy of his time, even if it was imbued with aristocratic morality and was the end product of an aristocratic educational ideal. The significance of this is that for at least two thousand years after Isocrates, education was principally

¹Peace., 12.

²Peace., 102.

³Paneg., 75-85.

⁴Jaeger, p. 122.

concerned with the education of the children of the ruling aristocracies. As we shall see in a later chapter, there is a clear connection between, for example, Sir Thomas Elyot's The Boke named the Governour, or Erasmus' The Education of a Christian Prince, and Isocratean ideals. Certainly, the genre is the same as that whose first representatives were the Cyprian Orations.

Further, Isocrates' nationalistic ideology, an ideology in which Athens is the founder of all civilization and in which there are many other ideas implicit in his paideia, was taken over by humanism as part of its general view of History.¹ Thus Isocrates had some influence, not only on the fact that History became a regular part of the school curriculum and the university calendar, but also on the form that History took as an intellectual discipline. Isocrates must, therefore, be granted a position of some importance in the history of the development of History, of less moment no doubt, than Herodotus and Thucydides, but nevertheless of lasting significance.

In the Isocratean theory of education, History plays the role that is played elsewhere in Greek educational theory by mathematics or by dialectic.² It was from History that the

¹Jaeger, p. 77.

²Jaeger, p. 101. To Nic., 35.

that the student was to get, not only inspiration, but also a finer appreciation of the nature of logos. Although, History cannot be divorced from logos, it is clear that it earned the right to be declared a separate subject in the Isocratean curriculum.

iv

However, logos remained the central subject of the school of Isocrates. All literature was part of logos and any part of literature could become part of the curriculum, if and when it was needed. Poetry and History no doubt had permanent places. As for the rest, Isocrates makes some distinction in the Antidosis between those topics which are, and those topics which are not pertinent to him. Among the latter he cites, genealogies of demi-gods, studies in the poets, histories of war and dialogues.¹ This is not to be construed as a definitive list of prohibited subjects. Certainly, studies in the poets could not have been totally excluded from the curriculum, because a large part of the study of logos must have been in the form of literary criticism, from which it would not be possible to omit "studies of the poets."

¹Antid., 45-46.

The requirement that an orator should know of, or about, all things, was spelled out in detail later, in the works of Cicero, but it was already implicit in Isocrates. In practice emphasis was undoubtedly placed on certain topics which were "pertinent". But the definition of pertinence was one that was liable to an almost infinite variation, for what was pertinent at one time might well not be pertinent at another and vice-versa. Further, the needs of one student at a particular time were liable to vary a great deal from those of another. It is clear, therefore, that a fixed curriculum was impossible and that it was indeed encyclopaedic in potential.

An example of this is the fact that Isocrates was not totally blind to the merits of other educational systems. This may well have been a recognition that no one system could possibly cover all the knowledge that was even then available. In the Nicocles he declared, "I myself welcome all forms of discourse which are capable of benefitting us even in a small degree."¹ It is not quite as surprising, therefore, to encounter in the Antidosis² and in the Panathenaicus³

¹Nic., 10.

²Antid., 265-68

³Panath., 26.

Isocrates advising young men to study Geometry, Astronomy and even the 'eristic' dialogues. Marrou has suggested that, in fact, Isocrates added Mathematics to his general curriculum.¹ However, this assumption does not seem to be supported by the passages in question. It may have been that, just as Plato was forced to admit the teaching of Rhetoric into the Academy, because, presumably, of the pressure of the demands from students for its inclusion, so Isocrates was forced to admit the literally Academic subjects into his school. The evidence for this is not persuasive.

His recommendation of these subjects deserves some explanation, however. By the time that he did recommend them, he was an old man and his school was well-established and there was, therefore, no threat implied by such recognition. In any event the subjects had become popular and there was nothing that Isocrates could do but bow, as gracefully as possible, to the inevitable fact that they were of educational value. In any event there was no strong animosity between Plato and Isocrates, despite stories to the contrary.² Thus,

¹Marrou, p. 83. See also H. Ll. Hudson-Williams, "A Greek Humanist," Greece and Rome, IX, No. 27 (1940), 171.

²M. L. W. Laistner, De Pace and Philippus, Cornell Studies in Classical Philology, XXII, 1927, xiv-xv.

as the two great men grew older and their similarities became more obvious, similarities such as their innate conservatism, distrust of contemporary democracy, absorption in educational problems, even their shy and retiring dispositions,¹ and as professional rivalry simply became less relevant, it became possible for Isocrates to acknowledge that which was of value in Plato's teaching.

Isocrates' recommendation of the Academic subjects is quite warm. He speaks of "the subtlety and exactness of astronomy and geometry" which force us "to apply our minds to difficult problems . . . and not let our wits go wool-gathering." He goes on, "we gain the power, after being exercised and sharpened on these disciplines, of grasping and learning more easily and more quickly those subjects which are of more importance and of greater value."² Such training, however, is not philosophy but "a gymnastic of the mind and a preparation for philosophy." It is harder than schoolboy studies such as grammar but of much the same nature. The students "are not a whit advanced in their ability to speak

¹George Grote, Plato (London, 1881), I, 248.

²Antid., 265-66.

and deliberate on affairs, but they have increased their aptitude for mastering greater and more serious studies."¹ This is a classic description of the alleged benefits of the transfer of training and Isocrates was probably giving more credit to the Academic subjects than was strictly speaking their due. He ends his recommendations on a more acid note.

I would therefore advise young men to spend some time on these disciplines, but not to allow their minds to be dried up by these barren subtleties, nor to be stranded on the speculations of the ancient sophists. . . .²

The ancient Sophists are the Ionian scientists. The whole tone of this excerpt, I would suggest, is that of Isocrates bowing to the inevitable, but not to the extent that his school would offer tuition in these subjects. The drift of the whole passage indicates his scepticism, which is based predominately on the inability of these subjects, intellectually stimulating as they may be, to help in the management of affairs. In no way could they really help to form doxa.

Doxa remains the product of logos and logos, to Isocrates' way of thinking, was in no way helped by scientific subjects except in so far as they had a minor role as "gymnastic

¹Antid., 266-67.

²Antid., 268.

of the mind." This curious expression we shall find in the next chapter has a lot to do with his own view on teaching methods. His teaching methods will also shed light on the language aspect of logos. This is the most important aspect of the curriculum, for the two other major parts of it, namely the study of Literature and History are themselves ancillary to the acquisition of a command of language. It is to be noted that Isocrates was concerned with a mastery of Greek, the vernacular. It was not a dead but a live language. Greek was the language of culture, but its great importance to Isocrates was that it was also the language of the day. The incorporation of Greek and to a much greater extent Latin, in the school curriculum after the Renaissance was in response only to the first part of that statement. For Isocrates it was important to have a command of the language of culture, but if that was not the vernacular, then it was not useful. It is difficult to imagine Isocrates giving his approval to the teaching of Latin and Greek as it has been taught in the West, yet he must in some measure be held to account for it.

The curriculum of Isocrates school, therefore was the study of logos. This had three major aspects, the study of the Language, the Literature and the History of Greece. Each one of these aspects served to throw light on such topics

as Religion, Politics, Society, Personal Morality and Culture in general. However these do not deserve the title of subjects and should not be regarded as such. To these main areas of interest can be added almost any aspect of human knowledge and behaviour, not excluding the study of such subjects as Astronomy and Geometry. The only criterion was the degree of practical value that any topic might add to the command of logos. There was, therefore, no such thing as an extra-curricular academic subject.

It is worth noting however, that Isocrates warmly commended the ancients for compelling young men "to devote themselves to horsemanship, athletics [and] hunting . . . to achieve excellence . . . to abstain from many vices."¹ These were no part of the curriculum but they are a reflection of his belief in a sound body and a healthy mind² and also a precursor of the same belief, especially in British education. Certainly he knew that if young men were not kept in the field or in the palaestra there was every chance that they would be with the flute girls or in the gambling dens or at the Nine Fountains.

¹Areop., 45.

²To Dem., 40.

V TEACHING METHOD

A curriculum, of course, offers no more than guide lines in any educational enterprise. The success or failure of such an enterprise is dependent to a great extent on the way in which the guide lines are followed. Too close an adherence to the curriculum can result in narrow and stilted tuition; too loose, and the end may well be chaos. To a large extent, Isocrates was able to avoid both these extremes because of his general commitment to logos on the one hand, and his lack of commitment to particular and specialized studies on the other. His teaching method, therefore, was a model of flexibility. It was based, of course, on general principles and it will be the purpose of this chapter to determine the nature of these principles, along with the manner of their application. But we must not lose sight of the fact that neither the curriculum nor the teaching method that Isocrates employed were sacrosanct. Far more important were the particular needs of his students and the general aim of acquiring a mastery of logos by whatever means were necessary. Isocrates can lay claim to the honour of being the first teacher to practice incidental learning.

Jebb, in the quotation presented at the beginning of the previous chapter, put it very well when he suggested

that the reason for Isocrates' success was his great superiority in the practical department of teaching.¹ We have no eye-witness account of his teaching in progress but we are able to piece together a description from his own works, which will serve our purpose. Of one thing we can be certain. "It was not mainly by his theory, techne . . . that he formed his pupils. At the same time, his theory, so far as it went, was definite."²

ii

The success of any teaching method is determined to a large extent by the number of students to be taught at any one time. Conversely, the number of students to be taught can be a major factor in determining the method to be used. The question, therefore, of the number of pupils that Isocrates had, is of considerable importance. It is also a question that is not easily answered. The difficulties involved in its solution are made manifest in an article by R. Johnson, entitled, "A Note on the Number of Isocrates' Pupils."³

¹R. C. Jebb, The Attic Orators (New York, 1962), II, 431.

²Ibid.

³AJPh. LXXVII (1957), 297-300.

Johnson believes that Isocrates had about a hundred pupils during his lifetime, as against the hundred at any one time suggested by Freeman.¹ Freeman's assessment is based, presumably, on the statement by the pseudo-Plutarch that Isocrates had a hundred students.² Johnson argues that that ~~no~~^{very} many students at one time would require an intake of at least twenty-five each year, assuming that the average length of stay was about four years.³ His school was in existence for roughly fifty years, from about 390 to 340. Even allowing for a reduced intake in his later years this would mean a total number of students of from one thousand to one thousand two hundred and fifty, which seems, in Johnson's view, to be somewhat excessive.

This view is derived from an estimate of Isocrates' income based on a supposed standard fee of one thousand drachmas per pupil. This would make his lifetime earnings well over one million drachmas or more than two hundred talents, if he did indeed have over one thousand pupils. As Nicias and Callias, both renowned as very rich men, left something between one hundred and two hundred talents each,⁴ this would make Isocrates very

¹K. J. Freeman, Schools of Hellas (London, 1912), p. 191.

²(Plutarque), "Vies des Dix Orateurs," in Georges Mathieu and Emile Bremond, Isocrate Discours (Paris, 1963), p. xxviii.

³R. Johnson, "A Note," p. 298.

⁴Ibid.

rich indeed, especially if we add to his total income the twenty talents the pseudo-Plutarch tells us he received from Evagoras,¹ and another talent from Timotheus.²

Whilst agreeing with Johnson that such enormous wealth is beyond the bounds of possibility it must be pointed out that his figures are based on the unlikely assumption that all his students paid one thousand drachmas. If it can be shown, as I believe it can, that this is not so, then Johnson's argument that Isocrates could only have had one hundred pupils without accumulating vast wealth, is invalid. Indeed, any connection between Isocrates' fees and the number of pupils then becomes merely speculative.

The critical point to establish is whether or not Isocrates charged Athenians for his services. Certainly, he wishes to give the impression that he did not. In the Antidosis he declares that "my resources, which this fellow [Lysimachus his accuser] has exaggerated, have all come to me from abroad."³ Later he has one of his students say, "they think that these fees which come to you from your foreign pupils, are much greater than they actually are."⁴ Notice

¹(Plutarque), p. xxix.

²(Plutarque), p. xxviii.

³Antid., 39.

⁴Antid., 147.

that in both passages not only is the foreign source of his income emphasised but also the fact that he is not as wealthy as supposed. This supports Johnson's supposition that Isocrates did not make a huge fortune. Isocrates' most definite statement on the question of charging Athenians is, "I . . . have provided my advantages from foreigners."¹ By this he meant his foreign students, and also, perhaps Timotheus and Evagoras. However his denials are not entirely convincing, for there is some evidence, not only in the pseudo-Plutarch,² but also in the works of Demosthenes,³ that Isocrates did charge Athenians, not least Demosthenes himself. Furthermore, if we consider the manner in which Isocrates came to teaching, by way of logography, and if we also consider the fact that his school must have passed through a period of struggle before it had made a reputation, during which time Isocrates needed money, it is highly unlikely that Isocrates did not at some time charge fees to Athenian students.

The situation is clearly analogous to his denial that he was ever a logographer. There certainly was a time when Isocrates did charge fees to all and sundry. But with

¹Antid., 164.

²(Plutarque), p. xxviii.

³Demosthenes, Against Lacritus, 15 & 42, in The Crown, The Philippics and ten other Orations, trans. C. Rann Kennedy (London, 1911).

the growth of his own wealth, the growth of the reputation of the school and, perhaps, with the example of Plato before him, by the time he wrote the Antidosis, he had ceased to charge Athenians. This would fit in with his expressions of love for his native city. He therefore, wished to give the impression that he had never charged fees, just as he wished to give the impression that he had never been a logographer.

We can even hazard a guess as to the date when Isocrates ceased to charge fees. Demosthenes was born in 383.¹ By 368-365 he would be ready for the kind of education that Isocrates could provide. He was, however refused entry because he could not pay the fee,² so we know that Isocrates still levied fees on Athenians at that time. But by that time Isocrates had written the Evagoras³ and must shortly afterwards have presented it to Nicocles, who, in turn, presented Isocrates with a large sum of money.⁴ The Antidosis, which contains the remarks, as we have seen, concerning the money Isocrates received from abroad was published by at least 353.⁵ We know that Isocrates took a long time writing anything

¹The Oxford Companion to Classical Literature, Ed. Sir Paul Harvey (Oxford, 1962), p. 139.

²(Plutarque), p. xxix.

³La Rue Van Hook, Isocrates, Loeb Classical Library (London, 1961), III, 3.

⁴Antid., 40.

⁵George Norlin, Isocrates, Loeb Classical Library (London, 1962), II, 183.

as important as the Antidosis, so we may assume that he began it in the late sixties, immediately after receiving the pension that made him financially secure and which no doubt allowed him to make the gesture of remitting the fees of Athenian students. It is unlikely that he could have been levying fees on them when the Antidosis was published so we may safely assume that by about 363 he had ceased to do so. In that case his references to money from abroad would apply more to Evagoras than to his foreign students.

Johnson's carefully calculated figures, which allowed him to conclude that Isocrates had a hundred students in his lifetime are therefore largely meaningless because it is clear that Isocrates did not always charge all of his students. The figure of a hundred is in any event clearly arbitrary, as is the figure of one thousand drachmas. Both are derived from the Pseudo-Plutarch, who must be deemed a doubtful source. The latter figure has some support from the Orations of Demosthenes.¹ But it is not a firm declaration of the fact that one thousand drachmas was a standard charge. The question of how many students Isocrates might have had is further complicated by the fact that the Pseudo-Plutarch, besides mentioning the one hundred students, also declared that

¹ Against Lacritus, 42.

Isocrates "welcomed whoever sought him."¹ This seems to be at odds with his other statement. We are forced to conclude that one hundred is simply a round figure, which may even be taken as a synonym for 'a lot.' As Laistner pointed out, when the Pseudo-Plutarch spoke of one hundred pupils, "in all probability he has taken into account only those thought worthy of enumeration by the third century writer Hermippus, and the total of Isocrates' pupils may well have been far greater."²

Isocrates himself commented on the many students that he had had, "more than all the rest together who are occupied with philosophy."³ Some eighty pupils of Plato alone are known, which would seem to make nonsense of this claim, even if it is an example of rhetorical hyperbole unless Isocrates had considerably more than a hundred pupils. No proper estimate of the number of students Isocrates had can be made. There were, in all probability, a large number, certainly more than a hundred if considerably less than one thousand two hundred and fifty. The number attending the school at any one time may have varied considerably especially if we believe that he did in fact welcome all who sought him.

¹(Plutarque), p. xxviii.

²M. L. W. Laistner, "The Influence of Isocrates' Political Doctrines on some Fourth Century Men of Affairs," The Classical Weekly, March 10, 1930, XXIII, No. 17, 129.

³Antid., 41.

However, if we are unable to say much with certainty about the size of his school we can speak with greater confidence about the size of his classes. This is, of greater importance in the analysis of his teaching method.

In the Antidosis, he tells us that he had first three and then five students.¹ This may be some indication of the average size of his classes. On the other hand, the fact that "all these men were crowned by Athens with chaplets of gold,"² may well be evidence that he was singling out only his star pupils for universal admiration.

In the Panathenaicus, he remarks at one point that he was "revising it with three or four youths who are wont to spend their time in my company."³ These two pieces of evidence seem to confirm each other and allow us to tentatively conclude that he usually taught between three and five students at a time. There are several small provisos to be made, however. The Panathenaicus was written when Isocrates was over ninety years old. It may have been, therefore, that the size of his classes was smaller at that time than they had once been. Furthermore, not only might the

¹Antid., 93.

²Antid., 94.

³Panath., 200.

classes at one time have been larger, there may also have been more of them. That is to say, it may have been possible for Isocrates to teach more than one group of students during a 'school year.' Indeed, in view of the amount of reading and composition work that they must have had to do, his students must have spent a great deal of time working on their own. This would leave him with sufficient time to deal with one or more other groups. The fact that most of his great and long works were written after he was eighty, may be taken as some corroboration that his teaching load declined as he got older, a decline measured in terms of the number of groups of students that he was teaching at any one time, not in the number of students in any one group.

His teaching method, which we shall now examine in some detail, is indeed a small-group method, with some elements of informal lectures, object lessons and, perhaps most important, tutorial groups included.

ii

Much of what is germane to a study of Isocrates' teaching method appears in a section of the Antidosis,¹ to which we shall, in consequence, refer almost continuously.

¹Antid., 180-194.

He begins, he tells us, like a genealogist, at the beginning. He makes, first of all, a fundamental distinction between the mind and the body and their functions. It "is the function of the mind to decide both on personal and public questions and of the body to be servant of the judgements of the mind."¹ However, although "gymnastic and philosophy" are separate they "are twin arts, parallel and complementary."² "For the greatest thing in the smallest compass is a sound mind in a human body,"³ and they cannot, in consequence, be separated. Not surprisingly, therefore, they use "similar methods of instruction, exercise and other forms of discipline."⁴ In other words, the teaching of philosophy and the teaching of gymnastic require essentially the same method. This is very important and allows us to be very certain of the nature of Isocrates' teaching.

He compares the teachers of philosophy to the paidotribes, the wrestling coaches who, "instruct their followers in the postures which have been devised for bodily contests."⁵ The postures or holds of the wrestlers are akin to the rhetorical devices which are taught in Isocrates' school, for use in verbal contests. The comparison with

¹Antid., 180.

²Antid., 181-82.

³To Dem., 40.

⁴Antid., 182.

⁵Antid., 183.

philosophy is always an instructive one, but this is especially so in this case. If we imagine the paidotribes in the palaestra as he first demonstrates a hold, then sets the boys in his charge to practicing and finally as he moves about from pair to pair correcting and encouraging the boys in their work, then we also have a vivid picture of the way in which the early stages of Isocratean education were conducted. This is also a teaching method much like that we may assume was used by the grammatikos, the teacher of letters, who was in charge of the earlier stages of education before the boys came to Isocrates. The work situation would thus be familiar to his students and the transition from one stage to another easy and smooth. This would be so whether Isocrates intended it or not.

In terms of the curriculum, this first period was concerned with imparting "all the forms of discourse in which the mind expresses itself."¹ Although the aim was instruction in the form and style of logos in general, no doubt in practice it was very closely tied to the style of Isocrates. His discourses were used as models of style and perhaps comparisons were made with the work of other orators. At this stage also much reading must have been required in order to examine all

¹Antid., 183.

the forms of discourse. The lessons learnt from the study of Literature and History were then applied, if we follow the wrestling analogy, in exercises and even in mock debates between pairs of boys, a device which is in evidence also at later stages. In this manner, the students would increase their command of language and also no doubt their own self-confidence. Because of the small size of the classes, also a feature of instruction in the palaestra, let it be noted, Isocrates was in a position to give highly individualized instruction and extra tutoring to those pupils who evinced weaknesses in certain areas.

This stage may have been rather mechanical, but it was of basic importance, laying the groundwork of what was to come. The next stage was to set the students to using what they had learnt by means of exercises. This they had already begun to do, but it was no longer a matter of learning the holds, as it were, of learning rhetorical devices. It was much more in earnest. It was meant to "habituate them to work, and require them to combine in practice the particular things which they have learned."¹ The emphasis on work is important. Although Isocrates insisted on the pleasures of

¹Antid., 184.

study, ponoi hedones echontes,¹ he made no bones about the fact that it was at least as much ponos, drudgery, as it was hedone, pleasure:

All knowledge yields itself up to us only after great effort on our part.²

[Students must] pay out money and submit to toil.³

People [may] succeed in making progress through their own diligence alone.⁴

Education and diligence are in the highest degree potent to improve our nature.⁵

It would be false however, to assume that Isocrates advocated hard work above all else. It remains nevertheless one of the fact of Western educational life that hard work, in and for itself, has often been the sole apparent aim of education, at least from the point of view of the schoolboy. Too often the pleasure as well as the drudgery of education has not been emphasised. Isocrates must take some of the responsibility for this.

Besides working hard the students were expected to practice what they had learnt "in order that they may grasp

¹H. H. Hudson-Williams, "A Greek Humanist," Greece and Rome, IX, No. 27 (1940), 166.

²Antid., 201.

³Antid., 289.

⁴Antid., 208.

⁵To Nic., 12.

them more firmly and bring their theories into closer touch with the occasions for applying them."¹ The word that Norlin translates as 'theories' is in fact doxais, or opinions. In other words, the students were to practice the art of making their opinions known. The implication is that real issues were discussed and debated in these practice sessions and not imaginary or trivial matters.

Another interesting and important word in this passage is kairos, best translated as the right moment. It and to prepon, fitness, have already been mentioned as important notions in Isocrates.² They are best understood in terms of the wrestling metaphor. In wrestling it is important to select an appropriate hold at a particular stage in the contest. There is presumably, a best hold in any particular situation. Similarly in the composition of a discourse, or in the delivery, there is always a best word or phrase or thought at any particular point. The selection of any of these, or for that matter of a particular wrestling hold, is a matter for the exercise of to prepon. This is plainly a skill that may only be acquired by means of practice.

¹Antid., 184.

²See Chapter III.

However, the selection of the fittest element, is very much dependant on the particular stage which the contest, bodily or otherwise, has reached. It must not only be appropriate to the discourse as a whole but to the particular moment. Again if we think of the wrestling match, it is not only a matter of having a particular hold at a particular time, but knowing when to increase the pressure and by how much, or when to make the throw by means of the proper hold in order to finish the contest. The importance of timing to wrestling is clearly of vital interest, but no more so, in Isocrates' eyes, than to the art of logos. It is not simply sufficient to have sound and defensible opinions. Orators must also know which particular opinion to use at any particular time, if they are to be effective. Even if Isocrates was himself confined to writing discourses, his students were not, and no doubt the practice debates helped teach them how to think and talk on their feet.

Once the essential elements of logos had been mastered, in so far as a process may be said to have reached a stage of completion such that the term can be used, and the students had also become practiced in the art of combining these elements into speeches and had learnt how to deliver speeches and partake in debates with due regard for kairos and to prepon, the third stage of Isocratean education could be entered upon.

As we shall see when we examine this stage, this is something of an over-simplified description of the progress of the student through the school. But the first two stages must have preceded to some extent the third, simply because of its nature, even if it is also true that all three stages were partially concurrent. In order to understand this third stage and indeed to throw light on Isocrates' teaching method as a whole, it is worthwhile paying some attention to Isocrates' concept of educational psychology.

iv

Isocrates' teaching method is to a large degree pragmatic, in so much as it could be adjusted to the needs of any particular pupil as well as to the demands of logos. It is possible to trace this pragmatism through Western education at least up to the thought of John Dewey. Isocrates was pragmatic in so much as he denied the existence of a science by which either paidotribes or philosophy teachers could "make capable athletes or capable orators out of whomsoever they please."¹ They are, however, "able to advance their pupils to a point where they are better men and where they are stronger in thinking

¹Antid., 185.

or in the use of their bodies."¹ Isocrates claims for education are, perhaps suprisingly, low-keyed. The teachers "can contribute in some degree to these results but these powers are never found in their perfection save in those who excel by virtue both of talent and of training."²

The relationship between talent and training is of great importance to an understanding of Isocrates' teaching method. He tells us:

I say to them [his pupils] that if they are to excel in oratory or in managing affairs, or in any line of work, they must, first of all, have a natural aptitude for that which they have elected to do.³

This is a logical point of view and it is in fact the criterion accepted in general in the West for the provision of secondary education. This is not to say that Isocrates was responsible for its adoption as a general rule, only that it was something that appeared to be self-evident. Often, of course, in the centuries since Isocrates' time it was assumed that if someone belonged to a certain social class they automatically possessed the requisite aptitude. Isocrates, dealing as he was with only one class, was not of course aware of this possible discrimination.

¹Antid., 185.

²Antid., 185.

³Antid., 187.

The weak spot in any selective system of education is the method of selection. It is instructive, therefore, to note that Isocrates advocated that men should "elect to do" whatever they had the aptitude for. They were not selected.

Although Isocrates placed a great emphasis on aptitude, he could not ignore the power of either instruction or, as we have seen, of practice and hard work. His students, "must submit to training and master the knowledge of their particular subject whatever it may be in each case."¹ Submission to training means submission to a teacher. This must be so because "no one but the master [has] the ability to impart knowledge . . . the master must painstakingly direct his pupil, and the latter must rigidly follow the master's instruction."² Knowledge is essential if the student is to "become fully competent and pre-eminent in any line of endeavour," and if he is to "become versed and practiced in the use and application of [his] art."³

Rigidity, subservience, imitation and drudgery are all inherent in this prescription for successful learning. They are at the root of much that has been and, indeed still is, wrong with Western education. If Isocrates was able himself

¹Antid., 187.

²Antid., 188.

³Antid., 187-88.

to escape the worst aspects of these faults, it can only have been because of his close and intimate relationship with his students, a relationship made possible only by the small size of his classes. There is food for thought in this. Isocrates was not alone in his idea of the role of the teacher and the ancient world had to wait for Quintilian to suggest a less authoritarian role. It is only in comparatively recent times that Western education in general has begun to respond to calls for more humanistic and humane attitudes toward school children.

In Isocrates' educational psychology, as we have already noted, aptitude and ability stand first in the hierarchy of requirements for learning.

If anyone . . . were to ask me which of these factors [ability, training or practice] has the greatest power in the education of an orator I should answer that natural ability is paramount and comes before all else.¹

This is a little difficult to reconcile with some of the statements he made concerning the value and meritsoof hard work. For instance this passage in the Antidosis, which seems to play down inherent ability.

I marvel at men who felicitate those who are eloquent by nature on being blessed with a noble gift, and yet rail at those who wish to become eloquent, on the ground that they desire an immoral and debasing education. Pray, what [is it] that is noble by nature [but] becomes shameful and base when one attains it by effort?²

¹Antid., 189.

²Antid., 291.

This is a defence not only of his own kind of education but also education in general. It appears to be in direct contradiction to the passage, in which, after declaring that "native ability and practice" are essential to the training of an orator he declares that "I cannot make a like claim for education; its powers are not equal or comparable to theirs."¹ The reason being, that no matter how thorough education might be, if a student should "lack one thing only, namely assurance . . . he would not be able to utter a word."² It is very interesting to see how Isocrates derived his general psychology of education from an introspective examination of his own psychology.

In order to resolve these apparent inconsistencies and thus determine the relationship existing between ability, training and practice we need to take note of what Isocrates has to say on the subject.

Given a man with a mind which is capable of finding out and learning the truth and of working hard and remembering what it learns, and also with a voice and a clarity of utterance which are able to captivate the audience, not only by what he says, but by the music of his words, and, finally, with an assurance which is not an expression of bravado, but which, tempered by sobriety, so fortifies the spirit that he is no less at ease in addressing all his fellow-citizens than in reflecting to himself -- who does not know that such a man might, without the advantage of an elaborate education and with only a superficial and common training, be an orator such as has never, perhaps, been seen among the Hellenes?³

¹Antid., 192.

²Antid., 192.

³Antid. 189-190

Ability, to Isocrates, therefore, means not only a mind and a memory, but also qualities of speech and voice, and the gift, infinitely precious to one who did not possess it, of self-confidence. It also means the ability to work hard, which helps to explain the tributes to application that we have already noted. Indeed hard work allied with experience, can overcome even deficiencies in ability.

We know that men who are less generously endowed by nature but excel in experience and practice, not only improve upon themselves, but surpass others who, though highly gifted, have been too negligent of their talents.¹

It is when all these things are combined that a man is produced, who is "incomparable among his fellows."²

Although Isocrates was able to identify the intellectual, psychological and even the physical requirements of a great orator, it is unlikely that he ever had as a pupil anyone who fitted the ideal specifications. It might be suggested that the specification, as it is expressed above, is at least reminiscent of Demosthenes, which would then be one of the more interesting ironies of history. The interrelationship between the various requirements for an orator is reminiscent of the interrelationship between the various parts of his philosophy. Indeed, his psychology and his philosophy are reminiscent of

¹Antid., 191.

²Antid., 191.

of each other. Just as logos is supreme in philosophy, so ability is in the psychology of learning. But just as logos is difficult to disentangle from the other components of his philosophy, so is it difficult to isolate ability. Furthermore, both logos and ability are heavily dependent on the other components: logos on kairos and to prepon, ability on hard work and experience. Again, and most importantly, if there are any gaps either in the mastery of logos, or in the natural gifts of a student, it is then the function of education to remedy the defects. As Jaeger pointed out, Isocrates "seeks only to compensate through his education, whatever defects may be in [the student's] nature."¹ It is this fact that required that Isocrates be very aware of the needs, psychological and intellectual, of his students.

A teacher, whether of philosophy or of wrestling, is severely limited by the capabilities of his students. A paidotribes confronted with a student lacking in strength or co-ordination can only hope to improve the student's performance to a limited extent and never to make him an Olympic wrestler. A philosophy teacher faced with a lazy or a stupid student can similarly have no hope of raising him to the first rank of orators. Lack of ability can only be compensated for

¹Werner Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, trans. Gilbert Highet (Oxford, 1945), III, 92.

by hard work. But even the talented must work hard, therefore hard work alone will not produce a good orator. The role of motivation clearly is of major importance in Isocrates' educational psychology and to go along with it, a realistic appreciation of his abilities by the student, as well as by Isocrates, was clearly of great importance, if he was to elect to do what he could do.

v

In the light of this analysis, it is clear that the first two stages of Isocrates' teaching method were of neither fixed duration nor of fixed content. But they were essential before the student was ready to take part in the third stage. The transition to the third stage was in all probability something which occurred gradually. Students would watch and listen before taking part for it would very quickly ferret out any weaknesses in the student's nature. For this was the stage of group criticism. Not the least remarkable fact about this stage was that Isocrates apparently submitted himself to it as well as his students. It was customary, as we shall see, for him to submit his own works for criticism and not simply offer them as models at the earlier stages to be copied. This offering to the group was Isocrates' equivalent to delivering the speech before an audience. Again let us note, an element of his teaching grew, apparently, out of his own psychological weakness.

To Philip offers an instance of this critical process at work.¹ It may not be quite typical, in that it may have taken place not among his pupils but among his associates, plesiasantoi is the word he uses. However, so many of his associates must have been past pupils that it may be safely taken as an instance of the critical technique in operation. The work which was being criticized was in fact To Philip, and the criticism began at a very early stage in its composition, indeed before pen was actually put to paper. After Isocrates had announced his intention of sending an address to the King of Macedonia,² his friends were quick to point out to him that it was unwise to offer advice to such a great and powerful man, who might indeed consider that he, Isocrates, was "a great simpleton."³ Isocrates, having recovered from his surprise at the vehemence of their criticism, "replied to each of their objections,"⁴ promised to "show the speech to no one else in the city but them," and "do nothing regarding it other than what they should approve."⁵ When "the speech was completed and presented to them, they . . . completely reversed their attitude."⁶ Although there are

¹To Phil., 17-23.

²To Phil., 17.

³To Phil., 21.

⁴To Phil., 22.

⁵To Phil., 22-3

⁶To Phil., 23.

several hints that Isocrates did not take too kindly to the criticism, he speaks of "presumption"¹ and says that he "rebuked with moderation . . . those who had made bold to criticize,"² and that "they acknowledged that they had never been so mistaken about anything in their lives,"³ the important point is that he did in fact submit his work for their approval. The obvious moral for his students was that if Isocrates himself could submit work for approval on so important a matter as an address to Philip, then they too could submit their work to criticism by their fellows.

In the Panathenaicus there is a very long passage,⁴ which is a detailed example of the group and self criticism processes at work. It is too long to go into in too great detail, but it is especially helpful in arriving at an understanding not only of the process but also of the nature of doxa in relation to the composition of discourses. Opinions are asked and given and defended in a manner reminiscent of the working of dialectic, although in this case, the search is for the best means of expressing certain ideas and not an ultimate truth.

¹To Phil., 23

²To Phil., 22.

³To Phil., 23.

⁴Panath 200-266.

Isocrates, who was then about ninety-five, tells us that he had completed a draft of the Panathenaicus, and "was revising it with three or four youths who are wont to spend their time in my company."¹ The speech was concerned with praise of Athens and also severe criticism of Sparta. "It seemed to us to be good and to require only an ending."² The use of "us" implies a group decision and is indicative of normal practice. Nevertheless Isocrates decides to send for a former pupil, possibly Theopompus,³ who "had lived under an oligarchy and had elected to extol the Lacedaemonians."⁴ Isocrates did so "in order that, if any false statement might escape me, he might detect it and point it out to me."⁵ This is an interesting statement, indicating that Isocrates was concerned with accuracy, if not with Truth. It is also interesting because of the responsibility he takes upon himself for this accuracy. In other words, the group might comment and criticize, but in the final analysis, it was the individual who had written the discourse, and not the group, who took the praise or blame for it. An added point is the recourse to

¹Panath., 200.

²Panath., 200.

³See Norlin's note a, p. 496.

⁴Panath., 200.

⁵Panath., 200.

an expert in a particular field for information, instead of, as we would more readily do today, to a reference book.

The former pupil praises the work, but naturally objects to what is said about Lacedaemonia. The Spartans, he declares, "had discovered the best ways of life and not only followed these but taught them to the rest of the world."¹ This is directly opposed to Isocrates' view, which he had expressed at length, that Athens is the source of all that is good and valuable and best. Isocrates, therefore, feels it necessary to analyze Spartan education. This is of great interest, but cannot, unfortunately, detain us here except to mention that because the Spartans had neglected logos, not even trying "to instruct themselves in letters," Isocrates believed that in some respects "the Lacedaemonians are more backward than the barbarians."²

The former pupil replies that he meant only that their warlike virtues were worth imitation.³ Isocrates accepts his explanation but insists that virtues such as justice and wisdom are more important.⁴ This silences his opponent who

¹Panath., 202.

²Panath., 209.

³Panath., 217.

⁴Panath., 219-228.

who had nevertheless, being an old student of the master, spoken well.¹ Isocrates' students applauded their master "for having spoken more vigorously than they anticipated and for having debated well."² But he himself was satisfied neither with his discourse nor with himself. He berates himself for lack of understanding, pride unbecoming to a man of his age, and for "youthful confusion."³

After his students leave, he examines his work again and is pleased, as before, with what he said about Athens, but is uncertain about the validity of his remarks concerning Sparta.⁴ He suspects himself of being contemptuous, overly bitter and lacking in understanding.⁵ He almost decides to burn it or blot out the offending sections, but because of all the labour he has put into it, he decides instead to call in for advice, all his former pupils still living in Athens.⁶ This occurs some three or four days later. All praise the work, but again the "panegyrist of the Lacedaemonians"⁷ detects that Isocrates like himself, is unhappy about the sections on Sparta. He

¹Panath., 218 & 229.

²Panath., 229.

³Panath., 230.

⁴Panath., 231-32.

⁵Panath., 232.

⁶Panath., 233.

⁷Panath., 234.

delivers a lengthy defence of the Spartans, pointing out how valuable they have been to the rest of the Hellenes in time of war.¹ His remarks are greeted with applause, in which Isocrates himself joins. The excellence of the speech, of course, reflects well on the master. Isocrates says, "I praised both his native ability and his training."²

Although these were unusual circumstances it is fair to assume that the group criticism seminars were conducted along these lines. There were, in any event, many object lessons for his students in the recounting of this particular criticism session. It is interesting to note that the remarks that the former pupil made were incorporated in to the text of the Panathenaicus. Even if these remarks were fictions devised by Isocrates, which seems to me to be unlikely, we may fairly assume that it was normal practice for remarks and suggestions which occurred during the group criticism sessions to be incorporated into the various texts. This was not something that was just done by Isocrates, but by all the members of the group. In this final stage of Isocratean education the instructional process was very much a two-way affair. It was not simply a matter of the master asserting and the students imitating, but of a real and continuing process taking place.

¹Panath., 235-263.

²Panath., 265.

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As a wrestler has to first learn the holds and throws, second to practice them until they become second nature, and third engage in mock fights with his fellows, so does a student of logos have to learn first the elements of his subject, second to practice them until he has complete command of them, and third to test himself and his work in the presence of his fellow students. In both wrestling and philosophy there is a fourth stage of learning, which takes place not in the palaestra or the school but in the arena or in the assembly. The major purpose of either form of training is to prepare the student to acquit himself honourably in the contest. But there is also the idea that each contest is also part of a continuing process of training and of education. As we saw in the passage from the Panathenaicus which we have just discussed, the old pupils of Isocrates were able and prepared to enter into the same kind of discussion that they had experienced when they were attending his school.

The point is important because when we consider the contribution that Isocrates made to the theory and practice of teaching methods, we must at least consider the possibility that, besides those ideas which he has already contributed,

there are still others in his work which have either not been considered or not been accepted. Certainly the idea of continuing adult education is not unique to Isocrates, nor something that has been completely ignored, especially in modern times. But what is perhaps especially important about the idea of adult education or continuing education that we can infer from his work, is the emphasis placed on the essential wholeness of the educational process. Later education was not something added on to the process which had begun in school, but an integral part of the whole.

Again many of his ideas need re-emphasis and are indeed being rediscovered and developed. The importance of language to learning, small classes, close relationships between student and teacher, knowledge of pupil characteristics and individual differences, both intellectual and psychological, the emphasis on individualized learning and individually prescribed instruction, variable length instruction courses and the acknowledgement of the existence of individual learning rates are all 'modern' ideas which are already part of the coherent whole of Isocrates' educational thought.

Elements of his teaching method which have already become accepted parts of Western education, include the tutorial group, the seminar, the 'viva' and the presentation

and preparation of papers and essays. These are not necessarily ideas that were unique to Isocrates. The tutorial group and the 'viva' were developed to a great extent by Socrates and the seminar was both a Platonic and an Aristotelian device. However, Isocrates made extensive use of such techniques and must be given some acknowledgement for their appearance in Western universities. The writing of papers and essays for presentation in either tutorial groups or seminars is his innovation. It is an innovation, moreover, which changed the character of education in a fundamental way. It above all emphasised the importance of logos and thus transformed Western education into literary education.

A final point is to consider one contribution which Isocrates did not make to Western education. He did not, as far as we can tell, deliver lectures. His whole idea of education militated against the one-way transmission of information from an authority to a neophyte. Undoubtedly, in practice he was the teacher and the students followed his lead and his orders, but even so the possibility of two-way communication was always present in his teaching, something that is by and large impossible in a lecture-system. It is this notion of communication instead of instruction, together with the notion of the essential unity of the educational

process, which are the most important contributions that Isocrates can make to our modern ideas on teaching.

VI THE PUPILS OF ISOCRATES

Isocrates' own teaching had an immediate and, in a sense, quite prosaic objective -- the formation of the intellectual elite which Greece needed hic et nunc.¹

There is little doubt that he did succeed in forming such an elite and that he did have tremendous success as a teacher.

The long line of statesmen and great public figures who had gone through Isocrates' school were a living testament to the force which had flowed from his teaching all through the life of his native city . . . there was no near rival to the work he had done in training them [his students] to be leaders of their cities.²

This last point is one that might occasion some surprise when we consider the reputation today of the Platonic Academy and it is one that we will touch on later in this chapter. This high opinion of the work that Isocrates did, was shared by many in ancient times, not least by Cicero:

Then behold! There arose Isocrates; the Master of all rhetoricians, from whose school, as from the Horse of Troy, none but leaders emerged.³

His students, as we shall see, were leaders in literature, history, oratory and education as well as in politics, kingship and statesmanship.⁴ The fame of his school spread

¹H. I. Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity, trans. G. Lamb (London, 1956), p. 79.

²Werner Jaeger, Paideia: the Ideals of Greek Culture, trans. Gilbert Highet (Oxford, 1945), III, 137.

³Cicero, De Oratore, trans. E. W. Sutton and H. Rackham, Loeb Classical Library (London, 1959), II, xxii, 94.

⁴Antid., 30. To Phil., 140.

far and wide during his lifetime. He was able to boast of "the students who cross the sea from Sicily, from the Pontus and from other parts of the world in order to enjoy my instruction,"¹ and who, in doing so "pay out money and go to all manner of trouble."² His boast was not a vain one. The list of students we have available to us³ indicates that they came from close by in Arcadia and from far away in Byzantium, Miletus in Asia Minor and Cumae in Italy, to say nothing of the many who came from the Aegean Islands.

Success, no doubt, begat success. The eight men named in the Antidosis⁴ who were all recipients of chaplets of gold from Athens must have been a very good advertisement for the school, apparently almost from its beginning. Furthermore the success of such men as Aeschines, Nicocles and above all Timotheus would not go unnoticed. It is clear that besides providing students with great technical ability in the arts of oratory,⁵ the whole cast of his educational philosophy gave his students a solid grounding in the political arts also.

¹Antid., 224.

²Antid., 226.

³See Appendix A.

⁴Antid., 93-94.

⁵George A. Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece, (London, 1964), p. 74.

In terms simply of success in the competitive kind of oratory, the peak of his career occurred in 351. According to an ancient tradition, when Mausolos of Mausoleum fame, the dynast of Karia, died, his widow Artemisia proposed that a contest of "panegyric eloquence" be held in his honour. This brought "a throng of brilliant rhetoricians to Halicarnassus," and all of them, it is said, were pupils of Isocrates.¹ The winner of the contest was Theopompus, who is better known as an historian. This is an apt illustration of the fact that, as Isocrates hoped, his pupils were all men of many parts, combining in each the talents of orator, statesman, poet, historian and teacher. In this respect, they are reminiscent of the ideal Renaissance man. Isocrates' education was intended to produce a well-rounded man, a tradition that has persisted in Western education.

Indeed, when Isocrates asks himself the question, "Whom, then, do I call educated?"² his answer not only gives us important information about the kind of pupils he wished to turn out and about the aims in general of his educational philosophy, but also about certain ideals in Western education

¹R. C. Jebb, The Attic Orators (New York, 1962), II, 11.

²Panath., 30.

from that time on, some of which, at least, were taken over and incorporated in to the catalogue of Christian virtues.

He begins answering his own question, by excluding all those who engage in "the arts and sciences and specialities."¹ He is dismissing technicians in general, and their ejection from the ranks of the educated is echoed in both Plato and Aristotle's thoughts on education, as well as, of course, in Western education. The truly educated are:

First those who manage well the circumstances which they encounter day by day, and who possess a judgement which is accurate in meeting occasions as they arise and rarely misses the expedient course of action.²

We have already discussed the role of doxa, judgement, in Isocrates' thought and the honourable connotations attached to the word expedient, or to seizing the advantage. An extra point to be stressed here is that it is the practicality, the attention to day-by-day circumstances which has ensured the survival of the kind of education that Isocrates advocated.

He continues his catalogue of virtues:

Next those who are decent and honourable in their intercourse with all whom they associate, tolerating easily and good-naturedly what is unpleasant or offensive in others and being themselves as agreeable and reasonable to their associates as it is possible to be. . . .³

¹Panath., 30.

²Panath., 30-31.

³Panath., 31.

There is almost a Victorian plea for decency in its emphasis on honour and reason. But the plea for tolerance has a great deal of relevance today also, just as it did in Isocrates' day and in the Christian era. Isocrates goes on:

Furthermore, those who hold their pleasures always under control and are not unduly overcome by their misfortunes, bearing up under them bravely, and in a manner worthy of our common nature. . . .¹

This is a reflection of advice given elsewhere in his discourses,² and is, of course, a recapitulation of the notion of sophrosyne, of general self-control, so important to the Greek notion of arete. He concludes his description of those who are educated:

Fourthly, and most important of all, those who are not spoiled by success and do not desert their true selves and become arrogant, but hold their ground steadfastly, not rejoicing in the good things which have come to them through chance, rather than in those which through their own nature and intelligence are theirs from birth. Those who have a character which is in accord, not with one of these things, but all of them -- these, I contend, are wise and complete men, possessed of all the virtues.³

The wise and complete man, therefore, has common sense and practical judgement, is honourable and has decent sensibilities, is sober, modest, balanced and steadfast. It would be difficult even today to find a politician who did not, at least on the

¹Panath., 31-32.

²See Chapter III.

³Panath., 32.

surface, portray himself as having most if not all of these virtues. They were, we may assume, just as essential for a politician in Isocrates' day, for in the last analysis Isocrates most of all wanted to produce politicians. But the list of virtues would also have been acceptable in the definition of a Renaissance man or a Roman patrician or an English gentleman. This is not to say that these are the supreme virtues, but simply that they are the virtues of the middle classes in general, of the merchants, the farmers, the small landowners and the petit bourgeoisie. These are the classes who have consistently returned to Isocratean ideas without in any way connecting them with Isocrates, because they fitted very well the continuing needs of their times.

His popularity in his own time, as has been suggested, fed upon his initial success but it is clear that his success was well rooted in the needs of his fellow Athenians. As Jaeger has suggested, the younger generation, not only of Athens, but of all the Greek world, must have felt that "Isocrates' national morality was a happy and timely mean between the extremes of ethical scepticism on the one hand and philosophical retreat to the Absolute on the other."¹ Indeed, it was the "national morality" he propounded

¹Jaeger, p. 82.

and his distrust of over-concentration on ethical and philosophical niceties, which, together with the emphasis on practicality in his teaching, made it so attractive to the Romans and particularly to Cicero. We will return to this point later, but the rest of this chapter will be concerned with what we know about his pupils and in particular Timotheus his favourite and in many ways, most successful pupil. It will be as well to bear in mind the virtues that Isocrates considered to be necessary for wise and complete men and we will return to these virtues at the end of the chapter.

ii

The names of forty-one of Isocrates' pupils are known to us today.¹ These names have been authenticated with varying degrees of certainty. The main credit for this must go to Sanneg in De Schola Isocratea² and after him Blass in Die Attische Beredsamkeit.³ Problems remain concerning some of those included in the list. For instance it is possible that Cicero erred in including Dinarchus on his own short list of Isocrates' pupils.⁴ It must be acknowledged that he was

¹See Appendix A.

²Halle, 1867.

³Leipzig, 1874, 2 vols.

⁴De Oratore, II, xxiii, 94.

writing a long time after the event. Problems also remain concerning some names which are not on the list. It has already been established that Isocrates had many pupils, probably well over a hundred, and although many of his students must simply have sunk into obscurity, it is reasonable to speculate that some of the men known to us in other connections may indeed have gone to the school. This is especially true of men whose names occur in the Discourses, such as Athenodorus and Callistratus,¹ or in the Letters, such as Jason, Polyacles² or Archidamus.³ It is also possible to speculate on the possible student-teacher relationship that may have existed between Isocrates and some of the members of the conservative political party with which he was associated, notably Eubulus.⁴ However, we will confine our attention in the main to the authenticated list.

The first work on the pupils of Isocrates was by Hermippus of Smyrna, according to Athenaeus in The Deipnosophists.⁵ This may have been the source used by the Pseudo-Plutarch in his life of Isocrates. It is certainly evidence of the importance

¹Peace., 24.

²Jason., 1.

³To Arch., 1.

⁴See George Norlin, Isocrates, Loeb Classical Library (London, 1962), II, 2.

⁵Trans., Charles B. Gulick, Loeb Classical Library (London, 1927), XII, 592d.

of Isocrates' school and of the attention paid to it and its pupils in ancient times. In Hellenistic times the reputation of the school stood high as is shown by an examination of "the ten authors whom Alexandrian critics included in the canon of Attic orators. [They] are Antiphon, Andocides, Lysias, Isocrates [and] Isaeus in the first group, Aeschines, Demosthenes, Lycurgus, Hypereides and Dinarchus in the second group."¹ Antiphon, 480-411, Lysias, born according to tradition in 458 and Andocides, born just before Isocrates in about 440 and a prominent figure in the scandal of the mutilation of the Hermes in 415,² all antedated Isocrates. Of the remainder, Isaeus, Aeschines, Lycurgus and Hypereides all were Isocrates' students.³ Demosthenes was a pupil of Isaeus, which provides him with a close connection to Isocrates and there is some evidence that he was influenced stylistically by him as well by Isaeus. There is little evidence to connect Dinarchus with Isocrates, except the remark by Cicero already mentioned.⁴ The significance of this may well be that Cicero, writing after a gap of some three hundred years, assumed almost automatically that any orator living in the Fourth Century

¹T. A. Sinclair, A History of Classical Greek Literature (London, 1934), p. 361.

²The Oxford Companion to Classical Literature, Ed. Sir Paul Harvey (Oxford, 1962), pp. 32, 252-53 and 27.

³See Appendix A for references in Blass and etc.

⁴De Oratore, II, xxiii, 94.

must have been the pupil of Isocrates. This is a testament, not only to the high esteem in which Cicero held Isocrates, but also to the reputation that Isocrates had maintained among the ancients in general.

The careers of the orators in the canon who are acknowledged as his pupils show a wide divergence. Isaeus was a logographer.¹ It is reasonable to assume therefore, that he was one of Isocrates earliest pupils, when the latter was either still teaching logography or making the transition from Logography to Philosophy. His probable date of birth, c. 420,² would seem to support the former case. There is little evidence of Isocrates' teaching in his work except in his handling of subject matter.³ This is to be expected, due to his attendance at an early period, before Isocrates was able to work out his educational philosophy in detail. Isaeus, therefore, serves as a useful bench-mark by which to measure the performance both of other pupils and the development of Isocrates' philosophy. He seems to have modelled himself on the style of Lysias. He refrained from politics, which thus makes him an atypical Isocratean, and suggests that Isocrates did in fact teach him only forensic oratory.

¹Jebb, p. 265.

²Ibid., p. 264.

³Ibid., p. 265.

Aeschines of Arcadia is very much a pupil of Isocrates and in many ways is the exact opposite of Isaeus. His main interest was politics. He may also have been a pupil of Plato. Certainly he was of the same conservative cast as were both Isocrates and Plato. He served as an envoy for Eubulus in 348,¹ and remained with him while he carried out the policy of peace and retrenchment advocated by Isocrates in On the Peace.² Eubulus, a close associate of Isocrates, like him favoured a policy of conciliation toward Philip. Aeschines supported this policy also and this brought him into direct opposition with Demosthenes, the arch anti-Macedonian, with the result that the latter had him impeached in 343. He was acquitted on this charge, which, if nothing else, demonstrated his own high command of the arts of oratory.³ All his political thought is very close to that of Isocrates⁴ which is a clear indication both of the close ties and common bonds between them, and of Isocrates' continuing influence on and interest in his former pupils. Aeschines was vain, he had once been an actor, and lacked both nobility and political sagacity of

¹The Oxford Companion, p. 10.

²M. L. W. Laistner, "The Influence of Isocrates' Political Doctrines on some Fourth Century Men of Affairs," The Classical Weekly, March 10 1930, XXIII, No. 17, 131.

³The Oxford Companion, p. 10.

⁴Laistner, p. 131.

his own.¹ He is not, therefore to be taken as a perfect example of Isocrates' teaching. Indeed, it must have been pupils like Aeschines, who convinced Isocrates that virtue was not very teachable.

Lycurgus, in contrast to Aeschines, was very noble indeed.² He was a member of an illustrious family of hereditary priests and, not surprisingly, an advocate of the old social order as depicted so lovingly by Isocrates in the Areopagiticus. He was very much influenced by his master and is close to the ideal of a wise and complete man possessed of all the virtues. He served Athens faithfully and well, most notably as comptroller of finance for the period 338-326. During his term in office, he rebuilt the Lyceum Gymnasium, a project one might imagine, close to his heart, and reconstructed the Dionysian Theatre in marble. He also instituted a decree which called for the preservation of official copies of the works of Aeschylus, Euripides and Sophocles, an act for which he must receive the thanks of scholar and aesthete alike.³ He was plainly a man of taste and culture, well-endowed with civic virtue. In Lycurgus we can see plainly the Isocratean version of the Renaissance man.

¹The Oxford Companion, p. 10.

²Ibid., p. 251.

³Ibid.

Hypereides was not cast in the same mould as Lycurgus by any manner of means. He was, it is true, an orator of brilliance and urbanity.¹ He began his career as a logographer, in itself a fact of some significance, because he was not one of Isocrates' earlier pupils. He must therefore, have rejected Isocrates' strictures on forensic oratory as a career. He soon turned to politics and made a profession of accusing men of eminence. He had apparently no stable political view point. He prosecuted Demosthenes in the affair of Harpalus but had previously supported him against Philip. Indeed he was a leading figure in the war of revolt against Macedonia in 323 and for his pains was put to death by Antipater, who had served as the regent of Macedonia in Philip's absence.² This is a measure of his estrangement from the teaching of his master, not only because he was opposed to the Pan-Hellenic principles which caused Isocrates to welcome Philip as a possible unifier of the Hellenes, but also because Antipater was the recipient of a most informal and personal letter from Isocrates,³ presupposing the existence of friendly relations between the two men. None of the principles by which Isocrates hoped his pupils would live, seem to have been adopted by Hypereides.

¹The Oxford Companion, p. 218.

²Ibid.

³La Rue Van Hook, Isocrates, Loeb Classical Library (London, 1961), III, 411.

He was fond of food and gambling and of the dramatic gesture. It is said that when he was defending the courtesan Phryne against charges of impiety, he threw himself and his client on the mercy of the jury, by throwing open her dress to reveal the beauty of her bosom.¹ This is hardly a tactic which would fit into the Isocratean category of decent and honourable behaviour. Even more than Aeschines, Hypereides demonstrates Isocrates' dictum that "the kind of art which can implant honesty and justice in depraved natures has never existed and does not now exist."²

The last name in the canon is that of Dinarchus. He was a logographer. This, and the fact that his birth took place in about 360, which would have allowed him to enter Isocrates' school only when the old master was well into his nineties, seems to militate against his inclusion in the list of pupils.³

Isocrates was very proud of eight of his pupils who "were crowned by Athens with Chaplets of gold." They were "among the first to begin studying with him . . . Eunomus,

¹The Oxford Companion, p. 218.

²Antid., 274.

³The Oxford Companion, p. 146.

Lysitheides and Callipus; and following them were Onetor, Anticles, Philonides, Philomelus and Charmantides.¹ We know little of these men except what Isocrates tells us. Callipus may have been the author of an Ars mentioned in Aristotle.² Onetor may well be the Onetor who was the defendant in two 'ejectment suits' brought by Demosthenes in the course of his efforts to retrieve his patrimony.³ If it was indeed he, then he was rich and experienced in the courts if we are to believe Demosthenes' account, but his behaviour was sufficiently unethical to have made him not one of Isocrates' better pupils.

The chaplets of gold were marks of high esteem. Other recipients included Demosthenes, and Isocrates was justly proud of their feat. They were bestowed for acts of great benefit to the state. Such acts were in some cases, no doubt, payments into the equivalent of party coffers. However, it is reasonable to assume that at least some of the eight named above, received their chaplets for exceptional civic as opposed to political virtue. It was certainly consistent with Isocrates' teaching that they should concern themselves with civic affairs.

¹Antid., 93-4.

²Rhet., 1399a 16, 1400a 5.

³Private Orations, trans., A. T. Murray, Loeb Classical Library (London, 1936), I, 127-174.

Some of Isocrates' students were born into high positions in their native cities or countries and others attained such eminence. Among the eminent few were Nicocles, the son of Evagoras, king of Salamis in Cyprus, Clearchus, the tyrant of Heraclea Pontica and Hieronymus, one of the co-founders of the city of Megalopolis. All three were in the position to put into practice ideas of their own as well as those of Isocrates. In view of the influence Isocrates later had on the education of Princes in Europe they are of special interest to us.

Hieronymus was fervently pro-Macedonian, an attitude, it is safe to say, he acquired at least in part from Isocrates. He is one of the twelve politicians so bitterly attacked by Demosthenes in De Corona and defended a century and a half later by Polybius. Laistner suggests that among the twelve there may well have been other pupils of Isocrates.¹ Clearchus was a tyrant of the most ruthless kind.² In this he was, as far as we know, unique among the pupils of Isocrates in marked contrast to the pupils of Plato, who were so often distinguished by their cruelty and tyranny. This is especially interesting in view of the fact that Clearchus was also a pupil of Plato's.³

¹Laistner, p. 131.

²Jebb, p. 246.

³Ibid.

Jaeger drew attention to "the political careers of various pupils of Plato. Many of them had a brief and violent life as political experimentalists and revolutionaries."¹ He cited Erastus and Coriscus who were advisors to the tyrant Hermias of Atarneus, who was, interestingly, Aristotle's father-in-law and best friend, Callipus, who murdered Dion and made himself a despotic tyrant and Chion, whose chief claim to our attention was that he murdered Clearchus. Dion was himself a pupil of Plato's as was Eudemus of Cyprus who died fighting against tyranny in Syracuse.² To this list may be added Critias, who was responsible for the execution of Theramenes, and Alcibiades who, despite the attempts that have been made to justify his behaviour, was a traitor, and together with Critias, responsible for many grim deeds during one of the grimmest periods of Athenian history.³

In sharp contrast is Isocrates' pupil Nicocles. He may not have been the only king among Isocrates' students, but he certainly received special treatment, being the recipient of no less than three discourses from his old master, To Nicocles, Nicocles and the Evagoras. The latter prompted Nicocles to

¹Jaeger, p. 137.

²Jaeger, p. 318, n. 42.

³Jaeger, p. 137-38.

present Isocrates with a large sum of money.¹ It was an encomium on his father. In it there is an interesting passage in which Isocrates addresses his former pupil:

You, Nicocles, are the first and the only one of those who possess royal power, wealth and luxury, who has undertaken to pursue the study of philosophy.²

Nicocles, it appears, is the first philosopher-king. This as has already been suggested, is not the declared Isocratean intention. However, we may assume that the same motives that prompted Plato to associate with Dionysius of Syracuse, in the main the desire to see theory transformed into practice, influenced Isocrates also. There was, perhaps, in Isocrates' case an eye to financial advantage as well. Although Isocrates may not have formulated the notion of philosopher-kings and indeed meant something quite different by philosophy, he and Plato shared the same belief in monarchy and the same distrust of oligarchy and democracy. It is difficult, therefore, to see what kind of rulers he would have preferred to form, if not philosopher-kings. The critical difference, of course, is in their radically different views of the nature of philosophy and the existence of immutable ideas. Plato's ideal philosopher-king was a being so far superior to his subjects as to be morally fit to decide on matters concerning life and

¹ Antid., 40.

² Evag., 78.

death with absolute accuracy. Isocrates' philosopher-king, in the person of Nicocles, was a fallible being in constant need of advice and encouragement, especially from a true philosopher, namely Isocrates.

Nicocles, if he took heed of any of the advice that Isocrates gave him, must have come fairly close to the wise and complete man. As Nicocles was written after he had been king for some time,¹ it is fair to assume that Isocrates approved of his reign. In that event his rule may have come close to the idealized picture of monarchy that is presented in the work.

Other pupils involved in political life must have been very numerous. Among them was Leodamas of Archarnae. Leodamas was closely involved with Callistratus of Aphidnae, who has already been mentioned, but they were on opposite sides of the political fence. This is curious because Callistratus, who is not listed by Sanneg as being a pupil, held views on the Peace Congress of 371, which closely paralleled those of Isocrates.² This would seem to make Callistratus a more likely candidate for inclusion on the list of pupils than Leodamas. In 366 the latter accused Callistratus of treason, a charge

¹Norlin, Isocrates, II, 75.

²Laistner, p. 131. See also Paul Cloche, "La Politique de l'Athenien Callistratos," Revue des Etudes Anciennes, XXV, 1923, 5-23.

of which he was acquitted. Both men received high praise for their oratory, which reflects well in at least one case, on Isocrates. Callistratus is said to have inspired Demosthenes to take up the art of oratory because of his defence of himself in his treason trial and Leodamas was praised by both Demosthenes and Aeschines.

One last pupil of the many who must have been involved in politics may be mentioned. Python of Byzantium served Philip of Macedonia in the capacity of envoy to Athens.¹ In view of the fact that his education had been completed in that city, Philip's choice was a particularly wise one.

iv

Many of Isocrates' pupils made their names in other than the political arena. This is not to say that they were not involved in politics, but that their main reputation was made elsewhere. As we saw earlier, in the story of the contest at the funeral of Mausolos, in the field of display oratory, the pupils of Isocrates were well to the fore. Greek oratory was developing technically at a great pace during the mid-Fourth Century, and naturally the minimum requirement of an orator was good technical ability.² This ability the Isocrateans must

¹Laistner, p. 131.

²Kennedy, p. 74.

have possessed in great measure. It is reasonable, therefore, to suppose that many of them must have in their turn been teachers. This was, after all, an integral part of the rhetorical tradition. Furthermore, the process by which the best pupils become teachers in their turn has become, as Marrou pointed out, "a permanent feature of our own classical tradition."¹

At least three of Isocrates' students became heads of their own establishments. Aphareus, Isocrates' adopted son and Isocrates of Apollonia took over, apparently together, Isocrates' school. Aphareus was a tragic poet of some note and also a rhetorician.² Isocrates of Apollonia was a philosopher and rhetorician.³ It may be conjectured that Aphareus inherited his step-father's school, along with his other wealth, but that the actual operation of the school was left to Isocrates of Apollonia. The other pupil to become a headmaster was Speusippus, who was the heir to his uncle's establishment, the Academy, for his uncle was Plato.⁴ This somewhat surprising fact, that Speusippus was a pupil of Isocrates, is less surprising perhaps when we consider that his birth date was about 407. In that event he was one of

¹Marrou, p. 81.

²Jebb, p. 30.

³Jebb, p. 13.

⁴Jebb, p. 13.

the earliest of Isocrates' pupils, before the Academy came into existence. Later not too surprisingly, he was a consistent opponent of Isocrates.¹ Several of his works are known, but as they were all Academic in tone we will not consider them.

Isaeus as previously noted in Chapter I was a teacher, even if he only had one pupil, albeit a great pupil, in Demosthenes. So also was Lacritus of Phaselis. He was the defendant in the oration Against Lacritus delivered by Demosthenes.² He was a man of wealth and a shipowner as well as a teacher.³ This may not have been too unusual a combination. It serves also to point out the fact that no matter what else we may know about any one of Isocrates' pupils, it does not exclude the possibility that the pupil was also a teacher, even if only in a minor way.

Two of his pupils were critics. Dioscurides, whose comment on the similarity between drunkenness and madness in Homer is cited by Athenaeus,⁴ and Asclepiades of Tragilos. Asclepiades made a collection of the subjects treated by the

¹Blass, II, 68f.

²Against Lacritus, 41, in the Private Orations. See also p. 277.

³Against Lacritus, 55.

⁴The Deipnosophists, I, 11b.

Tragedians. It would have been surprising if a school devoted to logos had not produced some critics and they set a precedent for students brought up in a literary tradition ever since.

Three students were historians of some repute,¹ Androtion, Theopompus of Chios and Ephorus of Cumae. Androtion became a master of a "new type of history just then coming to its perfection, the Athenian chronicle or Atthis."² It was concerned with local traditions and the antiquities of Attica³ and with the origins and rituals of religious worship, divine festivals and pious celebrations.⁴ It was a kind of history which must have had the unqualified approval of Isocrates. Androtion wrote his own Atthis and brought the history of Athens down to at least 394.⁵

Ephorus and Theopompus both held a wider vision of history. Ephorus wrote a history of Greece in thirty books from the return of the Heracleidae to the seige of Perinthos by Philip in 341.⁶ According to the Pseudo-Plutarch he was

¹Jaeger, p. 103. See also as regards Theopompus; Philostratus, Lives of the Sophists, trans. W. C. Wright, Loeb Classical Library (London, 1922), 506.

²Jaeger, p. 117-18.

³Jebb, p. 48.

⁴Jaeger, p. 117-18.

⁵Jebb, p. 48.

⁶Jebb, p. 48.

nick-named Diphorus, he who pays tribute twice, by Isocrates.¹ This was a reference to the supposed fact that he left the school without learning anything but was sent back by his father who had to pay again. If this is true, it is a tribute to his own rather than his master's efforts that he achieved the success that he did. Theopompus carried on the work of Thucydides, covering in twelve volumes the years 411-394.² He also wrote a massive Philippica in fifty-eight books, which was, it seems, a History of Civilization with Philip of Macedonia as its central figure.³

Both Ephorus and Theopompus had considerable influence on the writing of history in the Fourth Century and this influence must have carried on for a little while at least.⁴ They were no doubt carrying out the mandate of their master who declared in the Areopagiticus:

If we will only imitate our ancestors we shall both deliver ourselves from our present ills and become the saviours, not of Athens alone, but of all the Hellenes.⁵

¹(Plutarque), p. xxxi.

²Jebb, p. 48.

³Jebb, p. 48, See also E. Curtius, The History of Greece, trans. A. W. Ward (London, 1873), V, 176, and Athenaeus, V, 531a.

⁴H. Ll. Hudson-Williams, "A Greek Humanist," Greece and Rome, IX, No. 27 (1940), 170.

⁵Areop., 84.

No imitation was possible without information and the role of history was to provide that information together with the spiritual uplift that was assumed to go along with knowledge of the past. Isocrates wanted "to bring to light the true Athenian physis [the inborn quality] . . . which was clearly displayed in the great exploits of its ancestors."¹ Whether or not Isocrates or his pupils succeeded in this aim, they did succeed in establishing history firmly on the curriculum. If Isocrates does not rank as a historian in our sense of the word, the ancients may have had other ideas and on at least one occasion he was mentioned in the same breath as Thucydides.² But in terms of the creation as opposed to the recording of history one Isocratean pupil stands out above the rest. He was Timotheus, whose position in other respects was also unique.

v

A long section of the Antidosis³ is devoted to a defence of Timotheus. It was probably written soon after his death in 356. Thus, this characteristic digression, which may have been a late insertion, helps to date the publication of the discourse to about 355. Timotheus had died in disgrace

¹Jaeger, p. 125.

²Athenaeus, V, 215e.

³Antid., 101-139.

after being tried and found guilty of failing to support his colleague Chares in an attack on Chios in 356. He was fined the incredible sum of one hundred talents and had been forced to flee to Chalçis in Euboea, where he died.¹ There were political motives in the affair and its outcome had as much to do with appeals to the demos and party advantage as with the true facts of the case.

Jaeger felt that the very fact that Isocrates accepted full responsibility for Timotheus, and by implication, for his other pupils also, thus "challenging public opinion . . . is sufficiently startling in a man who is generally scrupulously careful about offending the susceptibilities of the demos."² Isocrates was very aware of the political importance of creating good will;³ he was also aware of the incipient dangers of democracy, having seen the fate of both Theramenes and Socrates. However, in the case of Timotheus he was moved both by righteous indignation and by anger at the treatment of his friend. He was in any event, closely related in the popular mind to his former pupil. He had been teacher, friend, adviser and perhaps secretary to Timotheus and when Timotheus was enjoying success the connection between the two was something to be proud of. Furthermore, Isocrates was given a great deal of credit for

¹The Oxford Companion, p. 431.

²Jaeger, p. 138. Antid., 104-106.

³See Jacqueline de Romilly, "Euonia in Isocrates; or the Political Importance of Creating Good Will," JHS, LXXVIII (1958), 92-101.

Timotheus' success. Demosthenes remarked,

You will discover that Timotheus was deemed worthy of the highest repute and numerous honours, not because of his activities as a younger man, but because of his performances after he had studied with Isocrates.¹

Because Isocrates did go out of his way to defend Timotheus, whether it antagonized the demos or not, and because he depicted his faults as well as his virtues, we can be fairly certain that his portrait of his former pupil is accurate. If there is a tendency to idealize Timotheus, it is counter-balanced by Isocrates' belief in the ultimate imperfectability of man. Timotheus, in any event, is the closest Isocrates got to producing an ideal pupil.

This is so because Timotheus best fitted the ideal of devotion to the state. He performed many duties for Athens and this served to raise him above even the students who had received golden crowns, for they "were entrusted with only a few commissions . . . while Timotheus had the responsibility of many affairs of great importance and over a long period of time."² These affairs, as Isocrates relates in detail, were largely military duties, all of which Timotheus carried out successfully, efficiently and economically. "He made you masters of twenty-four cities and spent in doing so less than your

¹The Erotic Essay, trans. N. W. DeWitt and N. J. DeWitt, Loeb Classical Library (London, 1949), 46.

²Antid., 103.

fathers paid out in the siege of Melos."¹ This statement, addressed as it was directly to the demos, is significant in its emphasis on the economic manner in which Timotheus accomplished his deeds. It is a matter that he returns to:

All these cities he has taken and presented to you, with no great outlay of money, without imposing burdens upon your present allies, and without forcing you to pay many taxes into the treasury.²

The civic virtues that Isocrates propounded were neither vague nor impractical. Fiscal responsibility is a very great virtue in his eyes and it is a notion that reappears in the educational policies of many cities and nations later, especially those devoted to commerce.

In strictly military terms Timotheus possessed the two qualities essential to a successful general. Although he was not a big man in physical terms and was not strictly speaking a professional soldier,³ certainly not a mercenary, he had: "First of all the ability to know against whom and with whose help to make war."⁴ This is a military version of

¹Antid., 113.

²Antid., 108.

³Antid., 116.

⁴Antid., 117.

the notions of kairos and to prepon in the arts of oratory. The "second requisite of a good general"¹ is also connected to these arts. Just as an orator must take care in selecting and arranging words in a special way in order to make his point, so must a general show "the ability to collect an army which is adequate to the war in hand, and to organize and employ it to good advantage."² In the Fourth Century B.C. and in almost every age ever since, men with the qualities needed for leadership had to be able to exercise them in both civil and military capacities. The advantage of the kind of education which Isocrates proposed was that it was able to train men simultaneously for both kinds of role.

It is interesting to note, however, that the qualities which Isocrates believed should entitle Timotheus to the highest praise were those which were embodied in the list of virtues cited in the Panathenaicus. It was his integrity, his modesty and the factors which contributed to his exquisite sense of diplomacy which appealed especially to Isocrates. His integrity was beyond doubt, which probably infuriated his opponents. Even though, as Isocrates declares:

¹Antid., 119.

²Antid., 119.

You [the Athenians] respected only the kind of generals who threatened and tried to terrify the other cities and were always for setting up some revolution or other among your allies, he did not fall in with your prejudices, nor was he willing to enhance his own reputation to the injury of Athens.¹

His moderation was similarly well-known; indeed it had to be if it was to achieve the confidence of the other Hellenes.

He made it the object of his thought and of his actions to see to it that no one of the cities of Hellas should be afraid of him.²

He would never permit his soldiers to plunder and pillage and sack the people's homes . . . for his mind was not upon winning for himself the good opinion of his soldiers by such licence.³

Moreover, when cities had been taken by him in battle, he would treat them with a mildness and a consideration for their rights which no one else had ever shown to allies in war.⁴

His integrity and his moderation, his modesty, his sense of honour and above all, his judgement, were always well in evidence, but never more than when he was engaged in some endeavour that required a fine sense of diplomacy.

So concerned was he that none of the cities should in the slightest degree suspect him of sinister designs that whenever he intended to take his fleet to any of the cities which had been remiss in their contributions, he sent word to the authorities and announced

¹Antid., 121.

²Antid., 121.

³Antid., 124.

⁴Antid., 125.

his coming before hand, lest his appearance without warning in front of their ports might plunge them into disquiet and confusion.¹

Timotheus' success in allaying the fears of the rest of the Hellenes was such that "many of the cities which had no love for Athens used to welcome him with gates thrown wide."²

Timotheus had his faults, however, and most prominent of them was arrogance, prompted perhaps by his feelings of superiority. "He was by nature as inept in courting the favour of men as he was gifted in handling affairs."³ Because of his proud bearing he was accused of being anti-democratic and even a misanthrope. He was a true patrician and no politician. He must have been the despair of the politically minded realist Isocrates. Isocrates tells us that he often tried to tell Timotheus that it was simply not enough to do one's duty, it was also necessary to obtain the goodwill of the Athenians. If he should do so:

They will not judge your conduct by the facts but will construe it in a light favourable to you; and if you make mistakes, they will overlook them while if you succeed, they will exalt your success to high heaven.⁴

But Timotheus, the paragon of all the other virtues except

¹Antid., 123-24.

²Antid., 126.

³Antid., 131.

⁴Antid., 134.

forebearance, the very model of the gentle parfait knight, the prototype indeed of the Christian hero so beloved by, among others, the Victorians, was "wont to despise these men whom the multitude are wont to believe."¹ (As)^{my} much as Isocrates admired the nobility and purity of his pupil the fact that Timotheus "could not lower himself to the level of people who are intolerant of their natural superiors"² was clearly a political weakness as well as a character deficiency.

If Isocrates' criticism of Timotheus can be read as an attempt to placate the demos after his stringent analysis of their behaviour, it is nevertheless true that it also reflects his fundamental belief in the need for effective political behaviour on the part of his students. Timotheus was a statesman but not a politician, and in Isocrates' view this was a serious flaw even in one who had been so successful otherwise. Politics for Isocrates, was at bottom the art of getting things done and if getting things done should require at times that the great man bend an ear and perhaps even a knee to the populace, then that was the price that had to be paid.

If there is nothing in Isocrates of the fierce clarity of Machiavelli, both the Greek and the Florentine were convinced

¹Antid., 137.

²Antid., 138.

of the need for expedient political action in order to achieve predetermined goals. Timotheus, who was something of a prig as well as arrogant, did not share this belief. But his other virtues and the skills he displayed in his handling of his assignments, together with the cultural attainments he must have possessed in order to have been such a close friend of Isocrates, mark him off like Lycurgus as a model for the Renaissance figure of the well-rounded man. Indeed I would suggest that as prototypes Lycurgus and Timotheus are still with us today, for it would be very difficult to diminish the value of any of the virtues that they displayed.

Isocrates' pupils were, he hoped, men of integrity, moderation, sobriety, balance, common sense, honour, decent sensibilities, modesty and judgement. As we have seen, some of his pupils came close to this standard and many did not. He hoped to produce effective politicians and he did produce some. However we cannot judge Isocrates solely on the effect and influence he had during his life-time. We must therefore turn our attention to the centuries after his death in order to determine to what extent his ideas were able to outlast his life.

VII ISOCRATES AND WESTERN EDUCATIONAL THOUGHT

The death of the city-state and the birth of the Macedonian Empire marked the decline of rhetoric as the specific art of speaking in the assembly. Centralized government and the rule of satraps replaced government by the more or less democratic assemblies, where they and not tyrannies had existed. Such assemblies as continued to exist, were of little political importance and it is reasonable to assume that men of talent and ability devoted their time and energy to acquiring capabilities other than those necessary in order to convince and persuade.

The remarkable fact is that rhetoric did not die, even if no one rose to take the place of Demosthenes. The fact that it did not die is due as much to Isocrates as to anyone. There are two main reasons for the survival of rhetoric. The first is that largely due to Isocrates' efforts, it had become the art not only of speaking in the assembly, but also of written composition. It mattered little, therefore, that assemblies and the arts of declamation and debate had declined in importance, because the demand for literary and more importantly, political criticism remained. On both intellectual and in the broadest sense social grounds, the power of logos was recognized and accepted. As Isocrates was the

acknowledged master of the art of written composition it is reasonable to assume that his influence after his death was not negligible.

The second reason for the survival of rhetoric was that it had become an integral part of the Athenian educational system by the middle of the Fourth Century. Isocrates, of course, had been an important figure in the process of adoption and had been most successful in grafting on to the old 'elementary' system of education, his own system of rhetorical 'secondary' education. Rhetorical education in general had proved its worth and its practical value and as a result had had a great deal of prestige attached to it. It had in fact, become the dominant feature of Hellenistic education.¹

After the death of Isocrates, it was Aristotle who did the most to ensure the continued existence of rhetoric. It was he who had introduced the teaching of the subject into the Academy, presumably against the inclination of Plato,² and when he opened his own school in the Lyceum, rhetoric was, of course, on the curriculum.³ In this he was at one with other

¹George A. Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece (London, 1963), p. 7.

²Werner Jaeger, Paideia: the Ideals of Greek Culture, trans. Gilbert Highet (Oxford, 1945), III, 147 and 182. See also Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, trans. H. E. Butler, Loeb Classical Library (London, 1921-22), III, 1, 14.

³The Rhetoric is the equivalent of a techne produced by the demands of the work. The Lyceum became his school in 335.

institutes of higher learning. Rhetoric had infiltrated the schools of philosophy and thus helped to ensure its own survival. Indeed as philosophers tended to become more and more hermit-like, rhetoricians came more and more to dominate the main stream of education.¹

If Aristotle had arrived too late to produce an orator of note, or at least one who could find an arena worthy of his talents, he was not too late to produce the finest work written in antiquity on the subject of rhetoric, a techne but more than a mere text-book, his Rhetoric. The breadth and sweep of the work made it a standard reference book of unquestioned authority during Hellenistic and Roman times. During that period it must have been invaluable when good teachers were not available and when technical points were in dispute.

The importance of Rhetoric was not confined to the Classical period, however, and in the Middle Ages also, it was the standard reference book, certainly in the Universities, and probably in the choir schools also. In modern times it has proved an invaluable source of information on many matters besides the history of rhetoric. It is of special interest to

¹This is especially true of the Platonists who thus ceded the field of education to the followers of Isocrates.

us because of the number of references that Aristotle makes to Isocrates and the use he makes of both Isocrates' works and those of his pupils.¹ Only Homer is cited more often than Isocrates, which is a tribute both to the stature of Isocrates at the time and to his importance in the development of rhetoric. The recommendation of Aristotle, it is worth speculating, may have been important in the ready acceptance of Isocrates as a significant figure at a later date.

Of course, Isocrates' contribution to the Rhetoric either directly or indirectly is quite small and it is also impossible to determine whether or not Aristotle's views on rhetoric were influenced by Isocrates to any appreciable extent. However, it is clear that Isocrates' works, together with Aristotle's treatises on rhetoric,² were very influential in establishing rhetoric in the curriculum, as, indeed, the very centre and focus of attention in education. This joint influence was felt particularly in Roman education, not least by Cicero who viewed Aristotle and Isocrates as his twin authorities on

¹See Appendix B.

²Besides the Rhetoric, De Rhetorica ad Alexandra.

matters concerning rhetoric.¹ Cicero makes many specific references to the Rhetoric, but the most significant influence on Cicero's educational thought was rather that of Isocrates.

ii

The connection between Isocrates and Cicero in matters of style and political thought has already been established elsewhere.² Hubbell, in particular, has shown that the connection is strong enough to countenance the use of the word influence to describe the effect that Isocrates had on Cicero in political matters. Clearly, as there is a close connection in Isocrates' thought between politics and educational philosophy, it is reasonable to expect to find a similar connection between Isocrates' views on education and those of Cicero.

Cicero is the main link between Isocrates and later educational thought and practice. This is not to say that Cicero was merely a channel through which Isocratean ideas flowed on to posterity. Cicero adapted rather than adopted Isocratean notions. This process was necessary because of the radically different social, legal and political setting of Rome

¹H. M. Hubbell, The Influence of Isocrates on Cicero, Dionysius and Aristides (New Haven, 1914), pp. 16-17.

²Hubbell and also S. E. Smethurst, "Cicero and Isocrates," TAPA, LXXXIV, 1953, 262-320.

as compared to Athens. However we cannot ignore the fact that rhetoric, as the art of speaking in the assembly, underwent a revival during the last century before the birth of Christ, and in this kind of political activity Fourth Century Athens and Rome were not too radically different. The revival coincided with a return to a form of deliberative and participating government, which if it could not be described as democratic, did permit discussion and debate among those allowed to seat themselves in the Senate. Along with this revival of rhetoric and deliberative government went the codification of Roman Law which had far reaching effects on Roman education, effects which Isocrates had had no way of foretelling.

Nevertheless, it was a fact that once again the highest positions of power lay within the grasp of those who had not only the right qualification of birth but also a command of language. It therefore became a practical imperative for the select young men to receive a thorough grounding in the arts of rhetoric. What might have been only the occupation of a literary and dilettante few, became the standard education for all. This is true even if the revival of political oratory was doomed to last but a short time. The coming of the Augustinian Empire and its successors, like the coming of the Alexandrian Empire in Hellas, reduced political rhetoric

to the level of phrase-making. But the role of oratory in the Law-courts, which had come increasingly into prominence since the codification of the law, did not vanish quite so easily. Thus the original purpose of rhetoric served to perpetuate its existence long after it had lost its political effectiveness.

Cicero, writing in 55 B.C.,¹ could not foresee this eventual decline. His great work De Oratore although deeply concerned with the place of rhetoric in the Law-courts is also very attentive to its role in the political life of Rome. Indeed, as in Athens, the truly successful public figure almost of necessity had to be competent in both arenas, as was Cicero himself. Therefore, it is little wonder that Cicero turned for inspiration and ideas to Isocrates, whose whole philosophy was imbued with the need for political wisdom.

Much of Cicero's thought concerned specifically with education is to be found in the early pages of Book I of De Oratore and it is there also that we find most of the passages which can be related to Isocrates and his views on education. Above all there is a striking passage which closely

¹Cicero, De Oratore, trans. E. W. Sutton and H. Rackham, Loeb Classical Library (London, 1959), I, General Introduction, p. ix.

parallels the Hymn to Logos.¹ There are also 'harmonics,' similar to those in the works of Isocrates, in De Nature Deorum,² the Tusculanae Disputationes³ and De Inventiones.⁴ Hubbell notes⁵ that such passages in praise of eloquence and its function in promoting civilization are commonplaces at least as old as Isocrates. We may go further, however, and state that if Isocrates did not invent this kind of panegyric, he more than anyone made them popular and if he had a host of imitators, that is further proof of his own continued popularity in ancient times.

The passage in De Oratore is, however, more than another addition to the genre; it is almost a paraphrase of Isocrates and it is difficult to believe that Cicero was not very familiar with the passages in question. Indeed his enthusiasm for Isocrates is evident in several passages in his works. He calls him "that eminent father of eloquence,"⁶ "The Master of all rhetoricians,"⁷ and "the eminent professor."⁸

¹De Or., I, viii, 30-34. Nic., 5-9. Paneg., 48-50. Antid., 253-57.

²II, xiv, 37-39.

³V, ii, 5.

⁴I, i-iv, 2-5.

⁵Hubbell, p. 12.

⁶De Or., II, iii, 10.

⁷De Or., II, xxi, 94.

⁸De Or., III, ix, 36.

There is also, of course the Trojan Horse passage which we have already quoted.¹ In any event it is clear that the idea, commonplace or not, of the power of eloquence was congenial to him.

If we compare the two passages, as Hubbell has done,² we can observe the close parallels between them. They both, for instance, point out that it is speech which most clearly distinguishes men from animals and they do so in remarkably similar tones. Isocrates argues that:

In the other powers which we possess we are in no respect superior to other living creatures . . . [but] there has been implanted in us the power to persuade each other and to make clear to each other whatever we desire.³

Cicero similarly declares that:

The one point in which we have our greatest advantage over the brute creation is that we hold converse one with another and can reproduce our thought in words . . . wherein chiefly men are superior to animals.⁴

They agree further that this power has enabled man to become civilized. Isocrates says that:

Not only have we escaped the life of wild beasts, but we have come together and founded cities and made laws and invented arts; and generally speaking there is no institution devised by man which the power of speech has not helped us to establish.⁵

¹De Or., II, xxii, 94.

²Hubbell, pp. 27-8.

³Antid., 253-54.

⁴De Or., I, viii, 32-33.

⁵Antid., 254.

Cicero asks:

What other power could have been strong enough either to gather scattered humanity into one place, or to lead it out of its brutish existence in the wilderness up to our present condition of civilization as men and as citizens, or, after the establishment of social communities, to give shape to laws, tribunals and civic rights.¹

These last two lines are also reminiscent of Isocrates' declaration that:

This it is which has laid down laws concerning things just and unjust, and things honourable and base; and if it were not for these ordinances we should not be able to live with one another.²

Both the Isocratean and Ciceronian passages end in such a way as to speak most clearly of similarity. Isocrates says "And if there is need to speak in brief summary of this power,"³ whilst Cicero says "I will conclude the whole matter in a few words."⁴

Perhaps the most significant similarities between the various passages in Isocrates and those in Cicero, have to do with the place and role of each within the orations. The version of the Hymn in the Nicocles and the passage in praise of eloquence in De Inventione as well as that in

¹De Or., I, viii, 33.

²Antid., 255.

³Antid., 257.

⁴De Or., I, viii, 34.

De Oratore all occur in the early part of each work. The version of the Hymn in the Panegyricus, furthermore, occurs at the end of a long introductory section devoted to the origins of Athens, the characteristics of the Athenians and the value of oratory, not least when it is used in praise of Athens. Most importantly, especially in De Oratore, the passages in praise of logos or of eloquence, set the tone for the whole of each discourse.¹ In the Antidosis, if not at the beginning of the oration, the Hymn is at once the high point of the discourse and the dominant factor in the section devoted explicitly to education. It is apparent that Cicero shared with Isocrates a belief in the power and importance of logos, of eloquentia, and further that his treatment of the topic is so close that it is not out of place to suggest that it is a para-phrase of that of Isocrates.

However, the similarities between Isocrates and Cicero are not confined to this shared belief. In curriculum and teaching methods there are also striking similarities. We have already noted that Isocrates' curriculum was very broad and that it could be said to include virtually any subject that might happen to be needed by an orator in the composition of a discourse. Cicero also saw the need for an

¹Hubbell, p. 28.

orator to have at his command as great a knowledge as possible. He constantly reiterated this requirement.

A knowledge of very many matters must be grasped.¹

[No one can be an orator] who has not attained a knowledge of all important subjects and arts.²

No one should be numbered with the orators who is not accomplished in all those arts that befit the well-bred.³

[We need] to load and charge our mind with a delightful and plentiful variety of high matters in the greatest number.⁴

I therefore expect this perfect orator of ours to be familiar with all the theory of disputation which can be applied to speaking.⁵

However, just as we were able to isolate a core curriculum from the encyclopaedic curriculum that Isocrates advocated, so we are able to determine the main topics that would be covered in the creation of a 'doctus orator.' Indeed Cicero gives us an outline of the course in De Oratore. He insists, of course, on a thorough knowledge of Rhetoric. This includes language, as in Isocrates, but also memory-training and declamation.⁶ He also insists on debate, which is the same

¹De Or., I, v, 17.

²De Or., I, vi, 20.

³De Or., I, xvi, 72.

⁴De Or., III, xxx, 121.

⁵Cicero, Orator, trans. H. M. Hubbell, Loeb Classical Library (London, 1942), xxxii, 114.

⁶De Or., I, xxxiv, 154-56.

as the mock-contests ordained by Isocrates. Then, in a passage very Isocratean in its tone and content he declares that:

We must also read the poets, acquaint ourselves with histories, study and peruse the masters and authors in every excellent art.¹

A little later he declares that:

Besides this we must become learned in the common law and familiar with the statutes, and must contemplate all the olden time and investigate the ways of the senate, political philosophy, the rights of allies, the treaties and conventions and the policy of empire.²

The Ciceronian curriculum therefore appears to consist of Rhetoric, Literature, History, Law and Politics. It is thus very much like the Isocratean curriculum with the exception of the important place allotted to Law. It is also similar in that a great emphasis is placed on practical knowledge, such as the ways of the senate and the rights of the allies.

Rhetoric and Literature are the same twin aspects of logos on which Isocrates concentrated his attention. It is to be expected that Cicero would find them just as important. Cicero's stress on History is if anything more pronounced than that of Isocrates. He declares that History "bears witness to the passing of the ages, sheds light upon reality, gives,

¹ De Or., I, xxxiv, 158, cf. To Nic., 13. To Dem., 51.

² De Or., I, xxxiv, 159.

life to recollection and guidance to human existence and brings tidings of ancient days."¹ This is reminiscent of Isocrates' exhortation to "let the past be an exemplar for the future."² and his remark that "if you are mindful of the past you will plan better for the future."³ History, for both men, was most useful as a guide both to future action and to moral behaviour. Just as Isocrates praised the Council of the Areopagus as an ideal to be remembered by all Athenians, so did Cicero hold up the Twelve Tablets as the source of all that was good in Rome with their "weight of authority and wealth of usefulness alike."⁴ Cicero realised the educational value of History, as much as Isocrates did, not least because it could inculcate moral values, especially patriotic values. The orator "should also be acquainted with the history of the events of past ages, particularly of course, of our state."⁵

It should be noted that "Cicero was not the first Roman to emphasize the educational value of History, and in particular of national history."⁶ Cato and others had written

¹De Or., II, ix, 36.

²To Dem., 34.

³To Nic., 35.

⁴De Or., I, xliv, 195.

⁵Orator, xxxiv, 120.

⁶Aubrey Gwynn, Roman Education (Oxford, 1926), p. 102.

Histories of Rome. "Yet history was never taught as a separate subject in the Roman schools."¹ This, of course, is in accordance with Isocratean practice. However, History was undoubtedly accorded a high place by Cicero in his curriculum and it is difficult to believe that this was done without at least some reference to Isocrates' views on the matter. For one thing their reasons for including History were very similar. Again, knowing what we do of Cicero's admiration for Isocrates it is reasonable to expect that he was influential in guiding Cicero's thought.

Law, as we have noted, was a minor element in the Isocratean curriculum. Isocrates was not predominately concerned with producing men for the courts, but for the management of affairs. Cicero, however, was bound to try to produce both for he lived in a world which was much more legalistic than Athens had been. At the bare minimum, his students needed a thorough knowledge of statutes, as he indicated, but more than that they needed a knowledge of the processes of the Law, just as Isocrates' students had needed an understanding of the processes of government.

¹Gwynn, p. 102.

iii

When we come to the last subject in the Ciceronian curriculum, Politics, we are faced with some difficulty. Politics for Isocrates was an integral part of his educational system and it was the aim of that system to achieve effective political action. Yet there was nothing like political science or even Politics as a separate subject in his actual teaching. Cicero's aim was to produce men who were successful in both forensic and political arenas, and there was even less reason for him to include the study of Politics as a separate subject than there was for Isocrates. The difficulty is compounded by the fact that Gwynn, in his list of the studies in the Ciceronian curriculum, replaces Politics with Philosophy.¹ This brings us by a round about route to a very important area of similarity shared by Isocrates and Cicero.

The inclusion of Philosophy by Gwynn is very plausible. Certainly Cicero was well-acquainted with the work of philosophers from Socrates on.² Moreover he was a student for a time at the New Academy and was a pupil of Philo³ as well as various Stoics.⁴ He admired Plato, referring to "the

¹Gwynn, p. 118.

²Gwynn, pp. 69-78, for Cicero's education in philosophy.

³Gwynn, p. 76.

⁴Gwynn, p. 77.

admirable volumes of Plato,"¹ and to "Plato . . . with the voice of a god,"² and confessed that his own eloquence "comes not from the workshops of the rhetoricians but from the spacious grounds of the Academy . . . first trodden by the feet of Plato."³ Furthermore, he remarks the need for study of "the mysteries of nature, the subtleties of dialectic and human life and conduct."⁴ especially the latter, or in other words, of Physics, Logic, and Psychology, all 'philosophical' topics.

True as all this is, it is nevertheless somewhat misleading. Cicero's view of Philosophy, like that of Isocrates, was not the same as that of Plato or indeed of ourselves. Proof of this lies in the fact that his attacks on the Socratics and Platonists are fierce.

This is the source from which has sprung the undoubtedly absurd and unprofitable and reprehensible severance between the tongue and the brain, leading to our having one set of professors to teach us to think and another to speak.⁵

Persons who banter and ridicule the orator after the manner of Socrates in Plato's Gorgias just as if [rhetoric] did not include . . . the entire field of philosophy.⁶

¹De Or., III, iv, 15.

²De Or., I, xi, 49.

³Orator, iii, 12.

⁴De Or., I, xv, 68.

⁵De Or., III, xvi, 61.

⁶De Or., III, xxxi, 122.

This last phrase is very reminiscent of our analysis of the nature of Isocrates' philosophy. Cicero's criticism is aimed at the unnecessary division between rhetoric and philosophy and it is similar to the same criticism offered by Isocrates. Both of them believed that rhetoric and philosophy were united by their very natures.¹ It is difficult, in fact, to escape the conclusion that philosophy meant much the same to both Cicero and Isocrates. Even the fact of Cicero's attendance at the Academy does not prove that he was a philosopher in the Platonic sense of the term. He studied under two heads of the New Academy. One of them, Antiochus, was loyal to the old Academy and its methods; the other, Philo, with whom Cicero's name is more often connected, taught both rhetoric and philosophy.²

Cicero, like Isocrates, based his concept of philosophy on a union of thought and speech. This is inherent in the Isocratean idea of logos. It serves to point up the relative importance of the passages in praise of eloquence that we have already discussed. It was a tragedy

¹Hubbell, p. 23.

²Gwynn, pp. 114-15.

to Cicero that there should exist a breach between speech and thought and he was quite certain where the blame for this breach should be laid.

The whole study and practice of the liberal sciences is entitled philosophy. Socrates robbed them orators of this general designation, and in his discussions separated the science of wise thinking from that of elegant speaking, though in reality they are closely linked together.¹

Cicero was fighting over again the battle that Isocrates had fought centuries before. It may be assumed that to some considerable degree Cicero was aware of and inspired by the Isocratean arguments. If we are in any doubt as to where Cicero's sympathies lie, when he names the best men of the past his choice falls on Themistocles, Pericles, Theramenes, Gorgias, Thrasy Machus and Isocrates.² Of these, it must be noted, Theramenes and Gorgias were very influential in the education of Isocrates. All of these were men of action and also orators, "two careers that are inseparable."³ It may be argued that Isocrates fitted neither of these specifications, but in Cicero's view he did and he was, along with the other wise men, in marked contrast to Socrates.⁴

¹De Or., III, xvi, 60.

²De Or., III, xvi, 59.

³Ibid.

⁴De Or., III, xvi, 60.

Clearly Cicero finds most congenial the Fourth Century definition of philosophy, especially in the form espoused by Isocrates. The slight differences between the views of philosophy held by the two men are in the main occasioned by the fact that philosophy by Cicero's time had taken on a sense that had not commonly been granted to it during the Fourth Century. Thus Cicero sees philosophy as definitely inferior to rhetoric, whereas Isocrates endeavoured to present them as equivalent. Thus Cicero says,

I would prefer to be wise and unable to speak rather than to be a talkative fool; but when I am asked what is the highest excellence of all, I give the palm to the cultured orator.¹

The role of philosophy therefore is "to supply us with material for our eloquence as an orator."²

As regards the better term to use therefore, either Politics or Philosophy, it seems that our argument leads us to decide in favour of Philosophy, but Philosophy in the Isocratean and not the Platonic sense. Nor should we ignore the political component of the thought of the two men. Indeed in as much as their Philosophies were both eminently practical and in the truest sense political, perhaps the best term to

¹De Or., III, xxxv, 142-143.

²De Or., III, xxxv, 142.

use would be Political Philosophy. But behind this largely semantic difference lies the fact that Cicero was carrying on the Isocratean principle¹² that the curriculum should only be concerned with practical matters. It was this concern with the practical matters of government and state-craft that helped to make Cicero, and through him Isocrates, important in later Western education.

Before leaving the Ciceronian curriculum, two valid criticisms of it and, therefore, of the Isocratean curriculum need to be faced. First, it was always liable to become merely rhetorical and concerned only with elegant and ornate phrase-making with no depth and content. The charge is irrefutable and the only defence that may be offered on behalf of either Isocrates or Cicero was that they both presupposed a very close connection with the realities of any given situation and also with reality in general. They were only interested in practical results. If they were both concerned with culture, whether it be called paideia or humanitas, it was a practical culture that they envisaged. Their students ideally would be well-read, informed, capable, moral men-of-affairs who could be trusted to manage things for the benefit of themselves, their fellow-men and their country, not because of their belief in some abstract ethical ideal but because of their training in matters of practical moment. Education

in the Isocratean-Ciceronian mould was flexible and pragmatic at its best and it was these elements which made it the mainstay of European education despite its periods of rhetorical excesses.

Second, there is the charge that their theories led to shallowness and superficial learning. Again the charge is irrefutable. By the very nature of the broad curriculum that they both advocated, they exposed themselves to this danger. But conversely, because they in practice limited the range of subjects to the core curriculum, they themselves were to some extent able to avoid this danger. Although Isocrates, for instance, allowed even the 'eristic' subjects such as geometry and astronomy to have a place in the curriculum, largely because such learning "at any rate keeps the young out of many other things which are harmful,"¹ his ultimate criterion is whether or not a topic fits into his notion of practical culture. Normally such a criterion was more than whether or not it kept youngsters out of mischief. Similarly Cicero considers that as regards the "master sciences," "one only takes up so much of them as one really needs."² This phrase is in fact the key to their joint view of the broad curriculum and its application.

¹Panath., 26-27.

²De Or., III, xxiii, 87.

The teaching methods of the two men are similar but not as markedly so as their curricula. Both accepted the traditional teaching methods of their respective countries as a basis on which to build later learning. Both also felt that natural ability was more important to a good orator than any amount of practice. Cicero declared that:

Certain persons have noted and collected the doings of men who were naturally eloquent; thus eloquence is not the offspring of art, but art of eloquence.¹

He added that there "is also a certain practical training that you may undergo," a training "like that for the games."² This is identical to Isocrates' notions comparing rhetoric to wrestling. Cicero's teaching also included selection and ordering of material in the manner of Isocrates and arranging "them in the adornments of style."³ a phrase very reminiscent of the Athenian. It is true, however, that Cicero was concerned with the techniques of oratory, especially as regards memorizing and delivery, in a way that is quite alien to Isocrates.

A closer connection is in their mutual belief in mock contests as a way of training their students, and Cicero's comments on such contests lead him to a position as regards the writing of orations which is identical to that of Isocrates.

You propound some case, closely resembling such as are brought into court and argue it in a fashion as nearly as possible to real life.⁴

¹De Or., I, xxxii, 146.

²De Or., I, xxxi, 147.

³De Or., I, xxxi, 142.

⁴De Or., I, xxxiii, 149.

This is the same as Isocrates' insistence on reality, but Cicero warns, "most students, in so doing, merely exercise their voices."¹ He points out that:

Although there is a value in plenty of extempore speaking, it is still more serviceable to take time for consideration, and to speak better prepared and more carefully.²

He comments elsewhere:

The chief thing is what, to tell the truth, we do least (for it needs great pains which most of us shirk) to write as much as possible.³

Cicero is clearly in the Isocratean mould as regards written and extempore speeches. It is plain in general that there are very close parallels between the two men, parallels which it would be foolish to label as mere coincidences. It is by way of Cicero that the West received Isocrates' message. For even when Empire brought an end to political oratory and when later ultimate cataclysm brought Roman civilization itself to an end, the tradition established by Cicero, which was above all concerned with literary composition remained as if in response to his dictum that "The pen is the best and most eminent author and teacher of eloquence."⁴

¹De Or., I, xxxiii, 149.

²De Or., I, xxxiii, 150.

³De Or., I, xxxiii, 150.

⁴De Or., I, xxxiii, 150.

No one took more heed of this dictum than Quintilian. We now encounter for the first time the difficulty involved in separating the Isocratean from the Ciceronian in their joint tradition. Quintilian may show himself a disciple of Isocrates, as when he declares that "without natural gifts technical rules are useless."¹ But he is more likely to give the credit for such a statement to Cicero than to Isocrates, as when he declares that "Cicero has clearly shown . . . that the same men were regarded as uniting the qualifications of orator and philosopher."² If our previous analysis is correct, that is as much of an Isocratean as a Ciceronian notion. Of course Quintilian's debt to Cicero was enormous and he freely and frequently acknowledged it. He also quotes constantly from Cicero's works, citing him as the absolute authority. He does not ignore Isocrates completely however. He calls him:

The prince of instructors, whose works proclaim his eloquence no less than his pupils testify to his excellence as a teacher.³

He declares elsewhere that "the pupils of Isocrates were eminent in every branch of study,"⁴ and that "it is to the school of

¹Inst. Or., I, pr., 9. .

²Inst. Or., I, pr., 13. In reference to De Or., III, xv, 57. See also II, xv, 33-34.

³Inst. Or., II, viii, 11.

⁴Inst. Or., III, i, 14.

Isocrates that we owe the greatest orators."¹ However, there is something almost mechanical about these statements and it might be conjectured that his enthusiasm is merely a reflection of Cicero's. Certainly he does not refer to him as a theorist, nor does he refer very often to his works.² Other references are ^{to} innocuous aspects of Isocrates' style, such as his elegance,³ and his charm,⁴ or to his defects⁵ or to certain technical opinions held by Isocrates.⁶ He also offered a bland but friendly criticism, praising his style, but commenting that it is "better suited to the fencing school than the battlefield."⁷ This is an apt enough remark considering Isocrates' own references to the wrestling school.

There are many points of similarity of course, between Quintilian, Isocrates and Cicero. As regards curriculum for instance, History figures for all three, and is included for moral reasons, by Quintilian as by the other two.

¹Inst. Or., XII, x, 22.

²Helen and the Panegyricus in Inst. Or., III, viii, 9, and the alleged Isocratean Techne in II, xv, 4.

³Inst. Or., IX, iii, 74.

⁴Inst. Or., X, i, 108-109.

⁵Inst. Or., XII, x, 50 and IX, iv, 35.

⁶Inst. Or., III, v, 18 and IV, ii, 31-32.

⁷Inst. Or., X, i, 79.

For if the Greeks bear away the palm for moral precepts, Rome can produce more striking examples of moral performance, which is a far greater thing.¹

Quintilian who, like Isocrates was a practising school-master, although with much younger boys, used his experience to devise psychological and pedagogical reasons for adopting a broad curriculum. He knew of the limitations of his students' minds yet believed that "boys stand the strain better than young men,"² and suggested that it is "much easier . . . to do many things than to do one thing for a long time continuously."³

It is to be expected therefore that even his core curriculum should be broader than that of either Isocrates or Cicero, bearing in mind that for all three there were very few limits on what could be taught. It included Rhetoric, of course, which for him was mainly Grammar, but also, and for us significantly, Writing. He insisted that "the art of writing is combined with speaking,"⁴ thereby revealing the influence of Isocrates. He advocates Literature, "the interpretation of the poets,"⁵ and is thus far well within the Isocratean

¹Inst. Or., XII, ii, 30.

²Inst. Or., I, xii, 10.

³Inst. Or., I, xii, 7.

⁴Inst. Or., I, iv, 3.

⁵Inst. Or., I, iv, 2.

mould. But then he adds Music, Astronomy and Natural Philosophy,¹ and later Geometry.² In this way he created the basis for the Seven Liberal Arts familiar to the Middle Ages, by means of a fusion of the Isocratean-Ciceronian model with those of the Platonists and the Aristotelians.³

However, like Isocrates he did not believe that these subjects were to be taught in and of themselves. They were all subordinate to the one idea of producing "a good man skilled in speaking."⁴ This is Cato's phrase, but the idea it incorporates, namely that eloquence and morality are almost synonymous, is clearly Isocratean and quite different from the Platonic notion that knowledge and virtue are equivalent.

v

If Isocrates is indeed the Father of Humanism,⁵ it is necessary for us to make some connection between him and some outstanding Renaissance Humanists. In one respect

¹Inst. Or., I, iv, 4.

²Inst. Or., I, x, 34.

³The Seven are Rhetoric, Grammar, Dialectic, Music, Astronomy, Geometry and Arithmetic. However, Philosophy figures in some lists and Logic is preferred by some to the vaguer term Dialectic. Evidence for all these subjects can be found in Quintilian, who in true Isocratean fashion believed in a very broad curriculum.

⁴Inst. Or., XII, i, 1. See also I, Pr., 9, and Gwynn, p. 230.

⁵Jaeger, p. 46.

at least we can associate Isocrates with such men, those who wrote treatises after the manner of the Cyprian Orations containing advice from laymen to monarchs, especially concerning the education of princes.¹ Direct influence by Isocrates is, of course, another matter. This is especially so when we consider the works that were written before the beginning of the Renaissance, when it is difficult to prove that Isocrates was widely known. For instance there was John of Salisbury's Policratus of 1159 and St. Thomas Aquinas' De Regimine Principum of c. 1256. Nor is it safe to grant Isocrates much influence on Petrarch's De Republica optime administranda, written at about the same time as Aquinas' work and revived toward the end of the Fifteenth Century when the genre underwent a revival. It is entirely possible that all three works were inspired by the Cyprian Orations but there is little proof available for such an assertion.²

¹The Orations are To Demonicus, To Nicocles, Nicocles and Evagoras.

²John M. Major, Sir Thomas Elyot and Renaissance Humanism (Lincoln, Nebraska, 1964), p. 39. Unless otherwise specified, all references in this section to Renaissance literature have been verified in one or all of the following: The British Museum Catalogue of Printed Books, Photolithographic Edition to 1955. H. B. Lathrop, Translations from the Classics into English from Caxton to Chapman, 1477-1620. (Madison, Wisconsin, 1933), Foster Watson, English Writers on Education, 1480-1603 (Gainesville, Florida, 1967).

Later writers, especially in Italy, are a different matter. Franciscus Patricius Senensis, or Patrizi in the Italianate form (1412-1494), in his De Regno et regis institutione declared that:

Two books on kingship kept afloat and appeared in Italy; now they are read by everyone, to wit, Isocrates and Dio Prusensis [died c. 120 A.D.]. . . . Isocrates was a man thoroughly experienced in the art of speaking and living, from whose school (as the greatest of orators says) as from the Trojan horse innumerable "Princes" have come forth. . . . He left two books addressed to Nicocles, king of Cyprus in one of which gave advice to the king, in the other to his subjects.¹

Patrizi's work, according to Foster Watson was the model for The Boke named the Governour.² It was also translated into English by Richard Robinson in 1570, under the title of A Moral Method of Civil Policy.

With the prestige of Cicero to vouch for him and with this evidence that Isocrates' works were known in the Fifteenth Century, we may safely suppose that other Italian works of a similar nature were written in awareness of those of Isocrates. Among these we may include Baldessore Castiglione's Il Cortegiano, Giovanni Pontano's De Principe, Matteo Palimeri's

¹De Regno et Regis institutione, I, 4. Quoted in Allan H. Gilbert, Machiavelli's Prince and its Forerunners (New York, 1938), p. 12, n. 33.

²Watson, p. 4.

Libri della vita Civile and perhaps even Niccolo Machiavelli's Il Principe. Certainly as regards the latter the dedication is almost a paraphrase of the dedication written by Isocrates in To Nicocles. Consider for instance these two passages, Isocrates first.

When men make it a habit, Nicocles, to bring to you who are rulers of kingdoms, articles of dress, or of bronze, or of wrought gold or other such valuables of which they themselves have need and you have plenty . . .¹

Those who court the favour of princes present them with whatever they possess that is rare, curious or valuable, as horses, armour, embroidery or precious stones.²

Both men go on to contrast their own offerings which are advice and knowledge and in their eyes more valuable than all the other treasures. Machiavelli asserts that his knowledge comes from experience and "a diligent perusal of ancient writers."³ One of them must have been Isocrates.

Non-Italians also wrote to or for Princes, notably the Frenchman Guillaume Budé who published De l'institution du Prince in 1541, the Spaniard Christoval de Villalon who

¹To Nic., 1.

²Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, ed. Rossiter Johnson (New York, 1907), p. xxi. Both writers may be borrowing from Homer, The Odyssey, XVI, 231.

³Ibid.

wrote El Scholastico in about 1540 and of course Erasmus, whose book The Education of a Christian Prince appeared in 1516. So far we have been able only to show that certain authors wrote in the genre that Isocrates devised and to suggest that some of them used certain of his ideas. But with Erasmus we are on much safer ground in claiming that his educational thought was influenced by that of Isocrates, for he makes plain his debt. As early as 1501 Erasmus had discovered Isocrates for himself and sent a copy of his works along with those of Euripides to Nicholas Benserad.¹ Then in the dedication to the Christian Prince he tells us that "we have done into Latin Isocrates' precepts on ruling a kingdom,"² which may be a reference to his translation of To Nicocles which was published in the same year, 1516, to be followed a year later by a translation of To Demonicus.³ But he seems rather to mean that his work is simply a Christian version of the principles expounded by Isocrates and not merely a translation, for he declares that:

¹The Epistles of Erasmus, ed. Francis M. Nichols (New York, 1962), I, 330 and 334.

²Desiderius Erasmus, The Education of a Christian Prince, trans. Lester K. Born (New York, 1936), p. 135.

³He also wrote a work entitled the Panegyricus in 1503. Born, in The Education of a Christian Prince, p. 5.

We have fashioned ours, set off with subject headings so as to be less inconvenient to the reader, after the fashion of his.¹

At the very least therefore, Isocrates is the inspiration of Erasmus' major work on education. He cautions that the

Sophist was instructing a young king, or rather a tyrant, one pagan instructing another. I, a theologian, am acting the part of teacher to a distinguished and pure-hearted prince -- one Christian to another.²

But the point of interest for us is that Erasmus is deliberately aping the work of Isocrates and it is to be expected that Isocratean ideas found a place in The Education of a Christian Prince.

The connection between Isocrates and Erasmus is important when we turn to English writers of the period because so many of them were influenced by Erasmus and admired his work. It is not surprising, therefore to find that Sir Thomas Elyot is an admirer of Isocrates. Indeed "few ancient authors are closer in spirit to the author of the Governour."³ Consider this passage from the Boke.

Isocrates, concerning the lesson of orators, is everywhere wonderful profitable, having almost as many wise sentences as he hath words, and with that is so sweet and delectable to read that, after him, almost all others seem

¹ The Education of a Christian Prince, p. 135.

² Ibid.

³ Major, p. 166.

unsavoury and tedious; and in persuading as well a prince as a private person to virtue, in two very little and compendious works, whereof he made the one to King Nicocles, the other to his friend Demonicus, would be perfectly conned and had in continual memory.¹

There can be little doubt that Isocrates had a great influence with Elyot, especially as he, like Erasmus, translated one of the "very little and compendious works," namely To Nicocles. It appeared in 1534 under the title of The Doctrinal of Princes. The fact that it was a translation into English, thereby falling in with Isocrates' injunction to master the vernacular, takes on an added significance when we consider that Elyot has been named as the originator of true English Prose.² Indeed H. B. Lathrop was of the opinion that he did so under the decided influence of Isocrates.

For Elyot, he [Isocrates] was the guide and the foundation not only of practical morals, but of style; and English prose, which had been rough and incondite or naively unformed, is by Elyot regularized, not only made accurate in syntax, but made, so far as he could make it, flowing in movement, and given a pattern after the ideas of Isocrates.³

¹ Sir Thomas Elyot, The Book named the Governour, ed. S. E. Lehmborg, Everyman Library (London, 1962), p. 35.

² Lathrop, p. 43.

³ Ibid.

If we accept this and also accept Lathrop's assertion that Isocrates was "the fundamental creator of prosaic prose, of prose which was comely without borrowing the special beauty of poetry,"¹ then we must accept that either by way of Cicero or of Sir Thomas Elyot, Isocrates has had a profound influence on the English language. The educational implications of this fact, great as they are, may only be noted at this point. But also we must not lose sight of the fact that through the Boke of the Governour Isocratean ideas on education were firmly implanted in England, especially those applicable to the education of gentlemen. It was after all but a short step from the education of princes to the education of gentlemen. Lathrop deserves to be quoted again at some length.

Isocrates is the great founder of that school of practical but not ungenerous prudential morality which was a part of the training for active life given by the rhetorical schools of Greece to those who were to be leaders of men. His tradition passed on into the Roman schools and gained renewed life at the Renaissance, effecting the ideals of the "Prince", the "Magistrate," and the "Gentleman." . . . The moral ideal and discipline . . . passed on through the Greek schools to the Roman and the Christian, to Cicero, Quintilian, Libanius, even to Augustine, Basil, and to Chrysostom, to Guarina and Vittorino and to St. Pauls, Winchester, Eton and Harrow.²

¹Lathrop, p. 42.

²Lathrop, pp. 42-43.

Of course it went to those places and others of the same kind, as witness the motto over the door of Shrewsbury school,¹ but it did not stop there. If Isocrates is granted some place in the foundation of English Public schools he must be granted a place in the foundation of Italian Merchant Schools, of German Gymnasia and French Lycées, for he affected education throughout the West. Nor was his influence only felt in the schools of the nobility but in the schools of the middle classes and in the last analysis in any school in which morality and literacy go hand in hand.

This account of Isocrates' influence in comparatively recent times must be left incomplete. But there is no doubt that his influence has been great. Isocrates is together with Plato, one of the twin pillars of Western Education.² The very minimum claim that can be made for him is that he had an "immense and abiding influence on Graeco-Roman education."³ This is not to say that that influence has always been for good. But if we admit that claim, then we must admit his claim to being one of the two great founders of Western Education simply because of the debt we owe to Graeco-Roman education.

¹To Dem., 18 "If you love knowledge, you will be a master of knowledge."

²H. I. Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity, trans. G. Lamb (London, 1956), p. 91.

³Gwynn, p. 46.

There are many particular examples of the influence Isocrates has had on Western Education, his championship of History, the emphasis he placed on practical learning and the teaching methods he advocated. But the one idea which assured his thought a place in Western Education was his espousal of Rhetoric. It is this which makes his work still relevant today. For "without rhetoric, designated by whatever name, liberal education cannot successfully humanize and civilize the young."¹ Above all it is wise to remember his declaration that, "none of the things which are done with intelligence are done without the aid of logos."²

¹Donald L. Clark, Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education (New York, 1957), p. 264.

²Antid., 257.

Appendix A.

The Pupils of Isocrates

The main source for the pupils of Isocrates is Friedrich Blass, Die Attische Beredsamkeit (Leipzig, 1874), vol. II. Others include: Cicero, De Oratore, trans. E. W. Sutton and H. Rackham, Loeb Classical Library (London, 1959). E. Curtius, The History of Greece, trans. A. W. Ward (London, 1873), vol. V. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, trans. R. D. Hicks, Loeb Classical Library (London, 1925). R. C. Jebb, The Attic Orators (New York, 1962).

Pupils

Source

Aeschines of Arcadia	Blass, p. 61. Diogenes Laertius, II, 64.
Anaxagoras	Blass, p. 61. Diogenes Laertius, II, 15.
Androtion	Blass, p. 19. Jebb, p. 48.
Anticles	Blass, p. 19. <u>Antid.</u> , 93-94.
Aphareus Adoptius	Blass, pp. 56, 71, 73.
Asclepiades of Tragilos	Blass, p. 57.
Astydamus the Younger	Blass, p. 56.
Autocrator	Blass, p. 59. <u>To Tim.</u> , 10.
Callippus	Blass, p. 18. <u>Antid.</u> , 93-94.
Cephisodorus	Blass, p. 451-453.
Charmantides	Blass, p. 19. <u>Antid.</u> , 93-94.
Clearchus of Heracleia	Blass, p. 58. <u>To Tim.</u> , 12.

<u>Pupils</u>	<u>Source</u>
Dinarchus	<u>De Or.</u> , II, xxiii, 94.
Diodotus	Blass, p. 59. <u>To Ant.</u> , 1.
Diophantus	Blass, p. 55. <u>Mytilene</u> , 8.
Dioscurides	Blass, p. 60.
Ephorus	Blass, p. 427. Jebb, p. 13.
Eunomos	Blass, p. 18. <u>Antid.</u> , 93-94.
Hieronymous of Arcadia	Blass, p. 60.
Hypereides	Blass, p. 56.
Isaeus	Blass, pp. 58, 488, 521, 523. <u>De Or.</u> , II, xxiii, 94.
Isocrates of Appollonia	Jebb, p. 11. Blass, p. 449.
Kokkos	Blass, p. 56.
Krates of Tralleis	Diogenes Laertius, IV, 23. Blass, p. 61.
Lacritus of Phaselis	Blass, p. 57.
Leodamas of Acharnae	Blass, p. 55. Jebb, p. 12.
Lycurgus	Blass, p. 56. <u>De Or.</u> , II, xxiii, 94.
Lysitheides	Blass, p. 18. <u>Antid.</u> , 93-94.
Metrodorus	Blass, p. 60.
Naucrates	Blass, p. 447. <u>De Or.</u> , II, xxiii, 94.
Nicocles	Blass, p. 54. <u>Evag.</u> , 78. <u>Antid.</u> , 40.
Onetor	Blass, p. 19. <u>Antid.</u> , 93-94.
Philiscus of Miletus	Blass, p. 453. <u>De Or.</u> , II, xxiii, 94.

<u>Pupils</u>	<u>Source</u>
Philomelus	Blass, p. 17. <u>Antid.</u> , 93-94.
Philonides	Blass, p. 19. <u>Antid.</u> , 93-94.
Python of Byzantium	Blass, p. 59.
Speusippus	Jebb, p. 13. Blass, p. 68 and p. 105. Blass refers to Speusippus as an opponent of Isocrates.
Straton	Blass, p. 61. Diogenes Laertius, IV, 23.
Theodectes	Blass, p. 441.
Theopompus	Jebb, p. 13. Blass, p. 400.
Timotheus	<u>Antid.</u> , 101-139, esp. 104. Blass, p. 52.

Appendix B

References to Isocrates and his works in the Rhetoric
of Aristotle

<u>Rhetoric</u>	<u>Works of Isocrates</u>
1368a 4	<u>Evag.</u> , 45. <u>Panath.</u> , 32
1368a 20	
1392b 10	
1399a 2, 4.	<u>Helen</u> , 18-38, 41-48. <u>Evag.</u> , 51ff
1399b 10	<u>Antid.</u> , 173.
1408b 15	<u>Paneg.</u> , 96, 186.
1409b 34	<u>Paneg.</u> , 1.
1410a 1-4	<u>Paneg.</u> , 35-36.
1410a 5	<u>Paneg.</u> , 41.
1410a 6	<u>Paneg.</u> , 48.
1410a 9	<u>Paneg.</u> , 72.
1410a 10	<u>Paneg.</u> , 89.
1410a 11	<u>Paneg.</u> , 105.
1410a 13	<u>Paneg.</u> , 149.
1410a 15	<u>Paneg.</u> , 181.
1410a 16	<u>Paneg.</u> , 186.
1410b 29	<u>To Phil.</u> , 73.
1411a 30	<u>To Phil.</u> , 12.
1411b 11	<u>Paneg.</u> , 151.
1411b 15	<u>Paneg.</u> , 172.
1411b 18	<u>Paneg.</u> , 180.

Rhetoric

Works of Isocrates

1411b 20

Peace., 120.

1411b 28

To Phil., 10.

1411b 29

To Phil., 127.

1412b 6

To Phil., 61, Paneg., 119,
Peace., 101.

1414b 27

Helen, 1-13.

1414b 33

Paneg., 1, 2.

1418a 31-33

Paneg., 110-114. Peace., 27.

1418a 34

Helen, 23-28, 41-48. Bus., 21-29,
38-40. Panath., 72-84

1418b 27

To Phil., 4-7. Antid., 132-38, 141-49

1418b 35

Arch., 50.

Appendix C

Correspondences between the Antidosis of Isocrates
and the Apology of Plato.

Some of these may be rhetorical common-places and not indications of imitation by Isocrates.

<u>Antidosis</u>	<u>Apology</u>
5	17b
15	19b
19	32
20	30c. Also 20e.
21	37a-b.
26	17d.
28	An echo of the fact that Socrates was facing the death penalty, which Isocrates was not, of course.
30	23c-d.
33 and 240	33d.
50	20d,e.
92	33a-b.
95 and 301	36d.
100	34a.
177	32d.
241	34a-b.
272	38c.
294	29d.
321	34c.
323	35d.

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